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A
t the heart of Sustainable Development Law & Policy’s
mission is the promotion of sound development practices,
and at the heart of all sound development practices is a for-
ward thinking energy policy. Very few subjects permeate through
other areas of sustainable development as much as the impacts from
traditional energy exploration, production, trade, and use. 
Climate change is recognized as an international issue
necessitating action from the global community. However,
energy issues must be examined at the forefront of any effective
climate agenda. For example, within the United States, energy-
related carbon dioxide emissions resulting from fossil fuel com-
bustion make up approximately 82 percent of our anthropogenic
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions and 25 percent of all global
emissions.1 As the legal community tackles global warming, a
reevaluation of energy consumption and production must occur
because these activities are the largest contributor of GHG and
the resultant climate problem. 
In short, our energy dependencies have resulted in the need
to increase regulation and decrease consumption. As one of the
few industrialized nations left without comprehensive GHG reg-
ulations, the United States is loathe to be left out of the race in
the development of new, clean, and efficient technologies to sus-
tain our consumptive energy needs. The United States’ global
competitiveness and international credibility to support sound
energy policies has been dim. However, the recent Supreme
Court case Massachusetts v. EPA2 results in a glimmer of hope
that change is on the horizon. This decision allows the EPA to
regulate carbon dioxide and pushes the federal government
towards curbing GHG emissions from automobiles. This also
strengthens the position of individual states leading the way with
progressive energy regulations and GHG reductions. The future
of energy policy in the United States is unknown, but as the
greatest contributor of GHG gases, change must occur.
The planet cannot afford an energy policy that does not take
into account environmental and climate impacts, just as it cannot
afford to have a climate policy that ignores energy impacts. We
hope this issue serves as a useful tool for those in the legal com-
munity, policy makers, and informed citizens who are working
to ensure a sustainable energy future as we face the challenge of
powering the 21st century.
Kelly Rain Maria Vanko
EDITORS-IN-CHIEF
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G
lobal warming is the most serious and profound impact
associated with energy production and consumption.
New energy policies may or may not aid in lowering
global warming pollution. A rigorous climate security frame-
work is essential to ensure the nation’s collective energy invest-
ments drive global warming pollution to dramatically lower
levels. In the United States, environmental advocates have
pressed for a protective, declining national cap on global warm-
ing pollution to spur investments in low carbon energy technolo-
gies and to inextricably align energy policy with the imperative
of science-based greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reductions. While
comprehensive national legislation to cap and reduce global
warming pollution is essential, existing law should be fully
enforced to harmonize today’s energy production and consump-
tion practices with climate security.  
On April 10, 1998, then U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) General Counsel Jonathan Cannon determined
the Clean Air Act empowered EPA to regulate carbon dioxide, a
principal heat-trapping gas.1 On April 2, 2007, the United States
Supreme Court agreed. In Massachusetts v. EPA,2 the high Court
held the statute’s “sweeping” definition of “air pollutant”
“embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe.” “Carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons”—all
principal GHGs—“are without a doubt ‘physical [and] chemical.
. . substance[s] which [are] emitted into . . . the ambient air.’” 
The case made its way to the Supreme Court because EPA
under the Bush administration decidedly reversed the Cannon
legal opinion. EPA refused to establish emission limits for GHGs,
withdrew the Cannon legal memorandum, and inserted in its place
a new legal memo categorically declaring: “the CAA does not
authorize EPA to regulate for global climate change purposes.”3
The resulting delay in progress comes at a high cost. In the
nine years since the April 1998 Cannon memorandum, U.S.
sources alone discharged more than 60 billion tons of carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere.4 The extensive volumes of pollu-
tion escaping federal regulation perilously elevate carbon diox-
ide levels to the highest concentrations in 650,000 years.5 The
scientific imperative for strict limits on global warming gases
has become grim and urgent. 
But the Bush administration has staunchly refused to adopt
mandatory national pollution limits on carbon dioxide levels or to
participate in binding multinational accords. Internationally, the
United States has devolved from a principal architect of the world’s
global warming policy to a marginal participant. Domestically,
EPA has stymied rather than enabled state climate initiatives.6
The states alone have devised meaningful corrective action.
States are adopting science-based timetables and goals to reduce
global warming pollution, and the blueprints for achieving these
reductions. The California Global Warming Solutions Act of
2006 requires returning GHG emissions—statewide—to 1990
levels by 2020.7 California’s urgent race to achieve these reduc-
tions is buffeted by an array of energy policy measures including
laws to limit global warming pollution from motor vehicle
tailpipes, expansive requirements for energy efficiency and
renewable electricity generating resources, and the nation’s first
GHG emission limits for power plants. 
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OVERVIEW: INTERSECTION OF CLIMATE SECURITY WITH ENERGY
PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
by Vickie Patton*
* Vickie Patton is a senior attorney at Environmental Defense, a non-partisan,
non-profit science-based organization dedicated to climate security. 
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Numerous states have advanced mandatory limits on global
warming pollution while national policy has retreated. A coali-
tion of eastern states crafted a regional cap on carbon dioxide
from the power sector. Five western states are now collaborating
on a regional global warming pollution abatement program. With
California, a dozen states east and west, have adopted programs
to curb GHGs from motor vehicle tailpipes. These tailpipe limits
now implicate over one-third of the U.S. motor vehicle fleet and
two percent of the total GHGs in the Earth’s atmosphere. 
The diligence observed in the states sharply contrasts with
the national political climate on global warming. Some oppo-
nents of national action argue the Clean Air Act’s muscular
power to address global warming should atrophy while Congress
considers legislation. But, while Congress deliberates, the
world’s largest coal company has hired former House Majority
Leader Dick Gephardt to fight legislative limits on carbon diox-
ide.8 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s historic decision, the
forces of delay and diminishing returns are circling the beltway. 
At the same time, countervailing forces for national leader-
ship could not be more compelling. The science commands a
protective, comprehensive solution. The states have incubated
new policies and technologies that can be readily scaled up for
national application. Major businesses such as Caterpillar and
Shell have allied with conservationists in calling for rigorous
caps on global warming pollution.9
A thorough, rigorous, and swift congressional response is
essential for climate security. It is also the case that climate security
requires EPA to end the decadal delay since the Cannon opinion
and implement existing law now, during the deliberations over
national legislation to ensure energy practices and policies are
promptly harmonized with greenhouse gas emission reduction
imperatives. This two-pronged approach to secure a safe climate is
rooted in science, economics, law and politics. Such a two-pronged
approach to climate security could capture the following elements: 
• The present value of today’s reductions. Immediate EPA
administrative action during the pendency of congres-
sional debate will help forestall the serious geopolitical
consequences of a destabilized climate system. Putting in
place a climate policy framework for today’s energy
investments will blunt the economic impacts of regulatory
action that is delayed and will immediately advance inno-
vation. Timely action today will stave off the severe social
costs and compliance costs wrought by climate change.
• Informed colloquy between legislative and executive
branches. Prompt EPA regulatory action, unbridled by the
tightly held political reins of the current Administration,
would help engage the valuable expertise of EPA’s career
technical staff in the national dialogue over climate secu-
rity policy design and implementation. 
• Smooth Transitions. Should executive branch policies leap-
frog ahead of congressional action in a race to address cli-
mate security, newly adopted administrative polices can be
integrated with a legislative response to smooth the transition.
• Limiting global warming pollution from coal plants and
industrial activities. The Clean Air Act is expansive in pro-
viding for the regulation of global warming from coal
plants and industrial activities - both new and existing. For
example, every major new industrial facility is required to
maximize the emission reductions of each pollutant sub-
ject to regulation under the Clean Air Act including carbon
dioxide and other GHGs.10 Further, the Clean Air Act calls
for standards of performance limiting emissions from cat-
egories of stationary sources, both new and existing, that
are anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 
• Curbing Global Warming Pollution from Engines and
Tailpipes. The statute is likewise sweeping in providing for
the establishment of GHG emission limits for new motor
vehicles, motorcycles, aircraft, and large diesel engines
and equipment.11
• A Supreme Constraint on Evading Responsibility. The
endangerment test at issue in Massachusetts v. EPA is rou-
tinely the trigger for regulatory action under the Clean Air
Act. The Supreme Court cabined EPA’s discretion to avoid
responsibility for global warming pollution by rejecting
EPA’s reliance on a “laundry list” of factors extraneous to
the endangerment test. EPA must tightly adhere to the statu-
tory factors. EPA may refuse to regulate only if it finds that
GHG emissions do not endanger public health or welfare.
EPA does not, according to the Court, have “a roving license
to ignore the statutory text.” So Massachusetts v. EPA not
only held that global warming pollution is subject to regula-
tion under the Clean Air Act but it sharply curtailed EPA’s
latitude to evade remedial action for such pollutants. 
• State Sovereignty. The balance of power between state and
federal governments under the Clean Air Act has largely
equilibrated through some 40 years of implementation
experience. The statute pointedly protects states’ preroga-
tives to regulate more rigorously with some very narrowly
delineated exceptions. Federal climate policy has much to
learn from the Clean Air Act’s deeply rooted preservation
of state power to exceed minimum federal standards.
In a world where scores of lives and livelihoods are precari-
ously synchronized with current climatic conditions, there is
simply no time to waste. An endeavor today to tightly integrate
energy practices, investments and policies with climate security
through robust implementation of existing law while breath-
lessly pursuing comprehensive congressional action is a prudent
and urgent race against time. 
This issue of Sustainable Development Law & Policy explor-
ing sustainable energy could not be timelier. Many of the current
issues contained within the energy and climate nexus that are
essential for the next generation of policy are discussed. Contrib-
utors explore the need to develop clean energy projects, discussing
sustainable finance, waste to energy projects and experiences with
the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol.
Moreover, case studies examine the experience implementing
renewable portfolio standards and ethanol policies in U.S. states
and transaction costs of emission trading programs in Germany.
Additionally, various other critical issues, including the impacts
on biofuel development on water scarcity and the need for climate
change adaptation and mitigation are explored.
Endnotes: Overview on page 70
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EMERGING STANDARDS FOR SUSTAINABLE
FINANCE OF THE ENERGY SECTOR
by Kirk Herbertson and David Hunter*
* Kirk Herbertson is a Law Fellow at the Institute for Governance & Sustainable
Development in Washington, DC. David Hunter is Assistant Professor of Law at
American University’s Washington College of Law and Director of its Program on
International and Comparative Environmental Law.
INTRODUCTION
T
he energy sector relies heavily on large-scale projects,
advanced technology, and complex infrastructure, and
thus relies heavily on project finance and other invest-
ments from international financial institutions (“IFIs”). World-
wide, the average annual investment in energy is around U.S.
$413 billion.1 This amount is increasing, particularly in the
developing world. Developing countries will require an esti-
mated annual investment in electricity of U.S. $165 billion
through 2010, which will increase about three percent per year
through 2030.2 Because of the magnitude of their investments in
the energy sector, IFIs have the potential to profoundly affect
future energy paths. 
Because of this influence, civil society advocates are pres-
suring IFIs to develop a variety of environmental and social poli-
cies that can influence the types of energy projects they will
finance and how those projects must be implemented. Through
these efforts, many energy-related projects have been scrutinized
(and in some cases rejected) for their contributions to severe
environmental degradation, involuntary resettlement of poor and
marginalized communities, or the inequitable allocation of proj-
ect benefits and costs. Controversy around such projects affects
the availability and conditionality of international finance for
future proposed energy projects. More recently, civil society
activists have also begun to focus on the climate change impacts
of IFI energy lending, and have begun to push changes they hope
will shift IFI lending portfolios away from fossil fuel projects
towards renewable energy or energy efficiency investments.
These trends can be expected to continue in the future, with
increasingly strict standards applying to the energy sector. 
This article surveys the environmental and social policies at
the IFIs as they relate to the energy sector. After discussing the
general impacts of IFIs on the energy sector, the article describes
existing and emerging environmental and social policies that
impact IFI support for the energy sector. This survey then
addresses policies relating to general development impacts, cli-
mate change policies, and policies aimed at specific energy sec-
tors (such as dams, renewables, or nuclear energy).
THE EMERGING ENVIRONMENTAL
AND SOCIAL STANDARDS FOR IFIS
At least among public IFIs, the World Bank Group is the
recognized leader for influencing developing countries’ eco-
nomic and development paths. The World Bank Group is com-
prised of four separate, but related, financial institutions: the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(“IBRD”), the International Development Association (“IDA”),
the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), and the Multilat-
eral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”).3 IBRD and IDA
provide loans to support public-sector projects. Together IBRD
and IDA are most frequently referred to as the “World Bank.”
The primary difference between the IBRD and IDA is that IDA
provides concessional or low-cost loans to the poorest countries
(those having per capita annual income below U.S. $1065 in
2005 dollars).4 The IBRD provides loans to other developing
countries and countries in economic transition at a near-market
rate with longer repayment terms than commercial loans. The
IFC and MIGA provide financial support to private sector proj-
ects in all developing countries or countries in economic transi-
tion. IFC makes loans and equity investments in private sector
projects. MIGA provides insurance against political risks faced
by private sector investments in developing countries (i.e. risks
from civil unrest or war). 
The World Bank Group is the largest source for develop-
ment financing in the world. Each year the Group supports
approximately U.S. $20 billion in projects and leverages an addi-
tional U.S. $50 billion from other financial institutions. From
1992 to 2004, the World Bank Group financed approximately
U.S. $28 billion towards fossil fuel projects.5 But the influence
of the World Bank Group extends far beyond the monetary value
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Construction of hydro-electric dams, such as this one in Tajikistan, often causes
substantial social and environmental harm.
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of its investments. The Group is the recognized intellectual
leader among development organizations, often setting prece-
dents for other institutions to follow. The Group’s influence is
expanded further by coordinating with other donors, mobilizing
bilateral and increasingly private-sector financing, conducting
policy research, and providing technical assistance to borrowing
countries. 
Beginning in the 1970s, independent observers began to
recognize that the World Bank and other IFIs were providing
support for some of the most environmentally damaging projects
taking place in developing countries. These projects, including
several large energy infrastructure projects, were often associ-
ated with allegations of severe environmental destruction, human
rights abuses, and long-term
harm to the economic well-being
of the poor in the project area.
Even assuming good intentions,
the size and scale of many of the
projects simply dwarfed the
legal and policy infrastructure of
the borrowing country.6
In response, pressure from
environmental and human rights
groups pushed IFIs to address
the sustainable development
impacts of the projects they
finance.7 As part of their
response, first the World Bank,
and then other IFIs, adopted
environmental and social policy
frameworks that provide certain
protections for local communi-
ties affected by the projects. The environmental assessment pol-
icy is the cornerstone of the Bank’s safeguard policy system. All
World Bank-financed projects are screened into three categories
depending on the extent of environmental impacts associated
with the project. “Category A” projects, which have “significant
adverse impacts that may be sensitive, irreversible and diverse,”
must undergo a full environmental assessment, with specific
requirements for consultation and disclosure. “Category B”
projects have adverse impacts that “are less significant than Cat-
egory A impacts. Preparation of a mitigatory plan suffices for
many Category B projects.” “Category C” projects normally do
not require any environmental analysis “because the project is
unlikely to have adverse impacts.”8 In general, about ten percent
of World Bank projects are classified as Category A, and signifi-
cantly more (57 percent in 2005) are classified as Category B. In
addition to environmental assessment, the World Bank environ-
mental and social policies include, among other things, specific
policies relating to involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples,
and natural habitats. 
Other IFIs, including multilateral development banks
(“MDBs”) such as the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank, commercial banks such as
Citibank and ABN Amro, and export credit and insurance agen-
cies (“ECAs”) such as the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the
UK’s Export Credits Guarantee Department, have all followed
the World Bank Group’s lead in developing environmental and
social standards. Even though many of these IFIs do not share
the World Bank’s development mandate, they increasingly
understand that setting environmental and social requirements
for projects lowers project risk and the institution’s own reputa-
tional risk.9 Thus, for example, ECAs, which are bilateral agen-
cies that provide project finance, guarantees, or insurance to
promote a country’s exports and investments abroad, adopted the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) Recommendations on Common Approaches on Envi-
ronment and Officially Supported Export Credits.10 While the
OECD Common Approaches
bind the ECAs to relatively few
commitments, they explicitly
require ECAs to benchmark
their projects against other envi-
ronmental and social standards,
including those of the World
Bank Group’s safeguard poli-
cies.11 Many individual ECAs
have also adopted more specific
environmental and social poli-
cies that have significant impli-
cations for their support of the
energy sector.12
Perhaps even more impor-
tantly, in 2003, a group of lead-
ing commercial banks committed
to adhere to the “Equator Princi-
ples,” which essentially incor-
porate the IFC’s environmental and social standards.13 The
Principles have now been adopted by commercial banks that col-
lectively arrange more than 80 percent of all international proj-
ect finance in developing countries.14 In addition, many of these
commercial banks have issued separate environmental and
social policies that go well beyond the requirements of the Equa-
tor Principles (or those of the IFC).15
POLICIES IMPLICATING THE ENERGY SECTOR
For the most part, IFI environmental and social policies
have not specifically targeted the energy sector. Although the
World Bank, for example, has developed lending strategies for
the energy sector, no policy establishes environmental and social
conditions specifically for energy-sector lending. Nonetheless,
concern over the development impacts, and more recently the
climate impacts, of the energy sector have led to policies that
directly bear on the future of IFI financial support. 
DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS
Many of the most controversial projects supported by IFIs in
recent years have been energy projects. These projects have
engendered stiff international opposition from civil society net-
works, primarily motivated by a belief that these projects do not
provide sufficient development benefits for, and impose unaccept-
Observers began to
recognize that the 
World Bank and other
IFIs were providing
support for some of the
most environmentally
damaging projects in
developing countries.
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ably high costs on, local affected communities. In some instances,
these campaigns led to stronger environmental and social condi-
tionalities being placed on the projects, including for example the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (environmental and human rights
conditions),16 the Chad-Cameroon pipeline (environmental and
revenue management requirements),17 and the Sakhalin II Oil and
Gas project off of Russia (expanded protections of whales and
salmon habitat).18 Some projects were precluded from receiving
financial support from specific institutions, including the Camisea
pipeline in Peru (financing rejected by the U.S. Export-Import
Bank due to environmental and social concerns),19 and China’s
massive Three Gorges dam (both the World Bank and the U.S.
Export-Import Bank refused financial support).20 Still others have
been cancelled (or at least delayed) due to these campaigns,
including the Ilisu hydroelectric dam in Turkey21 and Uganda’s
Bujagali dam.22
These projects were delayed,
modified, or cancelled because
of their failure to meet the envi-
ronmental and social conditions
that IFIs placed on them, in
order to improve the develop-
ment impacts. Although the
environmental and social poli-
cies applicable to each project
depend both on the proposed
lending institutions and the pro-
ject’s specific impacts, in gen-
eral the policies fall into five
categories: (1) policies relating
to environmental and social assessment; (2) policies relating 
to information disclosure23 and community consultation;24
(3) policies intended to ensure full compensation to people
involuntarily resettled;25 (4) policies meant to protect the rights
and interests of indigenous peoples;26 and (5) policies meant to
protect critical natural habitats. Most of the IFIs mentioned
above have adopted their own policies or follow the World Bank
Group’s policies on these issues. 
In addition to the normative framework found in the envi-
ronmental and social policies, at least nine financial institutions
have also adopted some form of accountability mechanism that
enables affected people to raise concerns regarding compliance
with the IFIs’ environmental and social policies. Beginning with
the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel in 1993, five
multilateral financial institutions27 and three bilateral financial
institutions28 currently provide locally-affected people access to
accountability mechanisms. Although the effectiveness and
independence of these mechanisms vary, they collectively pro-
vide significant new opportunities for challenges to future
energy projects. 
CLIMATE CHANGE
The impact of IFIs on climate change is clear and signifi-
cant. The World Resources Institute (“WRI”) reports that “[t]he
lending profile of MDBs demonstrates significant concentrations
of finance in sectors with substantial greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emission footprints, including transport, oil and gas, electric
power, and mining.”29 The report calculates that 27 percent of the
World Bank’s lending in 2004 went toward these projects, with
an investment of U.S. $7.6 billion. Since the signing of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) in
1992, the World Bank Group has financed over U.S. $28.4 billion
in fossil fuel projects, resulting in 43.3 billion tons of lifetime
carbon emissions.30 Other MDBs are similarly committed to
projects that contribute substantially to GHG emissions. In 2004,
the Inter-American Development Bank invested U.S. $730 mil-
lion (twelve percent of its total lending), and in 2003 the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development invested U.S.
$3.3 billion (27 percent of its total lending), in projects with
potentially substantial impacts on the climate.31
Closer review of the World
Bank shows the influence of the
banks, and their connection to
climate change. In addition to its
direct financing, the World Bank
is also an implementing agency
of the Global Environment
Facility (“GEF”), which among
other roles, acts as the financial
mechanism for the UNFCCC.32
Through its Carbon Finance
Unit,33 the Bank launched the
Prototype Carbon Fund in 2000
and continues to champion the
global carbon market, by financ-
ing the purchase of emission credits under the Kyoto Protocol’s
Clean Development Mechanism. The Bank’s influence is
expanded further by coordinating other donors, mobilizing bilat-
eral private-sector financing, conducting policy research, and
providing technical assistance to borrowing countries.
In recent years, the IFIs have begun to recognize that the cli-
mate change policy landscape has changed and that this may
lead to new financing conditionalities and a need to change their
energy portfolios. Almost every country in the world has signed
the 1992 UNFCCC and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Under Kyoto,
all industrialized countries, except the United States and Aus-
tralia, have committed to mandatory timetable and targets for
reducing emissions. As a result, many regional, national, and
sub-national governments throughout the world have created
policies to regulate GHG emissions, and many have established
carbon trading systems.34
Even though emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol
do not apply to developing countries, climate change is now rec-
ognized as a major development issue, requiring more direct
attention from development institutions. For example, climate
change impacts must now be included in the environmental
assessments required by the World Bank and most other IFIs.35
In addition, IFC’s new Performance Standards require projects
with annual GHG emissions greater than 100,000 tons to esti-
mate and report their emissions annually.36
Many of the most
controversial projects
supported by IFIs in 
recent years have been
energy projects.
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Other IFIs are also beginning to respond to climate change
with new policies that may restrict or change their lending prac-
tices. Private commercial banks, which are increasingly exposed
to climate risks, are beginning to account for these risks in the
costs of their loans and other services.37 Many commercial
banks have started to reduce their own internal carbon footprint,
with HSBC having achieved carbon neutrality in 2005.38 At least
four private commercial banks—Bank of America, Citibank,
JPMorganChase, and HSBC—have specific policies addressing
the climate impacts of their lending portfolios. JPMorganChase
has committed to work with its largest GHG-emitting clients 
to develop carbon mitigation plans, which include measuring
and disclosing GHG emissions and developing strategies to
reduce or offset them. Starting in 2006, the bank began 
reporting annually on GHG emissions from its power portfolio
and working with clients to develop new financial products that
facilitate emission reductions. Bank of America’s policy is note-
worthy because it includes a reduction target that commits the
bank to reduce emissions from its energy and utility portfolios
by seven percent by 2008. Neither Citigroup nor HSBC have
specific commitments relating to emissions reductions or carbon
mitigation plans, although Citigroup has committed to reporting
on emissions resulting from its energy sector lending.39 Export
credit agencies can also be expected to shift their climate poli-
cies, as part of their home country’s national climate or environ-
mental policies.40
To be sure, the IFIs’ current climate-related policies make
only modest commitments and their implementation appears to
be insufficient. According to WRI, for example, “[o]ver 80 per-
cent of World Bank’s publicly disclosed lending in the energy
sector from 2000 to 2004 did not consider climate change issues
in project appraisals and documentation.”41 Nonetheless, clear
trends are emerging that IFIs will increasingly have to commit at
least to: (1) assessing and reporting on climate emissions and
impacts; (2) reducing GHG emissions at the transactional and
portfolio levels; and (3) shifting towards clean energy technolo-
gies.42 Indeed, recently civil society is beginning to push for the
complete withdrawal of international financial assistance to the
fossil fuel industry.43 As climate impacts become more urgent,
such pressure will build and we can expect more stringent policy
responses from the IFIs.
RENEWABLE ENERGY PORTFOLIOS
Closely related to the push for a response to climate change
have been policies aimed at promoting renewable energy. Thus
far, IFIs have been slow to shift their energy sector portfolios in
the direction of renewable energy. The IBRD has committed to
increasing its lending for renewables by twenty percent per
year,44 but this is a modest increase given that renewable lending
starts from such a low baseline. In fiscal year 2005, for instance,
the IBRD’s financing for renewable energy projects comprised
less than five percent of its overall lending to the energy sector.45
In its September 2006 Investment Framework for Clean Energy
and Development, the IBRD does not make further commit-
ments to sustainable energy practices, and continues to rely on
fossil fuel projects to meet the energy needs of the poor.46
Other IFIs have made only limited commitments to increas-
ing their renewable energy portfolios. In May 2005, OECD
countries participating in the Arrangement on Officially Sup-
ported Export Credits, established special financial terms to
favor renewable energy projects. For a trial period from 1 July
2005 to 1 July 2007, participating ECAs agreed to give borrow-
ers for renewable energy projects extended repayment terms of
fifteen years (an improvement over the twelve year terms gener-
ally offered to power plants).47 This fell short of the calls by civil
society groups pushing for ECA reforms, which called for: (1)
developing a sustainable energy portfolio, requiring a phase-out
of support to fossil fuel and other unsustainable energy tech-
nologies within two years; (2) committing twenty percent of the
total energy portfolio within two years to supporting sustainable
energy; (3) introducing institutional reforms and capacity build-
ing measures to abolish preferences for fossil fuels and nuclear
technology; (4) providing the lowest interest rates and maximum
repayment terms available under existing guidelines to support
renewable energy, energy efficiency, and conservation projects;
and (5) establishing a Renewable Energy Advisory Committee
composed of representatives of the renewable energy sector,
civil society, and government officials to make a series of recom-
mendations.48 These or similar requests are likely to form the
civil society platforms for future IFI reforms.
DAMS
Large hydro-electric dams have long been a lightning rod
for civil society campaigns around IFI financing. Financing for
projects such as China’s Three Gorges dam, India’s Narmada
dam, Turkey’s Ilisu dam and Uganda’s Bujagali dam, have all
sparked considerable controversy, and in the cases of the Ilisu
and Bujagali dams, international financing (from the World
Bank group) was rejected. Nonetheless, in part as a response to
climate change, many IFIs are now calling for greater use of
hydropower. The World Bank Group, for example, considers
large scale dams to be a key component of its renewable energy
portfolios.49 Of the U.S. $748 million that the Bank financed in
fiscal year 2005 for “renewable energy and energy efficiency,”
approximately 60 percent went towards hydropower with capac-
ity of over ten megawatts.50
Many civil society organizations have argued that large
scale hydropower cannot be considered a viable renewable
energy alternative. Large dam projects have displaced between
40 and 80 million people worldwide, in addition to the millions
displaced by canals, powerhouses, and other infrastructure asso-
ciated with dams.51 In many cases, IFIs, governments, and proj-
ect proponents have not provided displaced communities with
viable resettlement plans or adequate compensation, shattering
the livelihoods of these persons.52 At the same time, dams have
caused irreversible impacts to local habitats and water basins.53
Because of their methane emissions, GHG emissions from large
dams have often exceeded the emissions of conventional fossil
fuel power plants generating equivalent amounts of energy.54
Furthermore, dams often do not run efficiently or meet their
power generation targets, and often suffer lengthy construction
delays and large cost overruns.55
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Because of these and related concerns, the World Bank con-
stituted a World Commission on Dams (“WCD”) in 1997 to pro-
vide an independent assessment of the future of large dams. The
highly acclaimed WCD report provided several recommenda-
tions in 2000, including that IFIs should: (1) use comprehensive
options assessments as a risk mitigation tool; (2) incorporate the
WCD principles, criteria, and guidelines into their environmen-
tal and social policies, and use the guidelines as minimum
screens for evaluating support for, and investment in, individual
projects; (3) develop legally binding environmental and social
provisions in their insurance coverage, and debt and equity
arrangements; and (4) develop criteria for bond-rating systems
for use in financing all options, including large dams, in the
water resources and electric power sectors.56 Despite its initial
support, however, the World Bank rejected the WCD’s recom-
mendations and the Banks’ environmental and social policies do
not currently meet the WCD
standards with respect to issues
such as human rights, indige-
nous peoples, social assess-
ments, and transboundary
impacts.57 The IFC’s Policy and
Performance Standards follow
many, but not all, of the main
recommendations of the WCD.
Most importantly, the IFC does
not emphasize the human rights
of affected peoples to the same
degree as the WCD. The only
IFIs to explicitly incorporate the WCD recommendations are the
commercial banks HSBC and ABN Amro.58 Because most IFIs
do not have proper safeguards in place for dam projects, their
reliance on hydropower as a renewable alternative to oil and coal
will likely continue to engender substantial controversy and
opposition among civil society organizations. 
NUCLEAR POLICIES
Except for one loan to Italy in 1959, the World Bank Group
does not support nuclear power, primarily out of concerns that it
is non-economic and never a least-cost solution.59 Indeed, the
only multilateral development bank that directly supports
nuclear power is the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, which has supported the construction and mod-
ernization of nuclear power plants in the former Soviet bloc.
Nonetheless, the World Bank and other IFIs increasingly con-
sider nuclear power projects as a non-fossil fuel option for
reducing emissions, acid rain, and air pollution,60 and the multi-
lateral reluctance to support nuclear power has not carried over
to the ECAs, which play a significant role in promoting nuclear
power technology around the world. According to one study,
fourteen of the 25 nuclear reactors under construction in 2001
were supported by ECA financing.61
The renewed interest in nuclear power concerns many 
civil society organizations because it is essentially “replacing
one evil with another.” Nuclear power plants contribute fewer
emissions than coal or oil, but are not emissions free. In order
for nuclear power to contribute to a twenty percent decline in
carbon emissions across the world, there would have to be three
to four times more reactors. This would cost trillions of dollars,
draining resources that could be spent on developing emissions
free technologies.62 Because nuclear power is also a “base-load
technology” whose energy output runs continuously, nuclear
energy cannot be adjusted to specific consumer and industrial
demands, and thus does not create incentives for energy con-
sumers to shift to more efficient, sustainable energy use.63
Furthermore, there are enormous environmental and public
health risks associated with nuclear power. As WWF describes,
“The entire commercial chain of the processing of nuclear raw
materials from nuclear mining; operating nuclear power stations;
handling nuclear waste and finally re-processing, is full of leaks
and contamination and produces a highly toxic legacy for 
thousands of years to come.”64 Nuclear power is also a “power-
grid based technology,” which
means that these projects would
be much more unlikely to
extend energy access to the
world’s poorest, remote commu-
nities.65 For these reasons, the
European ECA Reform Cam-
paign recommended that a
responsible ECA sustainable
energy policy (which is applica-
ble to all IFIs) should include
the following elements: (1) the
IFI will not fund new nuclear
projects or the expansion of old or delayed projects; and (2) the
IFI “may offer support to help decommission nuclear installa-
tions or improve the safety of a running nuclear power plant, 
but only if this safety improvement does not prolong the life of
the plant.”66
FUTURE TRENDS
IFIs are in a key position to provide leadership in the 
shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy that must be part 
of a global response to climate change. Moreover, the develop-
ment mandates of many of the IFIs should force them to 
consider the potential positive and negative development
impacts of such a shift, and will likely lead them to continue to
expand their environmental and social conditionality on energy
lending. This trend will be fueled by civil society’s continued
calls for stronger policies, to address both climate and develop-
ment impacts. 
Clear trends in the IFI environmental and social policies 
are evident. These policies have become increasingly salient 
to energy lending over time and have formed the basis for suc-
cessful civil society campaigns to delay, prevent or improve
environmentally and socially harmful projects.67 But although
progress has been made, the IFIs’ policies have failed to 
keep pace with advances in clean energy technology and 
knowledge about climate change. Additionally, civil society
organizations continue to criticize the weaknesses of existing
safeguard policies, for example: (1) many policies fall far short
IFIs have been slow to
shift their energy sector
portfolios in the direction
of renewable energy.
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of current international law and norms; (2) policies do not 
comprehensively address the full range of environmental and
social impacts of IFIs’ activities; (3) policies are often limited
only to project finance; (4) many policies allow only for limited
and inconsistent stakeholder involvement; (5) the language of
many policies is crafted so that IFIs do not actually commit to
any particular action; and (6) many policies have not been well
implemented.68 In some cases, as with climate change policies, 
a few commercial banks have surpassed the safeguards of 
the World Bank and other public institutions. Furthermore, 
there continues to be lack of full implementation of safeguard
policies. 
CONCLUSION
As concern over climate change continues, we can expect
more pressure to build on IFIs to restrict their fossil-fuel energy
portfolios and to expand their lending to other sectors. Existing
policies and approaches with respect to renewables, energy effi-
ciency, dams, and nuclear power will likely be revisited and
serve as flashpoints for future policy dialogue. Expansion of rel-
atively new energy sources, most notably biofuels, will likely
also launch substantial debates (and future policies) on their
development impacts.69 New IFI policies that emerge from those
debates will likely continue to shape the path of energy develop-
ment in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
T
he role of U.S. state governments in developing policies
to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions continues
to expand. One of the most widely-used policy tools is a
renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”). RPSs mandate that utili-
ties operating within a state must provide a designated amount of
power from renewable sources as a portion of their overall provi-
sion of electricity. This policy is not unique to the United States,
but the RPS has proliferated among the U.S. states at a rapid
rate. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have
adopted an RPS as of mid-2007, with a strong likelihood of con-
tinued expansion. 
The proliferation of state RPSs and the decision to expand
initial policies illustrate that these regulations tend to draw a
fairly broad base of political support that often crosses partisan
lines. States are motivated to enact or expand RPSs for multiple
reasons, and GHG emissions may or may not be a central factor.
This paper presents an overview of the RPS as policy tool and
examines key factors in both policy formation and implementa-
tion. This work considers the experience of all RPS states but
devotes particular attention to five case studies illustrating com-
mon themes and points of divergence among individual state
programs. The analysis concludes by identifying opportunities
and challenges facing future development. 
PROLIFERATION OF THE RPS
The RPS combines the policy strategies of regulation and
reliance on market mechanisms that is a hallmark of more recent
innovations in U.S. environmental and energy policy.1 For most
states, establishing an RPS merely involves an incremental
expansion of existing regulatory powers over electricity genera-
tion and distribution. Alongside their historic roles in overseeing
regulated utilities, market restructuring, approval and siting of
new generating facilities, and electricity rate-setting and taxa-
tion, states have for decades sought ways to promote renewable
energy sources as well as energy conservation.2 Consequently,
many state officials view RPSs as simply a new mechanism to
respond to public demand for a reliable, inexpensive, and envi-
ronmentally friendly electricity supply. With the exception of the
Southeast, every region in the United States has at least one RPS
in operation at this point. Many states with the largest popula-
tions and levels of electricity consumption have enacted RPSs,
including California, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. 
POLITICAL DRIVERS
Many areas of state energy policy are enormously con-
tentious, particularly those that propose significant changes for
privately held utilities that have traditionally dominated service
delivery in a jurisdiction, as has been evident in the battles over
proposed restructuring (or deregulation) of wholesale and retail
electricity rates.3 RPSs indeed call for significant changes from
past practice, but generally receive bi-partisan support. 
Formal representation in the state legislative process from
renewable energy developers eager to expand their role is
becoming increasingly apparent.4 In numerous states, these
organizations are more visible and influential in RPS delibera-
tions than conventional environmental advocacy groups. GHG
reduction constitutes one important benefit from greater use of
renewable energy and has been an important consideration, but
in many instances, climate benefits are deemed ancillary to a
variety of economic advantages. For example, for states frus-
trated with the unanticipated volatility in natural gas prices over
the past half-decade, the prospect of more predictable generation
costs through renewables is increasingly attractive. 
One common factor facilitating diverse support of RPSs is
the perception that promoting renewable energy through these
standards produces economic benefits compatible with the major
state goal of promoting economic development.5 Whereas fuel
accounts for much of the cost for conventional electricity,
renewables concentrate a larger share of their total costs on
labor. Development is particularly attractive if new renewable
sources are developed within a state’s boundaries supplanting
imported fossil fuels.
COMMON DESIGN TRENDS
Individual RPSs differ but share similar design features. All
RPSs establish a percentage or amount of renewable electricity
generation or capacity requirement that suppliers must provide
by a particular date. Each state program defines qualifying
renewable electricity sources and, over time, increases the
amount of renewable capacity or generation to meet the stan-
dard. Most states allow regulated parties to generate their own
renewable supply or purchase credits from other suppliers. The
so-called renewable energy credit (“REC”) system is an example
of market-based mechanisms that allows options for assuring
compliance, enabling suppliers to meet regulatory requirements
in the most inexpensive way feasible. In turn, each state RPS
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designates a lead governmental agency, commonly the state pub-
lic utility commission, to oversee implementation. 
States have increasingly tended to elevate the bar for the
amount of electricity required by an RPS;6 resembling a multi-
state “race-to-the-top,” whereby many states are committing to
future renewable energy levels that seemed inconceivable a half-
decade ago and many states are revising their initial require-
ments upward. State RPS programs are increasingly
complemented by other initiatives to promote renewable energy
and energy efficiency. While states historically did not favor one
renewable source over another in their RPSs, they have begun to
modify that practice placing renewables into differing classes.
Some mandate that a specific source comprise some percentage
of the RPS to boost relatively expensive technologies, such as
solar photoroltaics,7 raising cost concerns in policy debates. 
As RPSs proliferate, increased issues of inter-state collabo-
ration arise.8 To date, there has been relatively modest interac-
tion on RPS development between neighboring states, reflecting
the “home-grown” nature of RPS. But issues such as inter-state
recognition and trading of RECs loom larger and may necessi-
tate new forms of inter-state collaboration. Greater intergovern-
mental collaboration could also cross national boundaries,
involving Canadian provinces and Mexican states, reflecting the
reality that much North American energy flows north-south and
is indifferent to national borders.9
Finally, as states move beyond RPS policy enactment into
implementation, extensive rule-making provisions are necessary
and in some cases, leading to revised legislation. A growing con-
cern involves siting processes, both for renewable energy facili-
ties and transmission capacity to move renewable energy from
its point of generation to its point of use. In some instances,
political issues related to facility or transmission line siting may
be the most important determinant of long-term RPS viability
and development.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDIES
Five cases—Texas, Massachusetts, Nevada, Pennsylvania,
and Colorado—represent different patterns of political control at
enactment, and have divergent historic levels of commitment to
environmental policy. Representing different time periods at
enactment, they vary in their degree of interstate engagement on
policy collaboration. The following cases do not constitute any
effort to highlight “best practices.” Instead, they provide a
glimpse into common patterns and divergence in current prac-
tice. 
TEXAS: A GUST IN THE WIND RUSH
Given its historic role in fossil fuel development and use,
Texas might appear to be an unlikely setting for a major RPS
commitment. However, the RPS enacted in 1999 under then-
Governor George W. Bush triggered a massive increase in the
supply of renewables at highly competitive prices. The program
has proven so successful that the Texas Legislature overwhelm-
ingly endorsed a major extension and expansion of the legisla-
tion, signed into law by Republican Governor Rick Perry on
August 1, 2005.10
Electricity restructuring in the late 1990s opened a window
of opportunity for Texas to reconsider all dimensions of its elec-
tricity system. Several factors converged to push an RPS onto
the state’s political agenda, including supply concerns, environ-
mental problems, and the availability of enormous wind
resources. Moreover, an extensive series of “deliberative opinion
polls” demonstrated strong public consensus for a commitment
to renewables.11
The first piece of RPS legislation is regarded as a textbook
model, establishing a clear and effective REC program, a trans-
parent market transaction process, and an “alternative compli-
ance mechanism” that provides options, albeit costly ones, for
electricity suppliers unable to meet standard requirements. The
RPS focused on total renewable generation capacity and called
for an increase from 1280 megawatts (“MW”) in January 2003
to 2880 MW by January 2009, including approximately 880
MW of renewables, primarily older hydro facilities, in operation
for many decades before enactment of the RPS. 
While the policy did not favor any particular source, it has
had the effect of tapping into the state’s massive wind capacity.
In 2007, 1361 MW of new wind generation is expected to be on
line, leading to a total of 2600 expected MW of wind generation
online by 2011.12 This new wind capacity, alongside renewable
projects under construction or advanced stages of the approval
process, indicates that Texas will easily meet-and exceed-its
2009 standard. Moreover, wind energy is produced at rates that
are highly competitive with conventional sources when the fed-
eral production tax credit (which stands at 1.9 cents per kilowatt
hour in April 2007) is included.13
The second RPS iteration did not change the basic mechan-
ics of the initial design but it elevated the levels of renewables
required by 2007 and 2009 and specified continued expansion
into the next decade. The legislation amended Section 39.905 of
the Texas Utilities Code to require that “The cumulative installed
renewable capacity in this state shall total 5880 megawatts by
January 1, 2015.”14
The unexpectedly rapid development of wind energy in
remote sections of Western Texas placed significant demands on
C
ou
rt
es
y 
of
 A
nn
e 
N
ol
an
Ice Harbor Dam, on the Snake River in Southeastern Washington State, is an
example of a renewable energy source being utilized by a state as a portion of
its overall provision of electricity.
12SPRING 2007
the relatively modest transmission systems that deliver electric-
ity to areas of high demand. This constraint is linked with a
larger challenge in Texas, and nationwide, to upgrade and
expand the transmission system. As the Texas Public Utilities
Commission (“TPUC”) considers transmission, developers real-
ize that there are many possible places for renewables and are
aware of the need to link new generation with transmission
access. Texas faces a particularly acute challenge and the new
legislation calls upon the TPUC “to construct transmission
capacity necessary” to deliver anticipated expansion of renew-
ables. Implementation of this provision may be the single most
important factor in determining effectiveness of the new RPS.
MASSACHUSETTS: ONE COMPONENT OF A BROAD
CLIMATE STRATEGY
Like Texas, Massachusetts developed its RPS in the late
1990s in conjunction with legislation authorizing electricity
restructuring. The state also had
prior history with promoting
renewable energy and significant
concerns about electricity cost
and supply reliability. While it
considers renewable develop-
ment as part of its long-term
economic development, unlike
Texas, Massachusetts is explicit
about the role of its RPS as part
of a broad strategy to address
climate change.
The Massachusetts RPS
focuses exclusively on new
sources of renewable energy or
expansion in existing generating
capacity, with an initial one per-
cent level to represent sources
brought on line between Decem-
ber 31, 1997 and January 1,
2003. Thereafter, renewables must be increased at a rate of 0.5
percent per year, reaching four percent by 2009. At this point,
the legislation creates an open-ended increase of one percent per
year, until 2009 unless the Massachusetts Division of Energy
Resources decides otherwise.15 The 1997 authorizing legislation
establishes a series of alternative compliance payments “to max-
imize the commercial development of new renewable generation
capacity” where direct purchase of renewables is not viable.16
Similar to seventeen other states, Massachusetts enacted a
mandatory “public benefits” charge on electricity bills to support
renewable energy. Collectively, these efforts provide a base of
support for renewables that is not offered in Texas or some other
states. 
At the same time, the RPS and related energy initiatives are
only a component of Massachusetts’ broader effort to link GHG
reduction with economic development. In February 2007, Mass-
achusetts formally joined the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (“RGGI”), a regional “cap-and-trade” program for carbon
dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning power plants.17 The
state pioneered efforts in 2001 to cap its own releases from these
sources.18 It is also among the parties who successfully chal-
lenged the United States Environmental Protection Agency at
the Supreme Court level to regulate carbon dioxide from auto-
mobile emissions as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act.19 Each
of these steps systematically link climate protection with eco-
nomic development. 
Implementation of the Massachusetts RPS has not triggered
the exponential growth of renewable energy that is occurring in
Texas, but it has successfully met requirements by relying on
out-of-state renewable electricity. A comprehensive report from
the Massachusetts Division of Energy Resources (“DOER”)
released this year concluded that all twenty parties covered by
the RPS achieved compliance in 2005.20 However, there was a
shortage of RECs available in the market, which all but three of
the parties required to achieve compliance due to increased
demand, among other factors.21
Additionally, the report noted
that DOER expects a better sup-
ply/demand balance due to an
expected increase in new renew-
able capacity by 2007.22
Massachusetts officials rec-
ognize that there may be
increasing regional demand for
renewable energy and conse-
quently will emphasize in-state
renewable energy development,
attractive for economic develop-
ment reasons, but posing serious
challenges to implementation.
For instance, the Cape Wind
Project, a major wind siting ini-
tiative off the shore of Nan-
tucket is in serious jeopardy due
to political opposition. If imple-
mented, this would involve the placement of approximately 130
wind turbines on a shoal and would meet a significant portion of
Massachusetts’ RPS requirement in the coming years.23 Local
response has been largely negative, out of concern about the
appearance of the turbines and their possible impact on tourism,
recreation, and property values of some of the most expensive
real estate in the Northeast. Opponents include U.S. Senators
from both political parties whose families hold property in the
area; they have attempted to amend various federal laws to
thwart the proposed project.24 Massachusetts’s officials acknowl-
edge that the Cape Wind development is highly doubtful. 
In response to the Cape Wind controversy, wind proponents
have attempted public outreach in exploring the possibility of
developing a set of smaller wind sources. In turn, other renew-
able technologies are receiving greater attention, reflected in a
particularly strong emphasis by potential private developers and
state officials in a possible expansion of biomass capacity in
Massachusetts and neighboring states. Biomass, however, does
not begin to match the scale of renewable energy anticipated
Just as new policies can
diffuse across states
through representative
institutions, there is ample
precedent for one state’s
use of direct democracy
provisions to trigger
replication elsewhere.
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from Cape Wind, and has triggered its own set of controversies.
State officials are moving toward finalization of regulations for
biomass eligibility but these will not resolve the considerable
uncertainty regarding Massachusetts’ ability to achieve its
ascending RPS targets in the coming years.
NEVADA: THE NEXT TEXAS?
Unlike Texas and Massachusetts, Nevada decided not to
pursue electricity restructuring, shaken by the experience of Cal-
ifornia. However, energy issues retained saliency in Nevada
throughout the last decade. As the state’s population and econ-
omy have expanded, so too have electricity demand and reliabil-
ity concerns. Additionally, as the federal government continues
to press the case that all of the nation’s high-level radioactive
waste should be transferred to a
repository in the southern part of
the state at Yucca Mountain, a
unifying theme in Nevada poli-
tics has been to take every con-
ceivable step to demonstrate to
the nation that there are viable
alternatives to nuclear energy.25
These factors have con-
verged to make renewable
energy, and RPS legislation, a
staple in the Nevada legislature.
Building on a fairly modest start
in 1997, Nevada has continually
expanded its RPS and come to
depict itself as an emerging
national leader in renewable energy generation. In its most
recent iteration, signed into law by Republican Governor Kenny
Guinn in June 2005, Nevada elected to “up the bar” again, man-
dating that twenty percent of Nevada’s electricity come from
renewable sources by 2015.26
Few anticipated such an ambitious target in 1997 when the
legislature enacted an RPS that called for a very modest set of
incremental increases in renewable energy, reaching one percent
by 2009.27 The primary driver behind that legislation was an
effort to promote a large solar facility near the Nevada Test Site,
which is best known as a former weapons testing facility pro-
posed as a transitional waste transfer site prior to the planned
opening of Yucca Mountain. The project collapsed for financial
reasons; however, the framework for RPS expansion was estab-
lished. Four years later, during the California electricity crisis
that prompted that state to desperately attempt to increase
imports of energy from its neighbors, the Nevada legislature
repealed the earlier bill and replaced it with a far more expansive
and ambitious RPS, including a markedly higher standard that
reached fifteen percent of electricity from renewable sources by
2013.28 Many important provisions were modeled after the RPS
experience in Texas, including the renewable energy credit sys-
tem and a provision to confine eligible electricity to that gener-
ated within state boundaries or imported through a dedicated
transmission line. 
Unlike Texas, Nevada decided to retain a solar carve-out,
although reducing the level from solar electricity to five percent
from the higher level established in 1997. Additionally, whereas
Texas quickly realized that it was likely to derive most of its
renewables from one source (wind) in one part of the state (West
Texas), Nevada prepared for a much more diverse set of energy
sources (including geothermal, wind, solar, biomass, and others)
from virtually every corner of the state. 
Over the next four years, however, Nevada would return its
RPS to the legislative shop for further modification, reflecting
broad consensus about the potential for renewable expansion
and its possible impact on economic development, although
environmental benefits remain salient as concerns about air
quality and nuclear waste stor-
age persist. Anticipated GHG
reductions have not figured
prominently, although state offi-
cials have become increasingly
aware of this issue.
Nevada’s 2003 revisions
provided a new boost for solar
energy, through development of
a REC bonus or “multiplier” for
electricity that is generated from
the sun as opposed to other
sources.29 Two years later,
Nevada literally transformed its
renewable energy credits into
“portfolio energy credits” by
giving RPS credit to approved
energy efficiency activities.30 The repeated modifications of the
Nevada RPS have given the Public Utility Commission of
Nevada a series of implementation challenges, involving a mas-
sive set of rule-making procedures that have continued into
2007. 
PENNSYLVANIA: GREEN AS GOLD
Pennsylvania’s attraction to renewable energy has mainly
been economical, but under unique circumstances. The Com-
monwealth suffered from a significant loss of jobs, particularly
in the manufacturing sector, and recent governors and legislators
have struggled to revitalize the economy. It has also suffered
from a series of environmental problems that may have impaired
economic development, including an unusually large number of
land tracts with extensive environmental contamination. At the
same time, coal mining and coal use in electricity have been
Pennsylvania staples for generations, posing formidable chal-
lenges for any policies that might encroach on that resource.
In recent years, Pennsylvania has given new prominence to
environmental protection and renewable energy, a hallmark of
the administration of Democratic Governor Edward Rendell,
who frames environmental improvements and renewable energy
as essential for economic development. As a result, legislation
and program initiatives supporting the Commonwealth’s devel-
opment of renewable energy sources and technologies, as well as
environmental clean-up expertise, have been part of a larger
RPSs continue to
proliferate and mature,
with the possibility of
eventual incorporation
into a policy that applies
across jurisdictions.
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strategy to revitalize the economy. This effort has included a
series of tax incentives and renewable energy development pro-
grams, with the centerpiece being the enactment in November
2004 of the Pennsylvania Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards
Act.31 Introduced with bipartisan support, this legislation took
effect in March 2005, followed by extensive rulemaking directed
by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission. 
Pennsylvania had some prior experience with renewables,
including 129 MW of wind power and a variety of hydro
sources. It retains, of course, its strong historic linkage with
coal, which was evident in its unique definition of what consti-
tutes a qualifying source. Like several other states, Pennsylvania
divided its Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard (“AEPS”) into
two distinct categories, with Tier I sources required to climb to a
level of eight percent by 2020 and Tier II sources required to
reach a level of ten percent by that same year. Under Tier I, the
legislation includes such familiar renewable sources as wind,
geothermal, solar photovoltaic, low-impact hydropower, biologi-
cally derived methane gas, biomass, and fuel cells. However, it
also includes coalmine methane. Under Tier II, Pennsylvania
joins Nevada in including energy efficiency, but also adds envi-
ronmentally controversial sources such as waste coal, integrated
coal gasification combined cycle, and incineration of municipal
trash and poultry farm wastes. This expansive definition made
the passage of the Pennsylvania legislation unusually controver-
sial and state-based environmental groups characterized the pro-
posal as “the dirtiest RPS” in the nation and urged the legislature
to narrow the definition of eligible energy sources. At the same
time, supporters contended that the creation of Tier II essentially
accepted energy sources that were already on line to be devel-
oped and that Tier I would foster considerable new renewable
capacity in the state.
Overshadowed by the definitional controversies, the Penn-
sylvania AEPS does make specific commitments to solar energy
and energy efficiency. It continues the trend in recent years
toward boosting the prospects for solar electricity through a des-
ignated percentage of Tier I energy that must be derived from
solar sources. In turn, it preceded Nevada by several months in
encouraging “the participation of demand side management and
energy efficiency resources” as eligible for inclusion within an
RPS, placing them alongside the more controversial items in
Tier II.32
Many of the details of these provisions continue to be refined
through rule-making procedures. Initial rule-making indicates
that defining the boundaries from which renewable energy can be
counted toward the Pennsylvania standard will entail a major
challenge. Much like other Eastern states, Pennsylvania has sub-
stantial cross-border exchange of energy. Most of the Common-
wealth is located within one regional transmission organization,
the PJM Interconnection that integrates Pennsylvania with elec-
tricity providers in twelve states and the District of Columbia.
However, portions of the state are located in other regional organ-
izations, suggesting that a wide range of states could conceivably
contribute renewable energy to Pennsylvania. The RPS legisla-
tion establishes that eligible energy must be “derived only” from
within Pennsylvania or “within the service territory of any
regional transmission organization that manages the transmission
system in any part of this Commonwealth.”33 Debate over just
how to interpret that clause continues, weighing the constitu-
tional requirement not to constrain interstate commerce against
Pennsylvania’s desire to capture economic and environmental
benefits of renewable energy internally. 
COLORADO: POWER TO THE PEOPLE
For many years, the lone mechanism whereby states enacted
RPSs and related state policies to reduce GHGs involved the tra-
ditional channels of representative government. But the majority
of U.S. states have constitutional provisions allowing legislation
through majority vote of the electorate; states have used them
increasingly in recent decades on a range of environmental and
energy issues.34 Consistent with that trend, in November 2004,
Colorado became the first state to enact an RPS through “direct
democracy” when Proposition 37 passed by a 54-to-46 percent
margin. This led to rule-making by the Colorado Public Utility
Commission, with an Order released in December 2005 requir-
ing three percent of electricity generation from renewables, and
increasing their renewable output to ten percent by 2015. 
More recently, Colorado has vastly expanded its RPS goals
as newly elected Democratic Governor Bill Ritter signed two
bills in April 2007 doubling the state’s RPS to twenty percent by
2020 and constructing new transmission crucial to delivering the
renewably generated energy.35 The development of a new energy
economy is central to Governor Ritter’s policy platform, and is
focused on creating jobs, adding economic value to the state and
establishing Colorado as a potential national leader in the new
energy economy.36
The ballot initiative happened after a coalition headed by
utilities and coal-mining interests blocked an RPS in three con-
secutive sessions of the Colorado legislature. Indeed, Colorado
had been among those states most reluctant to take any steps
related to GHG emissions during the previous decade.37 At the
same time, proponents felt that there was a strong base of sup-
port for the RPS. Consequently, supporters decided upon a ballot
initiative and the opposition, under a banner of Citizens for Sen-
sible Energy Choices, spent more than U.S. $2 million investing
heavily in a television advertising campaign focusing on poten-
tial costs. However, support was maintained through a campaign
with bipartisan leadership and a tapestry of supporters, repre-
senting numerous renewable energy developers, agriculture and
ranching interests, public health and environmental protection
constituencies, and various religious organizations. Proposition
37 also received endorsements from most of the state’s major
media outlets. A number of anticipated environmental benefits
were raised during the campaign but the most important driver
behind the passage of Proposition 37 was projected economic
development from expanding renewable capacity.38
Just as new policies can diffuse across states through repre-
sentative institutions, there is ample precedent for one state’s use
of direct democracy provisions to trigger replication elsewhere.
The Colorado RPS attracted considerable national publicity due
to its route of enactment and RPS proponents in Washington
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state successfully followed its model in November 2006 with the
enactment of its own RPS by ballot initiative.39
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES:
THE NEXT ROUND OF RPS DEVELOPMENT
In anticipating the next generation of RPS development, a
series of important challenges and opportunities appears to
loom, concerning both continued policy development by indi-
vidual states and increasingly salient interstate and intergovern-
mental factors.
First, a series of important issues has begun to emerge that
may not have been fully anticipated at the point of enactment but
could pose a challenge to successful implementation. Part of the
initial attraction of the RPS concept was that while it did impose
regulatory requirements specifying the amount of renewable
energy that would be provided, it did not favor one source over
another as long as it was deemed eligible. The growing tendency
to accord specialized status to more expensive renewable
sources removes the level playing field originally intended in
most states and, in some instances, may require significant finan-
cial subsidies from state sources or rate payers and thereby raise
the cost of the policies. Moreover, the shift toward differential
treatment has moved some of the recent debate over renewable
energy policy in state capitals toward a collision between com-
peting special interests, each seeking preferential treatment.40
Over time, one could envision a transformation whereby a well-
intended effort to supplement select renewable sources altered
RPSs into a complex formula with differential treatment for var-
ied sources, thereby removing much of the flexibility of this pol-
icy tool and increasing the cost of implementation.
Second, much of the early planning for RPS targets assumed
public support for renewable energy not only in general terms
but also in presumed receptivity to siting facilities and related
transmission capacity. In two of the five cases, one of the most
important determinants of RPS success will involve siting
issues. This problem may become common for states with rela-
tively concentrated and populated areas for outstanding renew-
able sources. More generally, the development of both intra-state
and inter-state transmission capacity remains a significant chal-
lenge, particularly in those regions of the country where there is
substantial physical distance between the energy source and its
potential consumers.
Third, the challenge of developing superior transmission
capacity and RPS proliferation more broadly suggests an
increasing likelihood that states may benefit from greater inter-
action and collaboration with each other. This may include
agreements for common definitions of renewables and related
credits as well as shared efforts to promote regionally based
renewable resources with high potential. States will also need to
guard against “double counting,” ensuring that renewable gener-
ation can only count toward RPS and GHG reduction require-
ments in one state. Thus far, states are clearly learning lessons
from one another, just as Nevada has closely monitored develop-
ments in Texas in refashioning its own RPS. Much of this cross-
state interaction, however, occurs only sporadically and state
officials across the United States acknowledge that they lack
resources to carefully evaluate other programs and draw impor-
tant lessons. Review of legislative testimony in all of the states
examined as case studies suggests only occasional and often
imprecise reference to the experience of other states. State
budget woes erode the capacity of some state agencies to main-
tain policy analysis expertise, attend conferences and workshops
out of state, and monitor developments in neighboring states. 
In turn, pressures to maximize the capture of economic
development benefits within state boundaries can serve to deter
serious exploration of cross-state collaboration. One area with
considerable potential for inter-state collaboration is the devel-
opment of a common metric for determining the GHG emissions
impacts as various levels of renewable energy are brought on
line in concert with RPS requirements. Interstate collaboration
could also take other forms, allowing neighboring RPS states to
trade RECs and encourage integration between RPS implemen-
tation and other state policies designed to reduce GHG through
both informal and formal agreements between states. 
Renewable energy—and RPSs—may offer similar opportu-
nities for states, much as other states are beginning to join com-
mon cause on other climate initiatives. Such collaborative
precedents might fruitfully guide states away from steps that sig-
nificantly constrain interstate movement of renewable energy
and potentially violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution. It is conceivable that policies that are in some way
designed to minimize the role of out-of-state renewables in
meeting RPS targets could face a Constitutional challenge.
Examples of such policies include those that confine acceptable
imports to those that arrive via a dedicated transmission line,
most notably Nevada and Texas. The Constitutional boundaries
are not at all clear in this area, especially given the recent depar-
ture from the Supreme Court of Justices William Rehnquist and
Sandra Day O’Connor, who held strong views on the power of
states in relation to the federal government. To date, no legal
challenges invoking the Commerce Clause have been brought
against a state RPS. Nonetheless, the very possibility of such a
challenge further underscores the potential benefits of greater
interstate collaboration to minimize the likelihood of such a 
confrontation.
Fourth, as the United States moves toward a de facto
national RPS through a tapestry of state-based programs, it is
important to find ways that the federal government can play a
constructive and supportive role. President George W. Bush
signed the Texas RPS into law in 1999. That statehouse experi-
ence has not, however, necessarily translated into constructive
federal engagement and support for continued state experimen-
tation with RPSs. Indeed, it is difficult to understate the antipa-
thy across partisan and regional lines that individuals
responsible for different areas of RPS development and imple-
mentation at the state level express over their dealings with the
federal government. Moreover, repeated fluctuation in the fed-
eral production tax credit for renewable energy has fostered a
boom-and-bust cycle for renewable development in a number of
states, leaving significant lags in the development of renewables
during those periods in which the credit has been terminated or
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Endnotes: Race to the Top continued on page 72
its status has remained uncertain. Additionally, state officials are
opposed to any federal legislation that would preempt or con-
strain existing state policies and are very concerned about any
steps that would penalize them for taking early actions. 
One constructive step that could occur on the national level
is a sequence of Congressional hearings designed to distill les-
sons from state practice that could guide future consideration of
the design of a federal RPS.41 Such hearings might also explore
models for a two-tier RPS system, with one tier that established
a national framework and national REC trading process along-
side another that allowed them to sustain renewable targets
above any federal level through their own programs. Terms for
state entrance into a possible federal program have been a major
focus in the creation of the RGGI, the multi-state effort to estab-
lish a carbon cap-and-trade program in the Northeast. This expe-
rience and lessons from other forms of intergovernmental
collaboration in environmental policy could also afford useful
guidance for possible models of state and federal cooperation
under a multi-tier RPS.
State policy makers perceive the federal production tax
credit as an essential step to level the playing field with conven-
tional sources that have long received a range of governmental
subsidies. They also acknowledge the need for federal assistance
in improving transmission capacity, particularly given the chal-
lenge of tapping renewable sources in remote areas and finding
ways to transfer such electricity to high-demand areas. In turn,
many state officials note that the federal government could also
promote interstate learning about RPS experience and help with
the development of common metrics to determine GHG impacts
as well as foster cross-state collaboration. It remains unclear
whether the federal government might at some point draw larger
lessons from the states and develop a nation-wide version of an
RPS that thoughtfully and systematically builds on the best prac-
tices of state experience. 
At present, the American experience resembles that of other
federated systems of government, such as the European Union
and Australia. In all of these cases, RPSs continue to proliferate
and mature, with the possibility of eventual incorporation into a
policy that applies across jurisdictions. For now, states have
moved to the cutting edge of this issue, having evolved in recent
years from modest experimentation to the assumption of central
roles in this area of climate policy development.
CONCLUSION
The 23 states that currently operate an RPS represent nearly
every region in the country. Each RPS embodies the same prin-
ciples, but tailor particular programs to special state circum-
stances. Early indicators suggest that RPSs have considerable
promise for boosting renewable energy supplies and doing so in
a cost-effective manner. The basic structure of an RPS involves a
blending of regulation and delegation of many choices to the
marketplace that is clearly appealing to a diverse set of elected
officials and organized interests. Collectively, the evolving and
expanding state experience with RPSs confirms the very real
potential of policy development that simultaneously advances
economic and environmental progress. At the same time, a num-
ber of implementation challenges have arisen that underscore the
importance of careful policy design.
Endnotes: Race to the Top
1 MAZMANIAN & KRAFT, TOWARD SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES: TRANSITION AND
TRANSFORMATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1999).
2 PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES (2004); WILLIAM T GORMLEY, THE
POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1983); ED SMELOFF & PETER ASMUS,
REINVENTING ELECTRIC UTILITIES (1987).
3 MATTHEW BROWN, RESTRUCTURING IN RETROSPECT (2001), available at
http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/restructing_in_retrospect.pdf
(last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
4 Barry G. Rabe & Philip Mundo, Business Influence in State-Level Environ-
mental Policy, in BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 265, 297 (Michael
Kraft & Sheldon Kamieniecki eds., 2007).
5 PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM (1995).
6 While all maintain some phase-in policy over a specified period of time, the
end target date tends to feature increasingly high levels of renewables. More
recent RPS enactment has tended toward more ambitious levels, consistently in
double-digits and as high as twenty percent by 2020 in California and 25 per-
cent by 2013 in New York.
7 For instance, approximately 80 percent of New Jersey’s new renewable capac-
ity must fall into Class I, which includes sources that have been deemed to have
the least environmental impact. In turn, New Jersey’s RPS features a “solar
carve-out,” which mandates that at least 90 megawatts of the new capacity in
that class must come from solar sources by 2008, and 1500 megawatts by 2020.
8 States have a clear incentive to attempt to retain any economic development
and environmental benefits from promoting renewables. See generally Barry G.
Rabe et al., State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation,
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2005).
9 COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION OF NORTH AMERICA, ENVI-
RONMENTAL CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE EVOLVING NORTH AMERI-
CAN ELECTRICITY MARKET (2002).
10 Tex. S. B. 20, 79th Leg., 1st C.S. (2005).
11 BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF
AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 49-62 (2004) [hereinafter RABE, STATE-
HOUSE AND GREENHOUSE].
12 PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS, REPORT TO THE 80TH TEXAS LEGISLA-
TURE 4 (2006), available at https://www.puc.state.tx.us/electric/reports/
renew/2006_Renew_Energy_Imp_Costs.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
13 R. WISER ET AL., EVALUATING EXPERIENCE WITH RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO
STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 14, available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/
reports/54439.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2007). 
14 Tex. S. Res. 20, 79th Leg. § 3(a) (2005).
15 Massachusetts Electric Utility Restructuring Act Ch. 164 (1997), available at
http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw97/sl970164.htm (last visited Apr. 14,
2007).
16 MASSACHUSETTS OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS AND BUSINESS REGULATION,
DIVISION OF ENERGY RESOURCES, RENEWABLE ENERGY PORTFOLIO STANDARD:
ANNUAL RPS COMPLIANCE REPORT FOR 2004 4 (2006), available at
http://www.mass.gov/doer/rps/rps-2004annual-rpt.pdf (last visited Apr. 14,
2007).
17 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
INTRODUCTION
T
he overwhelming consensus of the scientific community
is that climate change is upon us. The most recent reports
issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change confirmed with an even greater degree of certainty that
the earth is warming and that greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emis-
sions generated by humans and land use practices are causing a
warming trend and are poised to cause monumental damage.1
Our building stock presents enormous opportunities to address
the climate change challenge. Adopting green building practices
will further the goal of sustainability by providing effective tools
to mitigate the increase in GHGs and adapt to the irreversible
impacts of climate change. 
While climate change is a
crucial driver, there are other
significant factors that are mov-
ing the green building move-
ment forward. The cost of
energy fuels has risen, making
the goal of efficiently supplying
energy even more important.
Such cost increases seem likely
to continue, particularly if the
worldwide demand for energy
continues to increase. Interna-
tional geopolitical concerns
have led to a national call for
increased energy independence. The constantly increasing
demand for energy, projected to continue with the growth in
population and energy-intensive activities, has created serious
concerns about energy reliability. As siting and constructing new
generation facilities, transmission infrastructure, and pipelines
are difficult in our settled society, other means to deal with
energy demand are also required. Recent reports by military
advisers have added concerns about U.S. national security to the
list of reasons climate change should be addressed now. 
As these compelling drivers gain recognition, green build-
ings have moved into the ascendancy. Green building is being
employed as a major tool by government and the private sector to
address climate change.2 The Architecture 2030 Challenge,3
with its goal of making buildings dramatically more energy effi-
cient today and carbon neutral by 2030, is gaining acceptance
and was recently adopted as a goal by the U.S. Conference of
Mayors, the official nonpartisan organization of U.S. cities.
Many believe that the tipping point on green buildings has been
reached. The trade industry considers that soon Class A build-
ings that are not green will become Class B buildings, com-
manding lower prices and occupancy rates, as occurred with the
advent of air conditioning in an earlier generation. 
GOVERNMENT ACTION TO ADDRESS CLIMATE
CHANGE INCLUDES GREEN BUILDING INITIATIVES
In the absence of climate change legislation at the federal
level, the states have moved ahead with aggressive initiatives.
Twenty nine states, representing a population of over 180 mil-
lion, have developed some form of a climate action plan; four-
teen of those states have set GHG reduction targets. The
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states have entered into the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (“RGGI”) that sets caps on
carbon dioxide emissions from
electricity generation establish-
ing the first mandatory GHG
regime in the United States and
requiring emissions to be
reduced by ten percent by 2019.4
In February 2007, the Governors
of Arizona, California, New
Mexico, Oregon, and Washing-
ton signed an agreement estab-
lishing the Western Regional
Climate Action Initiative, a joint
effort to reduce GHG emissions
and address climate change.5
Several other regional efforts have been launched. The
Western Governors Association covers seventeen states and aims
to increase clean energy generation and energy efficiency.6
“Powering the Plains” was initiated by a group of five states in
the Midwestern United States: Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin,
North Dakota, and South Dakota. This group is working with
industry and clean energy advocacy groups to address energy
and agricultural issues.7 Similarly, the Southwest Climate
Change Initiative is a collaborative effort by Arizona and New
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Mexico to identify measures to reduce GHG emissions and pro-
mote clean energy and energy efficiency.8
Many states have taken steps individually to address climate
change. California, often a leader on environmental matters in
the United States, passed legislation in the fall of 2006 mandat-
ing statewide reductions in GHG emissions to 1990 levels by
2020 and 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.9 Numerous
other states have established various targets for GHG reductions,
and have adopted a suite of initiatives to increase energy effi-
ciency, promote green building, and foster the development of
renewable energy.10
In the face of the failure of the federal government to ratify
the Kyoto Protocol, local governmental entities in the United
States became a vigorous force in moving the country towards
compliance with the Protocol’s requirements. On February 16,
2005, the day the Kyoto Protocol went into effect, Mayor Neck-
les of Seattle, Washington launched the U.S. Mayors’ Climate
Protection Agreement.11 The goal was to have 141 mayors, the
number of countries that had ratified the Kyoto Protocol at that
time, sign on and commit to meet or beat the Kyoto Protocol tar-
gets in their own communities, a seven percent reduction from
1990 levels by 2012. As of April 2007, over 442 U.S. mayors
representing over 61 million people from every state in the union
and governed by leaders from every political party have joined
the U.S. Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement.12 The initiative
was endorsed by the U.S. Conference of Mayors. Joining in
another important program, over 240 local governments in the
U.S. collaborate with International Council on Local Environ-
mental Initiatives in its Cities for Climate Protection program.13
Through these and other mechanisms municipalities are
embarking on developing full fledged sustainability or climate
change action plans and setting their own GHG reduction goals.
For example, New York City recently launched an office of Long
Term Planning and Sustainability which has set as one of its
goals to reduce global warming emissions in New York City a
full thirty percent by 2030.14 San Francisco has set its goal at
achieving a twenty percent reduction from 1990 levels by
2012.15 Austin, Texas and Woodstock, New York have
announced that they are seeking to be essentially carbon neutral
by 2020. 
Local governments are addressing climate change with a
host of green building approaches. Such actions include chang-
ing land use regulations to discourage sprawl and increase den-
sity in urban centers, fostering green building construction,
promoting mass transit, biking, and pedestrian traffic, purchas-
ing cleaner vehicles and fuels, increasing energy efficiency,
reducing waste, planting trees, purchasing renewable energy, and
carbon offsets. Government is also engaging the citizenry and
businesses in the effort, recognizing that a sustainable future and
the required emission reductions can only be achieved with the
participation of the entire community.
GREEN BUILDINGS FACTS AND FIGURES
Green buildings, as they are commonly known, are high
performance buildings that: (1) increase the efficiency with
which buildings use energy, water, and materials; and (2) reduce
building impacts on human health and the environment through
better siting, design, construction, operation, maintenance, and
removal. While climate change has been an impetus for action,
the historic facts in the United States demonstrate the com-
pelling need to use green building practices to foster sustainabil-
ity. Currently, traditional buildings:
• Use 39 percent of all the energy consumed and 79 percent
of all the electricity;
• Are responsible for about 40 percent of the country’s emis-
sions of carbon dioxide, the principal cause of global
warming;
• Account for 49 percent of sulfur dioxide emissions, 25
percent of nitrous oxide emissions, and ten percent of par-
ticulate emissions, all of which degrade air quality; 
• Produce 136 million tons of construction and demolition
waste annually, as compared to 210 million tons of munic-
ipal solid waste; and
• Use 40 percent of the raw materials consumed globally.16
The trend to date has been away from sustainability: 
• Developed land in the United States has increased 34 per-
cent from 1982 to 1997;
• An American household uses on average 146,000 gallons
of water per year, 42 percent indoors and 56 percent out-
doors, a tenfold increase over the last 100 years;
• Mass transit ridership is down from a peak in 1946 of 23.4
billion to 9.4 billion in 2001; 
• Annual number of person miles traveled per capita
increased by 38 percent from 1969 to 1990, mostly
because of lengthened distances from home to work; and
• House sizes have more than doubled from 1950 to 
1999.17
The green building movement seeks to reverse these trends
and diminish the impact buildings have on the environment.
Green buildings provide an easy, cost effective opportunity for
climate change mitigation by reducing GHG emissions and
adopting more sustainable land use practices. Green buildings
provide the co-benefit of providing a means to adapt to the
inevitable warming caused by climate change and consequent
increase in demand for energy by curbing that increased demand
through design features. 
The opportunity presented by green building is enormous.
There are more than 76 million residential buildings and nearly
five million commercial buildings in the United States. Massive
energy savings can be achieved in this existing building stock by
implementing cost effective energy efficiency retrofits. By the
year 2015 the nation is projected to build fifteen million new
buildings; how these are built is critical to the future.
GREEN BUILDING FEATURES AND LEED
Green building design addresses all aspects of a building,
including siting, energy conservation, water conservation, land-
scaping, materials used, and indoor air quality. Founded just over
a decade ago, the United States Green Building Council
(“USGBC”) emerged as the leader of the green building move-
ment in the United States.18 Using a membership consensus
process, the USGBC developed a green rating system for new
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commercial construction and major renovation that is increas-
ingly utilized as the national standard for green buildings. 
The Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
(“LEED”) Green Building Rating System,19 first version 2.0
released in 2000, established a system that ranks buildings as
Certified, Silver, Gold, or Platinum based on the level of sustain-
ability achieved by construction and renovation projects. In late
2004, the USGBC issued a LEED Green Building Rating Sys-
tem for Existing Buildings, which creates a system for measur-
ing upgrades, operations, and maintenance. Following these
initial LEED programs, the USGBC added programs for com-
mercial interiors and core & shell, is piloting a program for
homes, is developing programs for neighborhood development,
schools, on campus projects, multiple buildings, and health care.
The LEED criteria serve the critical purposes of promoting sus-
tainable design features and cre-
ating a standard that can be
applied universally and credibly.
The LEED system has
gained wide acceptance. The
LEED training programs are
widely attended and there are
now over 35,000 accredited
LEED professionals who have
completed the rigorous training
and demonstrated proficiency in
green building strategies. There
are 735 LEED certified projects
to date but over 5,500 additional
buildings are registered for cer-
tification. 
LEED is being followed for construction and renovation at
every level of government. Several federal government agencies,
including the Department of Agriculture, Department of State,
NASA, U.S. General Services Administration (“GSA”), Army,
Navy, and Air Force, have adopted LEED standards for construc-
tion. Over twenty states have issued executive orders or laws that
require construction to LEED standards or otherwise mandate
green building practices consistent with LEED. These states
cover all regions of the country. As municipalities and counties
all over the country strive to reduce their carbon footprint, many
are mandating LEED certification for construction that they
fund or require green building practices consistent with LEED.
These encompass virtually every major city. Smaller communi-
ties are also legion in the ranks of those that have adopted LEED
as a standard for construction. Some communities have taken the
next step and have also mandated green building standards for
private residential construction.20
COSTS OF GREEN BUILDINGS
One of the major disincentives to the construction of green
buildings has been the view that they are more expensive. Com-
prehensive studies have demonstrated that this is not the case. A
report issued in October of 2004 by Davis Langdon Adamson
studied the actual construction cost of 45 LEED and 93 non-
LEED buildings and concluded that there was no statistical dif-
ference in construction costs for LEED versus non- LEED build-
ings.21 Similarly, a comprehensive study published in October of
2004 conducted for the U.S. GSA by Steven Winter Associates
Inc. concluded that a “LEED rating could potentially be
achieved within a standard GSA project budget without a green
building budget allowance.”22 A report released in October 2003
by Greg Kats, commissioned by the State of California’s Sus-
tainable Building Task Force (“California Study”), found a min-
imal average cost increase of about two percent. However, when
the many ancillary benefits of green buildings are added to the
analysis, the case for building green is compelling.23
BENEFITS OF GREEN BUILDINGS
The California Study addresses not only construction costs
but also benefits, using a life cycle costing perspective. Life
cycle costing is a much more accurate way to measure true cost
and is being increasingly
applied, not only in the private
sector but also by governmental
entities concerned about sustain-
ability. This approach often
enables public institutions to
make more sustainable and
healthier choices without being
faulted for sacrificing a seem-
ingly cheaper alternative that
might otherwise be politically or
even legally compelled. Apply-
ing life cycle cost, the California
Study concluded that while
energy savings alone, which are
typically in the order of 30 percent for green buildings, would
more than pay for any additional construction cost, when the
value of water conservation, emission reduction, waste reduc-
tion, commissioning operations and management, and health
and productivity gains is added, the additional costs to support
green design would on average result in life cycle savings of
more than ten times the initial investment in the green features.
What may prove to be most compelling to the marketplace
are the conclusions in the California Study relating the impact of
green buildings to human health and productivity. Based on a
thorough review of the numerous studies conducted on this
question, the California Report concludes that a conservative
value to attribute to the benefits in human health and productiv-
ity is a one percent overall increase. This attribute of green
buildings is not only supported by numerous studies, but also
makes sense intuitively: people work harder and more efficiently
in work environments with more comfortable thermal, light, and
ventilation levels. In the case of the California analysis, the con-
servative one percent increase in human productivity resulted in
a per square foot benefit of $36.89 to $53.33 depending on the
LEED level achieved over a twenty year life of the building, a
number many multiples higher than the additional cost of $3-$5
per square foot for the green building features.
With the many benefits of green buildings, incentives to
promote green building have already been initiated in many
The Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 established a host
of incentives to promote
green building and 
energy efficiency.
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jurisdictions. These incentives can often be utilized to drive
down the costs of building green even more.
GREEN BUILDING INCENTIVES
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established a host of incen-
tives to promote green building and energy efficiency. It is likely
that the 110th Congress, which is vigorously examining issues
related to global warming and energy independence, will pass
additional applicable legislation. Many local jurisdictions offer
design and consultation assistance, and a variety of incentives
for specific technologies to encourage green buildings. Direct
subsidies are offered for green features such as low flush toilets,
solar hot water heaters and other solar installations, and energy
smart appliances. These incentives change over time and each
jurisdiction must be consulted for its current offerings. Some
examples of additional innovative incentives include:
• Tax Credits—New York led the way with a green building
tax credit enacted in 2000 keyed to performance guide-
lines. Maryland, Nevada, Oregon followed with similar
enactments. 
• Expedited Permitting—Scottsdale, Arizona has imple-
mented a highly successful green building program by
offering a fast track plan review service that cuts building
permit time in half. The program is so successful that
about 21 percent of the residential permits in 2004 were
for green buildings. Similar programs are in place in sev-
eral other locales including Gainesville, San Diego, San
Francisco, and Sarasota County. 
• Density or Height Bonus—Arlington, Virginia offered
bonus density of between 0.15 and 0.35 FAR (floor-area
ratio) and/or an additional three stories in exchange for a
LEED Silver rating or higher. Portland, Oregon offers
three additional square feet for every square foot of vege-
tated roof in the project.
• Waiver or Reduction of Fees—San Antonio authorizes an
administrative waiver or reduction in certain development
fees for green buildings that meet specified standards. 
• Home Financing Incentives—Energy-efficient mortgages
are available through Fannie Mae, the Federal Housing
Authority, Freddie Mac, and the Veterans Administration.
Further, many private mortgage lenders have signed up to
become Energy Star Mortgage Partners; these enable
homeowners to qualify for a larger mortgage as a result of
projected energy savings.
CONCLUSION
Spreading the word about the attributes of green buildings is
the key to expediting their growth. The many benefits of green
buildings and the contribution they can make to the climate
change challenge are leading to increasing market demand.
Building appraisers and lenders are beginning to equate higher
performing buildings with greater occupancy rates, rents, and
resale values. Insurance companies are beginning to talk about
premium credits and building code enforcers are beginning to
understand green building features and are able to process per-
mit applications more quickly. 
The success of green buildings is illustrated by buildings all
over the country and is exemplified by the Durst buildings in
New York City. The Durst’s renowned Conde Nast building at 4
Times Square was such a success that the Durst Organization is
now in the process of completing the development of an adjacent
2.1 million square foot building with the Bank of America,
which seeks a LEED Platinum designation. Its features will
include construction largely of recycled or recyclable materials,
a state-of-the-art cogeneration plant, a gray water system to
recapture and reuse all rain and waste water, a green vegetated
roof that will reduce the heat island effect, carbon monoxide
detectors to add fresh air when necessary, maximum daylighting
and daylight dimming for greater occupant productivity, and
energy use reduction. 
Growing sensitivity to sustainable development and climate
change by government and corporate America, increasing inter-
est by homeowners in energy efficient and healthy homes, and
increasing knowledge of the low costs and many benefits of
green buildings are setting the stage for the burst in green build-
ing activity essential to reducing America’s ecological footprint,
reducing GHG emissions, and enabling the United States to
move towards living within its ecological means.
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D
ue to increasing concerns regarding energy policy, secu-
rity, and climate change, various alternative energy
resources recently enjoyed increased media and invest-
ment attention in both domestic and international spheres.1
Among these is “ocean energy,” which encompasses energy
derived from waves, tides, currents, and salinity and thermal
gradients.2 Like other resources, wave energy is imperfect, and
its development raises numerous challenges.3 However, wave
energy may have great potential, particularly in light of the
increasing environmental and economic costs of fossil and
nuclear energy, to provide clean, abundant, and sustainable
energy in suitable regions around the globe, or at least, to con-
tribute to the production of clean energy carriers (e.g., hydrogen)
for use in other applications.
Wave energy is, in essence, concentrated solar energy.4
Solar radiation creates temperature and air pressure differentials
on land and over water, which result in wind.5 These winds blow
over ocean surfaces, causing ripples, then chop, then developed
seas, and eventually, swells, which can travel thousands of miles
in deep water until dissipating their energy when they break on
shore.6 Wave energy technologies extract the kinetic energy
from surface waves, or from subsurface pressure fluctuations,7
and convert that energy into electricity, or make it available
directly for other purposes.8 Compared to traditional generation
resources, e.g., fossil fuel combustion and nuclear generation,
wave energy, with appropriate site selection and careful design,
is generally environmentally benign, does not directly generate
emissions or waste, is generally low-profile (far offshore or close
to or below the ocean’s surface), generally is more predictable
than solar and wind generation, and carries zero continuing fuel
cost.9 Research into wave energy extraction technologies began
in earnest following the oil crises of the early 1970s.10 However,
available financing diminished with depressed oil prices in the
1980s and 1990s.11 Wave energy technology garnered relatively
little research or investment attention since that time, and there-
fore, still is considered an emerging technology.12
Wave energy has limitations, many of which are economic
or technical.13 Extraction technology remains expensive, and is
not cost-competitive with traditional generation.14 For example,
extraction potential for deep ocean wave energy can be many
times greater than extraction potential at adjacent coastal sites,
but long-distance undersea transmission is prohibitively expen-
sive.15 Technical considerations, such as the oscillating, low-fre-
quency nature of wave energy, which would require it to be
converted to standard frequency before addition to the U.S.
national grid, and which present a potential reliability problem,
also must be addressed.16 Proving actual energy conversion
potential and demonstrating marine survivability of wave energy
extraction technologies also are among the challenges to be
overcome if wave energy is to become a viable, large-scale alter-
native resource.17 Despite these economic and technical obsta-
cles, however, the costs of wave energy extraction are decreasing.18
Relatively few large-scale wave energy extraction projects
currently are operational. However, in recent years, several com-
mercial projects have been installed, or are planned to be
installed, off of the coasts of Portugal and Scotland, among other
nations.19 In February 2007, citing “increasing interest in new
hydroelectric technologies,” including wave energy,20 and recog-
nizing the “significant potential,” for such technologies to
increase U.S. hydropower production,21 the U.S. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) issued an interim statement
of policy for review of preliminary permit applications for wave,
current, and river instream new technology projects.22 The
interim policy provides for, among other things, “strict scrutiny”
of new preliminary permit applications.23 However, while
FERC’s proposed regulations might delay wave and other energy
projects in the short term, increased regulatory certainty could,
in fact, foster future development.
Widespread implementation of wave energy extraction tech-
nologies could serve several sustainable development goals,
including enabling developing coastal and island nations to
increase electrification and standards of living, while minimiz-
ing carbon emissions and other pollution.24 If able to be included
in commercial generation portfolios in developed nations, wave
energy extraction technology might also reduce fossil fuel 
consumption and promote the concomitant benefits of such
reductions. Where technological limitations or reliability
requirements prevent interconnection with local electric trans-
mission infrastructure, wave energy extraction technologies
could be used in independent, off-grid operations for stand-
alone desalinization operations25 or hydrogen production.26
Realization of the promise of wave energy, which some com-
mentators describe as “too important to overlook,”27 will require
continued focused research, development, investment, and regu-
latory support. Current global environmental, economic, and
energy security concerns provide a strong mandate for such
efforts.
WAVE ENERGY: 
“NEW-WAVE” INTEREST IN AN OLD ALTERNATIVE RESOURCE
by Scott Johnson*
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INTRODUCTION
T
he issues of energy supply and climate change are insep-
arable. With the world’s demand for energy expanding,
and concerns about climate change growing, policy deci-
sions need to acknowledge the nuances of both problems. Fuel
supply for the automotive sector represents the most obvious
area where these issues overlap. 
While efficiency increases
in traditional hydrocarbon-
based fuel sources are sure 
to continue, world economic
growth will necessitate alterna-
tive energy resource develop-
ment. Options available for
change in the automotive sector
include: (1) switching to tech-
nology that uses an alternative
fuel source; or (2) increasing
fuel efficiency using fossil fuels. A brief analysis of these two
policy considerations is presented in this article.
The first section of this article will discuss viable fuel
source options that may be the answer to our increasing energy
needs; the common problems within each fuel source genre will
also be discussed. The second section explores options that poli-
cymakers—on the local, state, and national level—can make to
increase acceptance and prevalence of such alternatives.
VIABLE FUEL SOURCE OPTIONS
There are presently seven viable fuel sources for automotive
use.1 These options include six alternative sources: ethanol,
methanol, compressed natural gas, bio-diesel, hydrogen, electricity,
and, of course, petroleum. These fuel resources can be separated by
the nature of their production into three categories: (1) fuel sources
that must be manufactured (requiring “energy to make energy”);
(2) agricultural sources; and (3) fossil fuels. Regardless of the
option chosen, legal strategies will play a pivotal role in both the
final decision and the speed at which the transition is implemented.
It is important to remember that every viable option avail-
able today has considerable problems, some of which may be
alleviated by future technology, and others that will need to be
mitigated through regulation. When considering the environ-
mental impacts of alternative fuel sources, the discussion must
not be limited to only the impact on greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
levels, other environmental and economic impacts from these
decisions must be analyzed. 
For example, fuel sources that require “energy to make
energy” may increase society’s reliance upon traditional sources
of energy, i.e. coal, natural gas, hydroelectric, or nuclear. Expand-
ing the use of traditional energy sources will lead to an increase of
the environmental and economic problems currently attributed to
them (such as GHG emissions) and may result in economic reper-
cussions by complicating the pricing for these existing energy
services. In the case of agricultural sources, increasing pesticide
use to result in higher yields will
impact the environment and
human health. As a result,
reliance on agricultural sources
may complicate the food and
water markets that are currently
in place. Additionally, the
drilling and transportation of fos-
sil fuels can lead to environmen-
tal contamination upon the
occurrence of accidents. Geo-
politics can influence supplies of
fossil fuels; as a result, increas-
ing utilization of fossil fuels will maintain the current system of
economic vulnerability in producing nations.
FUEL SOURCES THAT MUST BE MANUFACTURED
Methanol
Methanol is an alcoholic compound capable of use as a fuel
source; virtually all domestic methanol uses methane derived
from natural gas associated with increased carbon emissions.2
Research and development shows the weakness of methanol as a
potential fuel because utilization results in low fuel economy
and high costs.3 Additionally, methanol requires additives to run
an engine negating many of its advantages (i.e. high octane rat-
ings).4 Methanol can also have serious negative effects on
human health and the environment5 in addition to other environ-
mental concerns associated with the leakage of methanol. 
Regardless of the negatives, independent technological
research in methanol continues, specifically focusing on the use
of methanol as a potential hydrogen carrier for fuel-cells.6 While
use of these fuel-cells would still result in emissions of carbon
dioxide at the point of use,7 the greatest amount of GHG emis-
sions in an economy that uses methanol as a fuel-cell carrier will
be in the production of methanol itself.8
Hydrogen
Hydrogen is a source for automotive power that is associated
with the use of fuel-cell technology. Hydrogen is a secondary
FUELING THE FUTURE: 
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source of energy, and increased levels of energy are necessary to
safely transport it,9 resulting in a high price of fuel for these
vehicles.  Additionally, the fact that hydrogen is highly com-
bustible creates a safety concern.10 This technology poses the
risk of increased explosions resulting from traffic accidents,
leading to high insurance-costs for these kinds of vehicles. The
combustible nature of hydrogen also adds to the cost of trans-
porting it. The use of “carriers,” such as methanol and ethanol,
might mitigate the risk of explosion in transporting hydrogen.11
Unfortunately, this technology is not yet developed. 
Electricity
Electric cars are able to tap into the preexisting complex
electric infrastructure. The attractiveness of this car is unfortu-
nately limited by a shortfall in battery technology. 
The electric batteries used to power the vehicles are far
more expensive than other batteries.12 The most recently devel-
oped electric vehicles utilize lithium ion batteries.13 These bat-
teries have several problems, including a tendency to catch fire,14
and such fires may have liability and litigation consequences.
The life-cycle approach results in problems regarding recycling
the batteries at the end of the car’s life, a cost that will eventually
be passed onto the consumers of the vehicles themselves. In
addition, the limited range of the batteries and the need for bat-
tery re-charging may reduce the likelihood of widespread con-
sumer acceptance.15 The problem of re-charging would also
complicate the utility market for electricity, as increases in
demand could potentially overwhelm current systems.
Common Problems With Manufactured Fuels 
All three of these fuel-options are most efficiently produced
by non-renewable fossil fuels.16 The resulting need for “energy to
make energy” does not contribute to a reduction of GHG emis-
sions. A solution is to investigate alternative energy resources
that can efficiently produce methanol, electricity, and hydrogen.
Nuclear energy is an option, but this source poses significant
environmental and safety concerns. Hydro-electric power is also
a consideration, but it is limited in availability and unlike nuclear
power, it is not climate neutral.17 Other primary sources of renew-
able power, such as wind, solar, geothermal, and wave, are not
adequately developed to satisfy the market at this time.18
As a result, the environmental impact of all three of these
options is largely dependent upon the method of production. With-
out adequate advances in the renewable sources listed above, a
reliance upon any fuel source that must be manufactured will
increase the demand for coal, natural gas, nuclear, and/or hydro-
electric production. Consequently, policymakers need to realize
that a reliance on manufactured fuel source must be coupled with
an increase in the development of other alternative energy sources. 
AGRICULTURALLY-BASED ENERGY PRODUCTS
Ethanol
Experts have shown that ethanol produced from corn, the
most prevalent method of production in the United States, is
inefficient.19 Sugarcane-based ethanol, which is prevalent in
Brazil, is a more efficient source of fermentable carbohydrates
than corn. Cellulosic ethanol (ethanol fuel produced from cellu-
lose) uses agricultural waste and shows promise in terms of effi-
ciency; however, the technology has not yet reached
maturation.20 Furthermore, whether agricultural waste can pro-
duce enough cellulosic ethanol to provide for the entire automo-
tive fuel market is an unanswered question. 
Other problems with ethanol, regardless of its source,
include the difficulty of transporting it to market, land use
change for the cultivation of the input products, increased water
consumption, and increased levels of nitrogen emissions.
Ethanol also requires refinement, thus its overall efficiency
would have to improve dramatically to justify it as an option.
Biodiesel 
Biodiesel is considered a clean burning alternative fuel, pro-
duced from domestic, renewable resources (such as new and
used vegetable oils and animal fats), that results in reduced car-
bon emissions. Additionally, biodiesel proponents argue that the
process of growing plants to manufacture the fuel will act as car-
bon sinks, offsetting the emissions. However widespread use of
bio-diesel will likely lead to land use change, another major con-
tributing factor to climate change.21 Concerns over water con-
sumption also exist, as hydro-politics in many areas are currently
complex. In addition, research suggests that biodiesel use may
lead to increased human health impacts.22
Common Problems With Agriculturally-Derived Fuels
Both bio-diesel and ethanol share common problems. By
relying on society’s ability to grow a necessary food source, we
would be placing our fuel supply at the mercy of the climate that
is currently changing and may impact agriculture. Heat waves,
forest fires, droughts, and other potential impacts from climate
change could place the food and energy supply in jeopardy. The
regulatory measures that need to address this problem include
requiring a reserve capacity of whatever fuel utilized. This would
require the producers of these fuel sources to be able to supply
more fuel than the market demands, thus, the efficiency of either
source would have to increase dramatically to be a reliable source.
The environmental impacts of a large-scale transition to
agriculturally-based energy products are not entirely known.
However, increases in land-use change, increased use of fertil-
izer and pesticides, increased water consumption, and perhaps
increases in air or water pollution depending upon the method of
production are all possible negative effects. Further, in areas of
food scarcity using agriculture to produce fuel may result in dire
conflicts. 
FOSSIL FUELS
Compressed Natural Gas
Compressed natural gas is a fossil fuel, and because it is a
finite resource, it is subject to price fluctuations and eventual
depletion. If used as automobile fuel, it will likely increase natu-
ral gas utility prices and further complicate the larger energy and
climate picture. In addition, increasing the value of natural gas
would lead to an increase in expeditions to find potential sources
of natural gas, which is often found in areas rich in crude oil.
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Discoveries of sources of crude oil usually leads to lower prices
for products derived from it, such as gasoline, diesel, and jet
fuel. These discoveries and the subsequent price decrease of
gasoline would slow the transition and stagger investment in
alternative fuels. Given these drawbacks, the costs of creating a
compressed natural gas infrastructure appear unjustified. Addi-
tionally, while fossil fuels represent the cheapest source of auto-
motive fuel at the current time, policy-makers must remember
that fossil fuels are exhaustible resources, and that eventual
depletion is possible.
ENCOURAGING THE CHANGES
The next question to be tackled is how to encourage people
to trust and purchase alternative fuel-powered vehicles. While
concerns about the environment and energy supply are present
amongst the populace, economics determine consumer actions.
In order to make the economics of alternative fuel vehicles more
attractive to consumers the tax code must be adjusted and
research and development must be encouraged by subsidizing
such projects. Policymakers must understand the importance of
these changes in order for alternative fuels to become the norm
in our society. 
TAX CREDITS AND DEDUCTIONS
One of the easiest ways to encourage alternative fuel vehicle
purchases is to increase the price of petroleum products. How-
ever, taxes on petroleum products are politically unpopular.
Absent large changes in political will, this policy decision is
unlikely to be chosen.
Tax credits and deductions are politically popular, and
could have a large effect on encouraging consumer transition to
alternative fuel sources. In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, dollar
for dollar tax credits are allowed for purchasers of new alterna-
tive powered vehicles, or highly efficient vehicles. The policy
implications of this Act is that consumers who can afford to pur-
chase new alternative fuel-powered vehicles may be rewarded
for doing so.23 Some states have also enacted similar tax incen-
tives for the purchase of alternative vehicles. However, the
downstream market of used-vehicles purchases is largely unaf-
fected, limiting the overall impact that such policies may have.
Regardless, tax credits and deductions are still mechanisms for
policymakers to convince American consumers to consider alter-
natively powered automobiles. 
ADDITIONAL INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE ALTERNATIVE
FUEL VEHICLES
Other laws can be enacted to provide small incentives to
encourage more consumers to utilize alternative fuels. For exam-
ple, many states have carpool lanes in metropolitan areas,
designed to relieve traffic congestion. In California, owners of
alternative fuel vehicles and hybrid vehicles are allowed to use
the carpool lanes regardless of the number of passengers.24 Sim-
ilar programs in other metropolitan areas, along with the inclu-
sion of all kinds of alternative vehicles in these programs, could
provide further encouragement. Additionally, minor local tax
incentives can encourage parking lots to allow preferential park-
ing for alternative fuel vehicles, or cities could waive parking
meter payments for alternative vehicle owners. Even though
such policies would require enforcement mechanisms to be
instituted to protect against fraud, the fines collected from
offenders could help to mitigate the program’s costs. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF SUBSIDIES
Another method to promote a policy change is to encourage
the government to support the development of alternatives as
viable substitutes. Absent major breakthroughs in research, all of
the renewable energy sources will require government subsidies
in order to develop into permanent solutions. 
At the federal level, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 is subsi-
dizing alternative energy development by slowly increasing the
minimum percentage of alternative automotive fuel sold or dis-
pensed to consumers.25 Grants have been authorized to fund
research on improving hybrid utilization,26 improving traditional
fuel efficiency,27 as well as other programs. Funding alternative
fuel infrastructure and development will continue to increase, as
it becomes a more prevalent concern among the electorate.28
Hydrogen29 and ethanol30 have received the lion’s share of
the distributed subsidy funds. This may reflect that these alterna-
tive fuel sources are favored by interest groups capable of influ-
encing the political system; it may also reflect piqued consumer
interest.
COMMON PROBLEMS
Despite the policy efforts taken by the government, alterna-
tive fuel sources still represent a small portion of the automotive
fuel market. While increasing interest in alternatives may ensure
continued funding for projects, vital technological innovations
will be necessary for alternatives to compete with traditional
fuels on a large-scale. Political decisions are often made based
on the political popularity of an idea, and popular ideas are not
always technologically viable.
CONCLUSION
The greatest challenge poised to policymakers tackling
energy security and climate change issues is time. Everyday
more carbon is emitted in the atmosphere, and more non-renew-
able energy sources are depleted. Quick action is necessary,
which will likely result in utilization of new technology without
knowing all of the possible complications that may arise. To pre-
vent this, and the backlash that would likely ensue, policymakers
must provide additional funding for study of the environmental
impacts of alternative fuels in their current stages of develop-
ment, especially accounting for the wide range of variability of
the impacts based on the method of production. 
In short, policymakers must continue to promote the devel-
opment of alternative fuel sources, but remain mindful of the
dangers involved in promoting alternatives without adequate
study. While the evaluation of many of these alternative sources
may have appeared pessimistic at times, we can only hope that
one of these sources will provide the answer to society’s increas-
ing energy demands.
Endnotes: Fueling the Future on page 73
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T
he United States is recognizing the value and importance
of energy diversification, but it may also be creating
greater environmental harm in the process.1 If America
decreases its dependence on foreign oil it will create greater eco-
nomic security for itself, reduce its current account deficit, pro-
vide less financing for tyrannical leaders and terrorists with
American petro-dollars, and improve its environmental creden-
tials.2 To reduce America’s craving for oil, the government
encourages domestic ethanol production; the United States is
behind only Brazil, the world’s largest producer of ethanol, and
combined the two produce over 70 percent of the world’s
ethanol.3 Currently the U.S. domestic ethanol industry is grow-
ing as a result of alternative fuels becoming politically popular,
and the addition of a subsidy and tariff applied to ethanol.4 How-
ever, arguably the ethanol tariff and subsidy do not provide any
substantial environmental benefits for the United States or the
world.5
The United States grants a 54 cent tax credit for each gallon
of ethanol in a qualified mixture, which is a mixture of alcohol
and gasoline.6 Additionally, the government provides extra pro-
tection to the ethanol industry from foreign competition by
imposing a 2.5 percent ad valorem tax and 14.27 cents per liter
tax on imported ethanol from countries with normal trade rela-
tions.7 Proponents of the tariff argue that it protects and pro-
motes a domestic industry, prevents the government from
subsidizing foreign ethanol production, and encourages the
development of cleaner technology.8
On closer inspection, ethanol produced from corn may gen-
erate as much pollution as the fossil fuels it replaces and may
create new environmental problems.9 Due to the growing
demand for ethanol, farmers intend to plant an estimated 88 mil-
lion acres of corn this year, the equivalent of covering Florida,
Georgia, and South Carolina in corn.10 In addition, farmers will
likely reduce crop rotation and replant fallow fields, which will
increase the use of fertilizers and insecticides and result in
greater pollution run-off into our water system.11 To replace the
United States’ current dependence on gasoline (140 billion gal-
lons per year) would take approximately 350 million acres of
corn (assuming 400 gallons per acre per year of ethanol).12 Since
greater ethanol production results from plants with higher cellu-
lose content, switchgrass or sugar cane should be used to pro-
duce ethanol, and thus, minimize the amount of land
cultivated.13
Besides having a higher cellulose content, sugar cane offers
several advantages over corn in the production of ethanol. First,
unlike corn, farmers plant sugar cane once every four to seven
years but harvest it yearly resulting in less soil erosion. Second,
sugar cane requires less fertilizers since it can obtain some of its
nitrogen from the air. Third, the energy to power the transforma-
tion from sugar cane to ethanol comes from burning the sugar
cane’s waste product and not from oil, gas, or the electrical grid
as with corn.14 Unfortunately with our current technology, even
if the United States produced most of its ethanol from sugar cane
or other crops with higher cellulose content it still would require
excessive amounts of land for cultivation.15
To protect its environment the United States should elimi-
nate the current ethanol tariff and subsidy, or at least focus the
subsidy on crops with high cellulose contents. In particular,
eliminating the tariff on ethanol will promote the growth of an
ethanol distribution system because more imports would enter
the country increasing the market for ethanol.16 In addition,
eliminating the ethanol tariff would increase the demand for
sugar cane, and thus, reduce third world countries’ excess sup-
ply. As a result, the price of sugar cane would increase providing
additional revenue to the third world sugar cane producers.17 The
additional sugar cane revenue entering these third world coun-
tries could foster the development of a middle class interested in
protecting their own environment and promoting sustainable
development.18 Finally, the elimination of the tariff and subsidy
could rekindle the trade negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the
Americas that stalled over agriculture and service industry dif-
ferences between Brazil and the United States.19
Even if America could end its thirst for foreign oil by using
crops with higher cellulose content and allowing greater imports
of ethanol from abroad, it still should encourage the develop-
ment of alternative renewable energies to ensure its economic,
national, and environmental security by ending its addiction to
foreign oil.20 The United States needs to seek alternative renew-
able energies, in addition to raising mileage standards for vehi-
cles, creating a carbon tax or tradable carbon market to
discourage the burning of fossil fuels in the development of
ethanol and other energy intensive industries, and end or refocus
its subsidy to more efficient crops.21 These steps would allow for
American oil dollars to end up in the pockets of Americans and
its neighbors to the North and South rather than in the pockets of
potentially tyrannical regimes or hostile terrorists.22
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INTRODUCTION
E
thanol is poised to become one of America’s most impor-
tant renewable energy sources in the near future. A com-
plex web of state and federal subsidies to ethanol
producers, refiners, and corn growers supports this fuel. Without
these subsidies, America’s thriving ethanol trade would not exist.
This article outlines the most important laws that provide the
financial largesse upon which ethanol production depends—the
analysis of the sustainability of ethanol is left to the reader.
Rather, the goal of this article is to explain how these laws and
policies operate, with the aim of helping the reader understand
the strong influence of government intervention throughout all
aspects of ethanol production and distribution. In short, this arti-
cle will demonstrate that American ethanol production has
become the business of government.
RECENT HISTORY OF ETHANOL SUBSIDIES
On October 22, 2004 President Bush signed into law the
American Jobs Creation Act. By providing a new excise tax credit
system for all ethanol blends and biodiesel, this law significantly
changed the way taxes are collected on gasohol (a fuel mixture
containing ethanol and gasoline) and other ethanol blends. Effec-
tive January 1, 2005, the Act eliminated the reduced rate of excise
tax for gasohol blends containing ten percent, 7.7 percent, and 5.7
percent ethanol. It replaces this tax with the Volumetric Ethanol
Excise Tax Credit (“VEETC”), a $0.51 per gallon excise tax
credit for each gallon of ethanol blended with gasoline. Addition-
ally, the Act extends the ethanol tax incentive to 2010 and deposits
all taxes paid on gasohol and other ethanol blends into the High-
way Trust Fund (while the credits are paid for out of the General
Fund). Furthermore, farmer cooperatives may now also claim the
small ethanol producer tax credit that was created in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 under this Act.1
CORN SUBSIDIES
Perhaps most importantly, U.S. taxpayers subsidize the pro-
duction of corn itself, to the tune of $51.3 billion from 1995 to
2005, according to the Environmental Working Group.2 Without
these subsidies, no corn-based ethanol would be produced in the
United States. The Department of Agriculture reported that corn
ethanol’s variable production costs are $0.96 per gallon, with cap-
ital costs averaging $1.57 per gallon. In total, ethanol costs an
average of $2.53 per gallon to produce in the United States.3 A
recent study published by the International Institute for Sustain-
able Development (“IISD”) estimates that U.S. subsidies for
ethanol totaled approximately between $5.1 billion and $6.8 bil-
lion in 2006.4 These subsidies translate into $1.05 to $1.38 per gal-
lon of ethanol, or 42 to 55 percent of its wholesale market price.5
IMPORT TARIFFS
Today, importers of Brazilian ethanol pay a $0.54 per gallon
import duty plus a 2.5 percent tax. This import tariff shields U.S.
producers from their Brazilian counterparts, whose sugar-
derived ethanol is far cheaper to produce and has higher energy
content than corn-based fuel.6 Even with the tariffs in place,
about half of the 160 million gallons of ethanol that the United
States imported in 2004 came from Brazil, and Brazil is spend-
ing $ nine billion on new facilities to export even more.7 This
could pay off, as soaring U.S. wholesale prices are making
Brazilian imports more competitive with domestic supplies. The
import tariff will expire at the end of September 2007, but many
federal legislators hope to see it extended8 because it has gener-
ated revenues of $53 million and $22 million in 2004 and 2005,
respectively.9 Additionally, a most-favored nation ad valorem
tariff is applied on imports of un-denatured ethyl alcohol (80
percent volume alcohol or higher) and denatured alcohol.10 Rev-
enues under the ad valorem tariff have been less than eight mil-
lion dollars per year in recent years.11
VOLUMETRIC ETHANOL EXCISE TAX CREDIT
Enacted in 2004 under the Jumpstart Our Business Strength
Act, the VEETC provision is the single largest subsidy to
ethanol.12 VEETC provides a tax credit based on ethanol
blended into motor fuel. According to IISD’s Global Subsidies
Initiative, “[i]t is awarded without limit, and regardless of the
price of gasoline, to every gallon of ethanol blended in the mar-
ketplace, domestic or imported.”13 The cost to the U.S. Treasury
from the subsidy is rising rapidly. In 2005, the Joint Committee
on Taxation (“JTC”) estimated that tax losses from the VEETC
would average $1.4 billion per year for the period 2005 to
2009.14 A year later, the JTC’s estimate increased more than 50
percent, averaging $2.2 billion per year for the period 2006 to
2010.15 The U.S. Treasury estimated an even higher cost value,
an average of $2.6 billion per year from 2005 to 2011.16
Actual demand growth, however, is outstripping govern-
ment estimates. Sales for 2006 resulted in VEETCs worth $2.5
billion, higher than either the Treasury’s or the JTC’s projections
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for the year.17 Demand is expected to continue to grow greatly
during the coming years. Projecting the cost of the VEETC pro-
vision is difficult in such a quickly expanding market, but the
Renewable Fuel Standard mandates “provide one stable bench-
mark against which to estimate VEETC subsidies.”18 Presuppos-
ing that the nation will meet these targets, revenue losses will
increase to $3.8 billion a year by 2012, when 7.5 billion gallons
of ethanol must be expended.19 This equates to a $3.05 billion
per year average for revenue losses for the period 2007 to 2012,
which is well above both Treasury and JTC estimates. In its 2006
Annual Energy Outlook, the Energy Information Agency
(“EIA”) projects corn ethanol consumption of $9.64 billion in
2012, far surpassing the $7.5 billion mandate, which the EIA
expects to be passed in 2010.20
An important issue is whether the credits themselves are tax
exempt. Even the tiniest changes in the interpretation of the tax
code can greatly affect aggregate subsidy values.21 If the tax
credit were includable income, the total subsidy would be the
revenue loss estimated above. If the credit were not includable,
however, the VEETC subsidy would increase by more than one
billion “on an outlay-equivalent basis.”22 Thus, the “total subsidy
value” during the 2006 to 2012 period of the renewable fuel
standards would be approximately $ nine billion higher.23
In January of 2005, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)
issued a guidance document on implementation issues related to
the VEETC.24 The guidance on implementation of VEETC was
silent on the tax treatment of the credits and indicated an inclina-
tion to characterize VEETC as non-includible in taxable income
until clearly instructed to do otherwise.25
THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005
The Chart entitled “Government Support for Bio-Fuels”
lists the amount of money earmarked for each subsidy program,
as it was outlined in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPACT
2005”). What is extremely troubling to realize is that this mone-
tary support does not displace the amount of money already
being given to farmers for corn production. Rather, this money
adds to the total amount that all individuals involved in ethanol
production will consume from U.S. taxpayers. For example, Sec-
tion 1342, Title XIII, Subtitle D of EPACT 2005:
“Provides a tax credit equal to 30 percent of the cost
alternative refueling property, up to $30,000 for busi-
ness property. Qualifying alternative fuels are natural
gas, propane, hydrogen, E85 [(85 percent ethanol)], or
biodiesel blends of [twenty percent] [(]B20[)] or more.
Buyers of residential refueling equipment can receive a
tax credit for $1,000. For non-tax-paying entities, the
credit can be passed back to the equipment seller. The
credit is effective on purchases put into service after
December 31, 2005. It expires December 31, 2009.”26
Additionally, EPACT 2005 modifies the definition of “small
ethanol producer” so that facilities that produce up to 60 million
gallons per year (previously 30 million gallons per year) are eli-
gible for the tax credit.27
RENEWABLE FUELS STANDARD
Title XV of EPACT 2005 gave a huge boost to the ethanol
industry by establishing a national Renewable Fuel Standard
(“RFS”), which requires that gasoline sold in the United States
contain a specified volume of biofuels and sets a target of 7.5 bil-
lion gallons of ethanol produced by 2012. The volume is “allo-
cated to all refiners, marketers and importers on a pro rata
basis.”28 Virtually all of this mandate will be met with traditional
(corn) ethanol despite sales-volume credits awarded to cellulosic
ethanol.29
The RFS has been highly successful in creating incentives
for ethanol and 2006 marked a new record in ethanol production
in the United States with some 4.9 billion gallons being pumped
out of the refineries. Because capacity expansion is proceeding
at tremendous rates, with approximately 80 refinery projects
underway and an expected added capacity of six billion gallons
by the middle of 2009, the RFS are now considered a floor for
ethanol production and not a target. Indeed, President Bush’s
recent announcement of a production target for 35 billion gal-
lons by 2017 will further build up the ethanol industry.30
The federal RFS does not preclude states from issuing more
ambitious mandates of their own; however, none of the estimates
above includes the price effects of state-level mandates. State
renewable fuel mandates, if they are more stringent than the fed-
eral requirement, can further increase price distortions within
their respective states.31 If the state mandates are equivalent or
less stringent than federal ones, no price distortions should be
reserved.32 However, state policies requiring the use of specific
feedstocks or quotas on locally produced fuels may result in an
incremental price effect where the percentage target does not
differ from the federal mandate.33
CHART 1: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BIOFUELS, ENERGY
POLICY ACT OF 2005.
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BIOFUELS
ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005
Program Fiscal Years Total Amount
Sugarcane Ethanol Program 2005-2007 $36 million
Cellulosic Biomass Ethanol 
and Municipal Solid Waste 
Loan Guarantee Program N/A $1 billion
Cellulosic biomass ethanol 
conversion assistance 2006-2008 $750 million
Ethanol production at 
Mississippi State and 
Oklahoma State universities 2005-2007 $12 million
Renewable Fuels Research 
and Development Grants 2006-2010 $125 million
Advanced Biofuels 
Technology Program 2005-2009 $550 million
Sugarcane Ethanol Loan Up to $50 million
Guarantee Program N/A per project
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PRICE EFFECTS & MARKET HEDGING
As the demand for ethanol rises as a result of purchase man-
dates, prices of intermediate inputs often rise as well—these are
goods and services consumed during the production process,
such as feedstocks and construction services to build ethanol
production plants.34 Where they occur, price increases may
exclude buyers in more price sensitive markets,35 which tend to
be poor and grain-importing countries.36 While not all related
products are expected to increase in price, co-products such as
distillers’ grain are expected to experience “price erosion” as the
increase in supply far outpaces market demand.37
Mandates may have the
effect of greatly reducing the
downside risk to producers.38
High gasoline prices and elimi-
nation of methyl tert-butyl ether
(“MTBE”) mean that demand
for ethanol will likely rise
regardless of the federal RFS.
Investors recognize than
demand is often fickle and
expect non-ethanol MTBE
alternatives to emerge over the
long-term.39 Similarly, rising
crop prices and/or falling fuel prices could very well reduce the
economic rationale for using ethanol. 
STATE SUPPORT AND ETHANOL PRODUCTION:
THE MINNESOTA MODEL
Many states vested in ethanol production have passed their
own types of ethanol subsidy laws. Indeed, some states make
direct payments to ethanol producers. Minnesota has imple-
mented a policy to award manufacturers a twenty-cent-per-gallon
producer incentive to support the state’s ethanol production.40
Similarly, a South Dakota subsidy program provided $3.1 mil-
lion to ethanol plants in just three towns in 2001.41 Nebraska
also pursued a similar policy awarding 60 cents in federal and 20
cents in state subsidies per gallon of ethanol produced.42 Twenty
states have similarly awarded tax credits or other incentives to
construct ethanol and biofuel production plants.43
Minnesota has by far been one of the most aggressive and
forward thinking states in passing ethanol legislation. In 1987,
the state legislature attempted to capitalize on Minnesota’s
largest crop, corn, by granting the Minnesota Department of
Agriculture $100,000 per year to conduct an ethanol promotion
program.44 The Minnesota Ethanol Commission was established
to promote the production and use of ethanol in Minnesota. By
1995, the commission’s purpose was furthered by a statutory
goal to develop 220 million gallons of Minnesota ethanol pro-
duction.45 This goal was quickly surpassed. Minnesota ethanol
production in 2006 was projected at 550 million gallons.46
As of June 2006, sixteen Minnesota facilities were produc-
ing ethanol.47 Minnesota has 226 public pumps, nearly one-third
of the 755 public pumps nationwide.48 By 2010, Minnesota cars
must begin running on twenty percent ethanol.49 Many Min-
nesotans believe that ethanol will play a large role in the transi-
tion from oil to something else.50
In 2005, Corn Plus, a 750-member farmer co-op, achieved
substantial efficiency gains in ethanol production.51 The major-
ity of ethanol facilities require one unit of energy to about 1.6
units of ethanol.52 Corn Plus, using assorted efficiencies, has
improved that ratio to nearly one to six through a process called
a fluidized bed biomass incinerator which burns a recycled
ethanol byproduct as steam cogeneration to power the facility.53
Since pioneering the technology, Corn Plus reduced natural gas
consumption by more than half.54
In order to protect its promising new industry, Minnesota
has taken steps to combat the
influence of corporations in their
state subsidized ethanol industry.
In 2002, the Minnesota Corn
Processors cooperative, formerly
owned by 5,500 Minnesota
farmers and the country’s sec-
ond-largest ethanol producer,
voted to sell all its shares in an
ethanol plant to Archer Daniels
Midland Company (“ADM”)
and subsequently believed that
the cooperative board deceived
the farmers in the sale.55 Consequently, Minnesota introduced a
law in 2003 to ensure that members of agricultural cooperatives
would have increased access to information and have more
direct influence over their cooperative policies.56 A law was also
introduced strengthening the state’s ethanol producer payment
program, restricting subsidies to those facilities owned by a
majority of farmers and requiring the repayment of subsidies if
the ethanol plant was sold to a corporation whose shareholders
were not mostly Minnesota farmers.57
The Minnesota model of ethanol production provides an
alternative scheme to how government intervention into ethanol
production can yield the most profitable results. By requiring
that farmers be the majority shareholders in order for ethanol
production plants to receive state subsidies, the Minnesota law
directs financial resources to moderately-sized, family-owned
farms. Thus, this law keeps financial resources in the rural com-
munity where the corn is grown and production occurred.
Because those profiting from the sale of ethanol are local farm-
ers and not larger corporate interests (such as an out-of-state cor-
poration like ADM), revenues are re-invested locally. 
INCREASING THE SCOPE: PENDING ETHANOL
LEGISLATION AND SUBSIDIES
There are currently a number of bills circulating in both the
U.S. Senate and House of Representatives that call for amend-
ments promoting the expansion of ethanol use through subsidies
to ethanol producers and distributors. Importantly, none of the
bills alter the subsidy scheme that has been used in the past. As a
result, all of the new bills merely add more layers of government
intervention and support.
Many states vested in
ethanol production have
passed their own types of
ethanol subsidy laws.
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The first is the American Fuels Act of 2007.58 The proposed
Act offers an incentive for the retail sale of E-85 (fuel blends of
85 percent ethanol and fifteen percent gasoline) starting at $0.35
per gallon (before 2010) and decreasing to $0.10 per gallon in
2012. Furthermore, the bill has incorporated another financial
incentive that pays for 50 percent of the equipment used to blend
and process ethanol. The incentive caps at $2,000,000, the
amount that ethanol producers can garner from the government
for the equipment.59 The bill also includes tax credits for manu-
facturers of flexible fuel motor vehicles. 
Another proposed law is the Dependence Reduction
Through Innovation in Vehicles and Energy Act (“DRIVE Act”),
introduced in the House of Representatives. The bill includes an
“Ethanol Action Plan” that calls for ten percent ethanol in the
transportation fuel supply by December 31, 2015.60 This bill also
proposes to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by
increasing the ethanol tax credit from thirty percent to fifty per-
cent of the cost of any qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling
property put into service by the taxpayer. A refueling property
will qualify as an alternative fuel vehicle refueling property if at
least 85 percent of the volume is ethanol (amongst other alterna-
tive fuels). 
The Biofuels Security Act of 2007 calls for the increase of
renewable fuels to 60 billion gallons by 2030. The bill also
requires the installation of E-85 pumps at an increasing percent-
age of refueling stations by “major oil companies” at owned and
branded stations. The Biofuels Security Act also provides incen-
tives for the manufacture of dual fuel vehicles in order to pro-
mote the use of vehicles that utilize ethanol and other alternative
fuels. 
Many of the proposed subsidies being contemplated for
ethanol producers are taking the form of tax incentives. These
subsidies operate by making ethanol producers pay less in taxes,
thus keeping more money for investment. One such amendment
to the IRS is the E-85 Investment Act of 2007, which would
increase the incentives for E-85 “fuel vehicle refueling prop-
erty” related to ethanol from 30 percent to 75 percent.61 Another
bill, the Independence from Oil with Agriculture Act of 2007,
proposes permanent tax incentives for alternative energy.62 The
Renewable Fuels and Energy Independence Promotion Act of
2007 further anticipates permanent tax incentives for ethanol
and biodiesel.63 The “To Encourage Alternatively Fueled Vehicle
Manufacturing up for Energy Independence Act of 2007,” also
known as “TEAM up for Energy Independence Act,” plans to
amend the IRS Code to impose an excise tax on automobiles
sold in the United States that are not compatible with alternative
fuels.64 Other legislation promoting the use of ethanol is the
“Congress Leads by Example through Alt-fuel Resources Act,”
or the CLEAR Act, which proposes to prohibit the use of a
Member’s Representational Allowance to provide any individual
with a vehicle, including providing an individual with a vehicle
under a long-term lease, which is not an alternative fuel vehicle.65
As their names indicate, these legislative bills attempt to
capitalize on the yet unproven exogenous benefits promised by
ethanol producers. Although this pending legislation will not
necessarily be enacted into law, it is important to realize that
Congress is contemplating an array of ethanol subsidies. If even
a minority of these ethanol subsidies were passed, it would add
to the growing government largess that artificially supports
ethanol production. 
CONCLUSION
The policy relationships embedded in ethanol production,
based on ever-growing tax incentives and subsidies, will likely
be perpetuated until one of two events occurs. Ethanol subsidies
and protective tariffs might lead to the establishment of an
“ethanol infrastructure” that will be competitive and independ-
ent of government support. Alternatively, there is the risk that
government intervention could lead to ever-greater dependence
on government protection and price supports. Regardless of
which scenario occurs, it is important to realize the full scope of
the support that is occurring. Ultimately, the laws that mandate
billions of dollars toward subsidizing ethanol production repre-
sent a policy risk. It is our hope that by understanding the laws
behind ethanol production, a more informed assessment of that
risk can be made. 
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T
he United States consumes over twenty million barrels of
petroleum products each day, over half of which is
imported.1 Oil consumption is currently center stage in
the national debate over how to address our oil addiction. Since
almost half of our petroleum is used for automobiles, changing
the way we power our cars is essential to any solution. A sustain-
able answer must combine vehicle efficiency, technological
innovation, and clean renewable fuels. 
One promising alternative to petroleum for gasoline is cel-
lulosic ethanol made from switchgrass. Cellulosic ethanol is the
same final product as corn or starch ethanol but made through
another process from different raw materials.2 These differences
result in a product that replaces more renewable energy than
corn ethanol with a more favorable energy balance.3,4 In addi-
tion, using switchgrass also reduces both greenhouse gas emis-
sions and fossil fuel use because a primary co-product of
cellulosic ethanol production is lignin which is similar to coal
and can be used to power cellulosic ethanol plants.5,6
Switchgrass is a fast-growing, cellulose rich, hardy grass
native to the mid-western United States.7 As an energy crop
switchgrass offers many potential benefits because it thrives
within our existing infrastructure.8 First, switchgrass shows
great promise for improving its yields in part because it is well-
adapted to our climate and soils.9 Second, switchgrass grows
well, up to ten feet high in a single growing season.10 Third,
switchgrass does not require the extensive fertilizers and other
chemicals that many traditional crops, such as corn, need.11
Thus, switchgrass offers energy, environmental, and agricultural
benefits over traditional crops. 
As a result of its biological characteristics, switchgrass also
offers additional benefits over other traditional energy crops.
First, its robust root system can help prevent erosion and act as a
filter for runoff from other crops, thus preventing water pollu-
tion.12 Second, switchgrass has a superior ability to sequester
carbon in the soil which has very positive implications for its
carbon lifecycle.13 Third, switchgrass absorbs nitrogen more
effectively than corn and other crops.14 Finally, using switch-
grass will likely decrease coal, natural gas, and other fossil fuel
consumption.15
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 included several provisions
promoting increased ethanol use such as a $0.51 tax credit per
gallon of ethanol used as motor fuel and a mandate for up to 7.5
billion gallons of renewable fuel to be used in gasoline by
2012.16 Before those provisions can be implemented more
research studying the environmental impacts of switchgrass
must be done including: air pollution, energy efficiency, and via-
bility of commercial cellulosic ethanol production. In addition,
other types of ethanol should not be ruled out since their com-
mercial viability is currently more advanced and their energy
benefit might increase when manufactured in conjunction with
cellulosic.17 Overall, switchgrass promises to be an extremely
viable energy crop that can help the United States reduce its fos-
sil fuel consumption with a renewable biofuel that can be grown
within its existing agricultural infrastructure. 
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2 Environmental Science & Technology Online News, How Green is Ethanol as
a Renewable Fuel? (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/
journals/esthag-w/2006/feb/policy/kc_ethanol.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
3 Environmental Science & Technology Online News, id.
4 Roel Hammerschlag, Ethanol’s Energy Return on Investment: A Survey of the
Literature 1990-Present, 40 ENVIRON. SCI. TECH. 1744 (2006).
5 Alexander E. Farrell et al., Ethanol Can Contribute to Energy and Environ-
mental Goals, 311 SCI. 506, 506-07 (2006).
6 Environmental Science & Technology Online News, supra note 2.
7 Bioenergy Feedstock Information Network, Biofuels from Switchgrass:
Greener Energy Pastures, http://bioenergy.ornl.gov/papers/misc/switgrs.html
(last visited Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Bioenergy Feedstock].
8 Natural Resources Defense Council, Growing Energy: How Biofuels Can
Help End America’s Oil Dependence (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.nrdc.
org/air/energy/biofuels/biofuels.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
9 Bioenergy Feedstock, supra note 7. 
10 Bioenergy Feedstock, supra note 7.
11 Natural Resources Defense Council, supra note 8. 
12 Bioenergy Feedstock, supra note 7.
13 Natural Resources Defense Council, supra note 8.
14 Natural Resources Defense Council, supra note 8.
15 Farrell et al., supra note 5, at 507. 
16 Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 15801.
17 Hammerschlag, supra note 4.
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INTRODUCTION
O
n August 8, 2005, President George W. Bush signed into
law the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the “Act”), the first
major piece of energy legislation in over a decade. Con-
gress enacted this law to encourage energy efficiency and con-
servation, to promote alternative and renewable energy sources,
to reduce dependence on foreign sources of energy, and to
increase domestic production of oil and natural gas. While the
purpose of the Act—“to ensure jobs for our future with secure,
affordable, and reliable energy”1—is simple, the Act’s scope and
range are far-reaching and its implementation requires several
federal agencies to work together, as well as separately, to
achieve the goals outlined above. 
The Department of the Interior (“DOI” or “Interior”) and, in
particular, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) and the
Minerals Management Service (“MMS”), play critical roles in
implementing the Act and developing many of its initiatives and
programs with respect to energy resources on public lands
onshore and on the outer continental shelf (“OCS”). No fewer
than 86 Sections of the Act require DOI action, and many of
these Sections prescribe time deadlines to complete rulemaking
or other activities. It is not surprising that so many Sections of
the Act are directed at DOI because Interior-managed onshore
and offshore resources are responsible for 30 percent of the
domestic production of oil and natural gas, 50 percent of geot-
hermal resources, and five percent of wind energy.2
In less than two years following enactment, DOI has timely
met, or is on schedule to meet, most of the deadlines prescribed
by the Act. In the few instances where significant deadlines were
not met or likely will not be met based on the current status of
the implementation process, DOI’s delay often is understand-
able. For example, in certain cases the prescribed deadlines were
somewhat unrealistic from the outset (such as the requirement
under Section 344 to issue a final rule on deep gas royalty relief,
an extremely complicated rule, within 180 days of enactment).
In other situations, the statutory direction Congress provided
was either incomplete or unclear, requiring Interior to speculate
as to Congress’ purpose. Also, some of DOI’s requirements
under the Act involve inter-agency coordination which often
requires additional time. Compounding the implementation
issues, particularly where Congress’ intent is unclear, is the lack
of legislative history explaining how Congress intended the Act
to be implemented. The Conference Report accompanying the
Act consists of approximately 1,700 pages of statutory provi-
sions and only one paragraph of text.3
This article examines DOI’s progress, and in particular
BLM’s and MMS’ efforts, in implementing selected Sections of
the Act that relate to oil and gas, geothermal energy, and alterna-
tive energy. The article highlights some of the statutory interpre-
tation and other legal issues that Interior encountered during the
implementation of some of these Sections, which in some
instances has caused DOI to miss deadlines. While there is still
more work to be done, a review demonstrates that, less than two
years after enactment, BLM and MMS had substantially met
Congress’ challenge and completed or initiated an enormous
number of tasks. 
IMPLEMENTING THE ACT: REVIEW OF
INTERIOR’S RECORD TWO YEARS LATER
Set forth below is a discussion regarding principal Sections
of the Act related to three resources produced on public lands
onshore and on the OCS: oil and gas, geothermal energy, and
alternative energy. Sections relating to each resource are organ-
ized by the implementation deadlines the Act imposes from ear-
liest to latest. 
OIL AND GAS
Actions Effective on the Date of Enactment of the Act
Naval Petroleum Reserve Numbered 2, Sections 331 and
332: These Sections provide that administrative jurisdiction and
control over all public domain lands4 included within Naval
Petroleum Reserve Numbered 2 (“NPR-2”), located in Kern
County, California, are to be transferred from the Department of
Energy (“DOE”) to DOI.5 The Act also provides that certain rev-
enues from existing leases and new leases will be deposited into
a U.S. Treasury account, and the amounts in that account are
available to DOI, without further appropriation, for environmen-
tal remediation and transition costs related to the transfer and
leasing of NPR-2 lands.6 On March 6, 2006, BLM issued a final
Environmental Assessment and proposed land use plan amend-
ment for further oil and gas leasing.7 BLM held its first lease
sale in NPR-2 on September 13, 2006 and leased five parcels
totaling 2,533 acres (the balance of the unleased acreage) for
$1.6 million. The transfer from DOE to BLM was effective on
the date of enactment. BLM has far more experience than DOE
in managing oil and gas production. BLM’s management of
NPR-2 should result in enhanced production from existing
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leases, increased efforts to lease the remaining portions of NPR-
2, and improved environmental monitoring.
Deepwater Royalty Relief, Section 345: This Section
requires DOI to provide a royalty relief incentive for Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”)8 leases in water depths
greater than four hundred meters in the Western and Central
Planning Area of the Gulf of Mexico during the five-year period
following enactment of the Act. It also prescribes royalty sus-
pension volumes (i.e. volumes of production for which no roy-
alty would be owed) for each lease in four specified water depth
ranges. The Act authorizes royalty suspension volumes of up to
sixteen million barrels of oil equivalent for each lease in water
depths greater than two thousand meters.9
The action prescribed by Section 345 was effective upon
enactment. The relief provisions have been included in all leases
issued since that date. Whether the prospect of increased royalty
relief will result in heightened interest in these OCS areas and
higher bonus bids for leases will depend on industry projections
as to whether prices for oil and gas will remain above the price
thresholds that operate to suspend the royalty relief. In January
2007, the House of Representatives passed H.R.6,10 which
among other things would eliminate the royalty relief provided
by this Section. H.R. 6 is currently under consideration by the
Senate.
Actions Required Within 45 Days After Enactment 
of the Act
Oil and Gas Leasing In Tar Sands Areas, Section 350: Sec-
tion 350 provides DOI with the authority to issue separate leases
in tar sands areas on federal lands for the exploration and devel-
opment of oil and gas and for the exploration and development
of tar sands, as opposed to the previous practice of issuing a
combined lease for the exploration and development of oil, gas,
and tar sands. Section 350 prescribes a time limit of 45 days after
the date of the enactment of the Act for DOI to issue a final rule
implementing this Section.11 On May 18, 2006, BLM issued a
final rule implementing this Section.12 However, BLM already
had implemented this new authority in an interim final rule on
October 7, 2005, 60 days after enactment.13 This action has been
completed. The ability to obtain access to the conventional oil
and gas resources without the tar sands issues should increase
industry interest in the area.
Actions Required Within 90 Days After Enactment 
of the Act
BLM Pilot Project Offices, Section 365: Section 365 directs
DOI to enter into a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”)
within 90 days after enactment of the Act with the Department of
Agriculture (“Agriculture”), the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the Army Corps of Engineers. The purpose of the
MOU is to develop a pilot project to streamline the federal per-
mitting process for oil or gas development, especially with
regard to processing an Application for Permit to Drill (“APD”)
which the lessee must obtain before beginning oil and gas
drilling operations on federal oil and gas leases. Employees from
each of the above-mentioned agencies will be assigned to seven
BLM field offices in Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Utah,
and Wyoming, the states with the highest potential for the devel-
opment and production of onshore domestic energy, to imple-
ment the pilot project.14 The purpose of this Section is to locate
in one office the expertise to complete reviews and issue permits,
including consultations and the preparation of biological opin-
ions under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act;15 permits
under Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act;16
regulatory matters under the Clean Air Act;17 planning under the
National Forest Management Act of 1976;18 and the preparation
of analyses under the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”).19 The MOU was signed on October 24, 200520 within
the 90-day deadline prescribed by Section 365 and all seven pilot
offices are staffed and functioning. This action has been com-
pleted. 
Actions Required Within 180 Days After Enactment
of the Act
OCS Deep Gas Royalty Relief, Section 344: Section 344 is
a royalty relief provision providing that, within 180 days after
enactment, DOI must issue a regulation granting royalty relief
for the production of natural gas from ultra deep wells on leases
issued in water depths less than four hundred meters in the Gulf
Coal is a traditional, yet antiquated, source of energy in the United States.
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of Mexico. Ultra deep wells are defined under this Section as “a
well drilled with a perforated interval, the top of which is at least
20,000 true vertical depth below the datum at mean sea level.”
Under Section 344(c), DOI may establish price thresholds limit-
ing the royalty reduction granted under this Section. This new
authority supplements MMS’ existing regulatory program for
deep gas royalty relief. MMS is still drafting a proposed rule.
This Section is not self-executing, and MMS has not met the 180
day deadline to issue a final rule. Further, as explained above
regarding Section 345, H.R. 6 would repeal this section. MMS is
faced with several interpretational issues here which could have
a significant effect on the scope of royalty relief offered.
Because the amount of potential royalty relief in issue is so
large, the impact could be mil-
lions of dollars per eligible well.
MMS will publish proposed
regulations in May 2007.
Actions Required Within
One Year After Enactment 
of the Act
Royalty Relief For Gas
Hydrates/CO2 Injection, Sec-
tions 353 and 354: Section 353
provides that DOI may grant
royalty relief as an incentive to
produce natural gas from gas
hydrate resources21 on the OCS
or on federal leases in Alaska.
DOI must conduct a rulemaking
to establish a royalty relief pro-
gram if the Secretary determines that royalty relief would
encourage the production of natural gas from gas hydrates.22
Similarly, Section 354 provides that if the Secretary determines
that it is in the public interest to provide royalty incentives for
enhanced recovery techniques for oil and gas using the injection
of carbon dioxide, DOI must conduct a rulemaking to provide
for those royalty incentives for an eligible onshore federal or
OCS lease.23 DOI is required to publish advanced notices of pro-
posed rulemaking for both sections within 180 days after the
date of enactment of the Act and final rulemaking for both Sec-
tions must be completed within 365 days after the enactment of
the Act unless the agency decides not to proceed with a rule. On
March 8, 2006, BLM and MMS jointly issued advanced notices
of rulemaking for public comment for both sections.24 These
actions have been completed. 
On August 4, 2006 DOI determined not to proceed with
rulemaking under either section. DOI concluded that the Act’s
royalty relief provisions would not result in additional natural
gas production from methane hydrates because of the opera-
tional, economic, and environmental uncertainties involved with
this emerging technology. DOI also concluded that the royalty
incentives would not lead to increased oil production on the
OCS, primarily due to unfavorable economics associated with
the high cost of installing appropriate equipment and the lack of
affordable nearby sources of carbon dioxide. For federal leases
onshore, DOI determined that current high oil prices made the
use of this technology affordable without additional financial
incentives.25
Actions Required Within 18 Months After Enactment
of the Act  
Oil Shale/Tar Sands Leasing, Section 369: The United
States is blessed with enormous oil shale resources on the public
lands. To encourage the development of this resource, the Act
provides, among other things, that: (a) within 180 days, DOI
must make available for leasing under the Mineral Leasing Act
(“MLA”)26 land within Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming that 
DOI considers to be necessary to conduct research and develop-
ment activities with respect to technologies for the recovery of
liquid fuels from oil shale and
tar sands resources on public
lands; (b) within 18 months,
DOI must develop a program-
matic environmental impact
statement (“EIS”) for a commer-
cial leasing program; and 
(c) within six months after com-
pleting the EIS, DOI must issue
regulations for a commercial
leasing program for oil shale and
tar sands. Within 180 days after
the final rule establishing the
commercial leasing program, the
DOI is directed to consult with
the States, Indian tribes, and
other interested persons, and the
DOI may conduct a lease sale only if there is sufficient support
to proceed. To expedite oil shale and tar sand project permit
review, subsection (k) directs the DOI to act as lead agency in
coordinating environmental and other reviews with states, local
governments, and Indian tribes. Regulations implementing this
requirement are due six months after enactment. The DOI is
required to submit a report to Congress within 90 days of enact-
ment describing its program in developing regulations and con-
ducting the final lease sales. In addition, Section 369 amends the
MLA to increase the acreage limitation from 5,120 acres to
5,760 acres for oil shale and tar sands.27 On March 4, 2006,
BLM selected six oil shale Research, Development, and Demon-
stration (“RD&D”) lease nominations in Colorado and Utah for
further review and analysis under NEPA and submitted a report
to Congress on December 6, 2006 on the status of implementa-
tion actions to promulgate regulations. In addition, on December
13, 2005, BLM initiated a programmatic EIS to evaluate oil
shale and tar sands development in Colorado, Utah, and
Wyoming28 and on August 25, 2006, BLM published an advance
notice of proposed rulemaking for oil shale regulations.29 On
December 15, 2006, BLM issued five RD&D leases to Chevron,
Shell, and EGL Resources. BLM has made progress in meeting
the various deadlines set forth in Section 369. Now that the
RD&D leases have been issued, there is increased interest in the
upcoming regulations for full-scale oil shale development.
Oil and gas, and
geothermal production
from leases managed by
BLM and MMS contribute
significantly to meeting
the energy needs of 
our Nation today.
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Actions Required Within Three Years After Enactment
of the Act
Royalty-In-Kind, Section 342: This Section provides perma-
nent authority to DOI to more effectively and efficiently operate
its royalty-in-kind (“RIK”) program. The MLA30 and the
OCSLA31 provide that DOI may allow federal oil and gas lessees
to satisfy their royalty payment obligations through RIK
arrangements under which the lessees provide physical volumes
of oil or gas in lieu of money. When DOI takes RIK, it then
either sells the oil or gas or transfers it to another federal agency,
such as the DOE, which stores oil in the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve. 
In recent years, MMS has taken increasingly large propor-
tions of its royalties in-kind, particularly from OCS leases, and
marketed that production in an effort to enhance revenues for the
United States. Annual appropriations acts provided MMS the
authority necessary to spend money for transportation, process-
ing, or other activities involved in marketing oil and gas. Section
342(b)(4) makes that authority permanent. The statute provides
that MMS may take and market RIK only if the benefits to the
United States are greater than or equal to taking royalties in
value. On September 29, 2006, MMS delivered its Royalty in
Kind report to Congress highlighting business processes, sys-
tems, and plans to support RIK capabilities.32 Many of the provi-
sions in Section 342 reaffirm existing RIK provisions in the
MLA and OCSLA, and most of the new provisions are self-exe-
cuting. In Fiscal Year 2006, MMS expects to take almost 80 per-
cent of its Gulf Of Mexico OCS lease oil royalties in-kind (a
value approaching four billion dollars) and 30 percent of its gas
(valued at over $2 billion).33 Having permanent authority will
enable MMS to develop additional marketing tools to enhance
the benefits of the RIK program to the United States.
Actions Required With No Deadline
Streamlining APD Processing, Section 366: This Section
provides that (a) no later than ten days after receiving an APD
for a federal oil and gas lease, BLM will notify the applicant
whether the application is complete and explain what informa-
tion is missing or required for it to be complete, and, no later
than 30 days after receiving a complete application, BLM will
issue the permit if it is in compliance with NEPA and other
applicable laws or defer the decision and provide the applicant
with steps it must take and a list of actions to be taken by Interior
to complete compliance. Once the applicant completes any
required steps, BLM must make a decision on the permit within
ten days unless compliance with NEPA or other applicable laws
is not complete.34 On March 7, 2007, BLM issued Onshore Oil
and Gas Order Number 1 incorporating the Act’s APD process-
ing timeframes.35
NEPA Categorical Exclusions, Section 390: Pursuant to this
Section, the following five actions are subject to a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a categorical exclusion under NEPA applies if the
activity is conducted pursuant to the MLA for the exploration
and development of oil and gas on federal leases: (1) individual
surface disturbances of less than five acres so long as the total
surface disturbance on the lease is not greater than 150 acres and
site-specific analysis in a document prepared pursuant to NEPA
has previously been completed; (2) drilling an oil and gas well at
a location or well pad site at which drilling has occurred previ-
ously within five years prior to the date of spudding the well; 
(3) drilling an oil or gas well within a developed field for which
an approved land use plan or any environmental document pre-
pared pursuant to NEPA analyzed such drilling as a reasonably
foreseeable activity, so long as such plan or document was
approved within five years prior to the date of spudding the well;
(4) placement of a pipeline in an approved right-of-way corridor,
so long as the corridor was approved within five years prior to
the date of placement of the pipeline; and (5) maintenance of a
minor activity, other than any construction or major renovation
of a building or facility.36 On September 30, 2005, BLM issued
policy guidance to implement these categorical exclusions.37
This action has been completed. 
BLM reports that as of September 2006, it has used the Sec-
tion 390 categorical exclusions for more than 1300 actions.
Although yet to be administratively or judicially challenged,
BLM’s policy guidance interpreting Section 390 has raised legal
questions regarding its efficacy. Specifically, BLM’s guidance
stated that the categorical exclusions in Section 390 are not sub-
ject to the extraordinary circumstances exception set forth in the
regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity (“CEQ”) implementing NEPA.38 In other words, BLM inter-
preted Section 390 as creating statutory categorical exclusions
not subject to review under the normal CEQ process for
approval. This aggressive stance was lauded by members of the
oil and natural gas industries as an improvement to the process
for permitting oil and gas exploration and development on pub-
lic lands.39 Not everyone, however, agrees with BLM’s interpre-
tation regarding the categorical exclusions. For example, in
correspondence to BLM dated November 29, 2005, the Wilder-
ness Society argued that BLM’s interpretation of Section 390
was legally deficient. BLM responded to the Wilderness Society
and announced that it would address the interpretation set forth
in its policy guidance in a rulemaking and would solicit com-
ments from the public. However, when BLM published its pro-
posed changes to Onshore Order Number 1 on March 13, 2006,
no language was included addressing the implementation of
Section 390. Similarly, the Final Onshore Order Number 1 did
not address the Section 390 categorical exclusions. In sum,
while BLM has met its charge under the Act to develop guidance
related to Section 390, the continuing viability of that guidance
may be unsettled. 
GEOTHERMAL
Action Required Within 180 Days After Enactment 
of the Act
Coordinating Leasing/Permitting, Section 225: This Section
requires that DOI and Agriculture enter into an MOU within 180
days regarding the coordination of leasing and permitting for
geothermal development of public lands and national forest
lands.40 On April 5, 2006, BLM signed an interagency MOU with
the Forest Service to improve geothermal leasing and permitting
35 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
procedures.41 This action has been completed. After the new
leasing provisions implementing the Act are adopted, BLM will
assess the effectiveness of the streamlining efforts for leasing
and permitting geothermal activities on national forest lands.
Actions Required with No Deadline
Geothermal Leasing/Royalty Value, Sections 222-224, 228-
229, and 231-234: These Sections amend the Geothermal Steam
Act of 197042 by changing the methodology for leasing federal
geothermal resources and simplifying the valuation calculations
for geothermal resources used for both direct use (e.g., heating
greenhouses or other buildings) and electrical generation. The
Act also directs DOI to process pending lease applications under
the provisions of law existing before the date of enactment. On
October 7, 2005, BLM issued interim guidance for processing
pending geothermal lease nominations (Section 222). On May 2,
2007, MMS43 and BLM44 issued final geothermal leasing and
royalty valuation regulations. Leasing activity under the newly-
amended provisions of the Geothermal Steam Act may now pro-
ceed under the new MMS and BLM regulations.
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY
Onshore Renewable Energy, Section 211: This Section
establishes a goal, as opposed to a directive, for DOI to “seek to
have approved non-hydropower renewable energy projects
located on the public lands with a generation capacity of at least
10,000 megawatts of electricity” before 2015.45 A Final Pro-
grammatic Wind Energy Development EIS was published in
June of 2005 and a Record of Decision (“ROD”) to implement
best management practices and land use plan amendments to
provide for wind energy development on public lands was issued
in December of 2005.46 A BLM wind energy policy implement-
ing the ROD was issued August 24, 2006.47
Actions Required Within 270 Days After Enactment
of the Act
OCS Alternative Energy Development, Section 388: This
Section provides that DOI may grant leases, easements, or
rights-of-way on the OCS for activities that support exploration,
development, production, or storage of oil or natural gas; sup-
port transportation of oil or natural gas, excluding shipping; pro-
duce or support production, transportation, or transmission of
energy from sources other than oil or natural gas; or use, for
energy-related or other authorized marine-related purposes,
facilities used for OCS activities. In addition, DOI is charged
with establishing royalties or other payments for any lease, ease-
ment, or right-of-way granted under Section 388. Within 180
days after the enactment of the Act, Section 388 directs DOI to
issue a final rule regarding the provisions for sharing revenues
from these activities with coastal states. Within 270 days after
the enactment of the Act, Section 388 directs DOI to issue a final
rule implementing this subsection.48 On December 30, 2005,
MMS published an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking
(“ANPR”) providing for public comment.49 This ANPR
addressed various rulemaking issues for alternative energy proj-
ects on the OCS other than oil or gas, such as wind, wave, or cur-
rent energy projects. It also addressed alternative uses of OCS
facilities, such as using oil and gas platforms for aquaculture. In
March 2007, MMS published a draft programmatic EIS examin-
ing the potential environmental consequences of implementing
an alternative energy and use program on the OCS.50 MMS esti-
mates that proposed rules, final rules, and a final programmatic
EIS will be published in 2007. 
Until the final regulations are complete, MMS is unlikely to
consider approving any alternative energy projects except, per-
haps, the proposed wind energy project offshore Cape Cod. Sev-
eral implementation issues exist with regard to this Section.
Section 388 delegates to DOI the authority to grant a lease, ease-
ment, or right-of-way on the OCS for alternative energy explo-
ration and development. DOI has managed oil and gas leasing
on the OCS for over 50 years, and MMS has assumed responsi-
bility for implementing Section 388. Alternative energy explo-
ration and development has focused on wind, wave, and tidal
resources, each of which would be used to develop electricity. Of
these resources, wind energy is the most promising, and projects
are proposed in federal waters off of Cape Cod and Long Island
and state waters offshore of Texas. 
Section 388 has created a debate as to which federal agency
has the authority to regulate alternative energy projects on the
OCS. In an ANPR, MMS stated that it interprets the authority
granted by Section 388 to issue leases, etc., “as also providing
MMS authority to regulate or permit the activities that occur on
those leases, easements or rights-of-way, if those activities are
energy related.”51 However, Section 388(a) provides that “[n]oth-
ing in this subsection displaces, supersedes, limits, or modifies
the jurisdiction, responsibility, or authority of any Federal or
State agency under any other Federal law.” In comments respond-
ing to the ANPR, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) asserts that it has jurisdiction under the Federal Power
Act52 to license offshore energy hydropower projects.53
The basis for FERC’s assertion appears to be, in part, an
administrative decision from 2003, In re Aqua Energy Group,
Ltd., in which an administrative law judge ruled that wave energy
projects are hydroelectric projects subject to FERC licensing
requirements where located on a navigable waterway, on govern-
ment lands, or in commerce clause waters and affecting interstate
commerce.54 This struggle between FERC and MMS, whether
perceived or real, may have a significant effect on the nascent
industry seeking to develop alternative energy sources on the
OCS. Many companies cannot afford to go through, for example,
FERC’s permitting process only to find that, in fact, they should
have gone through MMS’ permitting process, or vice versa.
Obtaining approvals from both agencies would also be extremely
burdensome. In short, inter-agency squabbling may delay the
growth of this industry and serve as a bar that would prevent
potentially interested companies and investors from entering into
this field. Regardless, the jostling between FERC and MMS over
this issue has hindered MMS in implementing Section 388, and
it appears that MMS will not issue a final rule implementing this
Section until late in 2007 or 2008.
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CONCLUSION
Interior’s substantial progress in less than two years of imple-
menting the Energy Policy Act of 2005 demonstrates that DOI,
MMS, and BLM have taken these implementation responsibili-
ties seriously and devoted the resources necessary to substantially
comply with Congress’ ambitious time schedule. Moreover,
while there have been some legal or policy implementation hur-
dles along the way, given the breadth of this new law, the agencies
have handled diligently multiple, overlapping deadlines and
deftly implemented sometimes vague statutory mandates.
Oil and gas, and geothermal production from leases man-
aged by BLM and MMS contribute significantly to meeting the
energy needs of our nation today. Development of alternative
energy, particularly on the OCS, and development of the vast oil
shale and methane hydrate resources on Interior-managed lands
hold great promise for the future. The investment that BLM and
MMS are making today in response to Congress’ direction in the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 undoubtedly will pay substantial div-
idends in our energy future.
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C
reating legal instruments that incorporate renewable
energy policy interests is a complex, but not insurmount-
able, challenge. Renewable energy technologies
(“RETs”) provide clean, safe, and lasting energy supplies. The
finite nature of hydrocarbon fuels, the controversy surrounding
carbon sequestration, the debate over “clean coal,” and the safety
and waste management concerns regarding nuclear energy have
resulted in RETs emerging as promising alternatives. Successful
examples of the implementation of RETs demonstrate the
importance of integrating this technology into local, national,
and international legislation.
The traditional emphasis of energy law has been to ensure
an adequate supply of energy, without adequate considerations
of efficiency, equity, and ecology.1 While the international com-
munity increasingly views RETs as strategic solutions to issues
such as climate change, rural electrification, energy security, and
environmental degradation due to hydrocarbon fuel burning,2
incorporating RETs in national projects will present a challenge.
International legal institutions provide the global community a
venue for strategic dialogue and goal-making; however, the
power of technology development and legal enforcement
remains in the control of national and local governments.
Numerous developed countries are beginning to alter their
energy portfolios to incorporate more RETs. For example,
between 1900 and 2003, RETs presence in Germany’s electric
power generation fuel mix grew from less than three percent to
almost nine percent.3 This German increase in utilization of
RETs occurred during a net national electricity consumption
growth of about five percent. The United States has also shown
promise in adopting more RETs when the Department of Energy
announced their aim to cut federal energy consumption levels
through the use of more efficient technologies. On the sub-
national level, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
signed into law the Global Warming Solutions Act (also known
as “AB 32”) on September 27, 2006, which is designed to limit
the state’s global warming emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, and
it is publicly anticipated that California will pioneer many new
clean and efficient energy technologies to comply with the limits.4
Developing and newly-developed countries are also adopt-
ing progressive national laws to promote the increase and inte-
gration of RETs. For example, in February 2005, the national
legislature in China approved the country’s first renewable
energy law, which requires power grid operators to purchase
resources from registered renewable energy producers.5 It also
encourages oil distribution companies to sell biological liquid
fuel and offers financial incentives, such as a national fund, to
foster renewable energy projects.6 In India, the government has
worked with the World Institute for Sustainable Energy and the
Renewable Energy and International Law Project to develop a
model renewable energy law, which aims to help the country
meet its energy security, environmental, and economic develop-
ment objectives.7
Regardless of the importance of national implementation,
international legal institutions can play a significant role in facil-
itating the national promotion of RETs, including deployment
and exports. For example, domestic subsidies for RETs develop-
ment are currently not actionable under World Trade Organiza-
tion (“WTO”) law. However, modifications can be be made
during future Doha Round negotiations regarding environmental
goods and services by targeting the removal or lowering the bar-
riers to trade in RETs.8 Additionally, RETs could be acknowl-
edged and incorporated into standing treaties, and clearly and
thoroughly addressed in the language of new international
agreements and treaties.9
Thus, International legal institutions have the potential to
play a significant role in facilitating the national promotion of
RETs. 
RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES: 
A PROMISING ENERGY ALTERNATIVE
by Ursula Kazarian*
* Ursula Kazarian is a JD candidate, May 2009, at American University Wash-
ington College of Law.
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A Cooling Tower for a Geo/Thermal Power Plant in New Zealand.
Endnotes: Rewnewable Energy Technologies on page 75
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INTRODUCTION
A
ccording to Annual Energy Outlook 2007, released by
the Energy Information Administration in February
2007, it is forecasted that long-term trends in oil sup-
plies will remain tight—with prices declining gradually through
2015, but rising after 2015 as demand continues to grow and
higher cost supplies are brought to market. Likewise, wellhead
natural gas prices are projected to decline from current levels
through 2015, but rise after 2015.1
Since 2000, world oil prices have risen sharply as supply
has tightened, first as a result of strong demand growth in emerg-
ing Asia, most notably in China, and later as a result of supply
constraints resulting from domestic disruptions and inadequate
investment to meet demand. Higher oil prices have impacted,
and will continue to impact, natural gas prices in the United
States.2 In fact, a June 27, 2006 Wall Street Journal article points
out that the United States has among the highest natural gas
prices in the industrial world and if these prices remain high,
companies will be driven to other countries, costing U.S. work-
ers their jobs.3
IMPACT OF CUSTOMER CONSERVATION
With the projected tightening of fuel supplies and inade-
quate overall investment to meet demand, which is part of the
result of severe impacts on U.S. infrastructure and offshore
drilling from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,4 the United States is
starting to focus on conservation. Along with certain other coun-
tries, the United States
has enacted policies
encouraging demand
side management,
energy efficiency, and
customers curbing their
use of natural gas. How-
ever, in the United
States, the interests of
natural gas utilities and
their customers are often
at odds. 
Natural gas cus-
tomers have seen their
bills increase by as much
as two hundred percent
in the last few years. At the same time, earnings for many of their
respective gas utilities have been below expectations. A primary
source of this reduction in earnings is due to customer conserva-
tion. For example, NiSource Inc., the parent company of local
distribution companies serving 3.3 million customers in nine
states, announced that residential usage decline due to customer
conservation efforts has
increased from a histori-
cal average of between
0.5 percent and one per-
cent per year to approxi-
mately four percent in
2006. This decline in
usage, which is inde-
pendent from the nor-
mal variations in usage
caused by weather, is
anticipated to reduce the
company’s profits by
approximately $20 mil-
lion in 2006.5
REGULATION OF GAS UTILITIES: 
AT ODDS WITH CONSERVATION
by Edward L. Flippen*
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An offshore oil platform located in the Gulf of Mexico.
As the United States becomes more
aggressive in pushing conservation
and decreased consumption results,
natural gas utilities increasingly
will be negatively impacted 
with lower profits.
* Edward L. Flippen is a Partner in the Energy & Utilities Department at
McGuireWoods LLP and Lecturer at the University of Virginia and Duke Univer-
sity Schools of Law.
In the long run, customer conservation is the product of
equipment efficiency changes. Natural gas utilities can adjust to
the decline in customer usage, mainly resulting from more effi-
cient consumer appliances and equipment, with increases in firm
productivity. However, there are few short-term off-setting steps
to the price-driven decline in utility sales. For example, gas rates
are designed by regulators to
recover a part of a utility’s prof-
its in the commodity or fuel
charge component of rates. As
the United States becomes more
aggressive in pushing conserva-
tion and decreased consumption
results, natural gas utilities
increasingly will be negatively
impacted with lower profits. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF
PARALLEL INTERESTS
Unfortunately, the historical
solution for utilities with declin-
ing profits—filing applications
with regulators for increased
rates—only exacerbates the
problem. As a result, there is a misalignment of interests. What 
is needed to resolve this misalignment is to provide customers
with incentives to conserve and, at the same time, provide a
mechanism that allows natural gas utilities to remain financially
sound. A profitable solution for the utility is as important as con-
servation is to the consumer. Without the former, the latter is
near counterproductive because utilities will simply seek to
increase prices to offset the lost profits resulting from reduced
consumption.  
Clearly, it is in a utility’s interest to encourage and even pro-
mote conservation to both attract new customers and maintain
existing ones. That means, however, realigning the customers’
and the utilities’ interests so both are attempting to achieve the
same outcome, specifically lower natural gas bills. Unfortu-
nately, there is little if anything in the Energy Policy Act of 2005
to direct federal and state regulators to realign the interests of
utilities and their customers. However, words of encouragement
are coming from state regulators. A resolution adopted in 2005
by the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commission-
ers (“NARUC”) states that “. . .
innovative rate designs includ-
ing ‘energy efficient tariffs’. . .
may assist, especially in the
short term, in promoting energy
efficiency and energy conser-
vation and slowing the rate of
demand growth of natural gas. . .”6
Importantly, the resolution notes
that “. . . current forms of rate
design may tend to create a mis-
alignment between the interests
of natural gas utilities and their
customers.”7
CONCLUSION
State regulators, of course,
are not policymakers. But they
understand the problem and are attempting to address it collec-
tively through NARUC. Many utilities also support changing
financial incentives to encourage energy conservation. As of
February 2007, a dozen of the nation’s largest utilities signed on
to a “National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency.”8 Now federal
and state policymakers must respond by augmenting the regula-
tory process to provide natural gas utilities with incentives to
manage costs, maintain or improve reliability, and reward
improved performance. They should focus on results and out-
comes rather than on outdated regulatory models developed
decades ago. If natural gas conservation is important—and
surely it is until someone finds an unlimited supply—regulation
of natural gas utilities cannot continue to be business as usual.
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Endnotes: Regulation of Gas Utilities
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anything in the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 to
direct federal and state
regulators to realign the
interests of utilities and
their customers.
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N
ot far from the ancient streets of Cusco, the once mighty
center of the Incan Empire, lays one of the most impor-
tant natural gas discoveries in Latin America. An esti-
mated 8.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 411 million
barrels of associated products (such as propane, butane, and
condensate) make the Camisea field an important source of
energy for Peru with enormous economic potential.1 However,
the Camisea field’s location on the lower Urubamba valley
among pristine natural areas home to isolated indigenous tribes2
and hundreds of rare species of plants, birds, fish, reptiles, and
small mammals3 creates a real
challenge for the Peruvian gov-
ernment. Officials must carefully
proceed with development while
balancing the social aspects and
biodiversity of the region.
With investment exceeding
U.S. $1.6 billion, Camisea rep-
resents the most ambitious
energy project in Peru’s history.4
Despite its discovery in the mid-
1980s and the progress of four Peruvian administrations, con-
struction only commenced under President Alejandro Toledo in
2002. Peru, seeking foreign capital and investment, granted
rights to exploitation, transportation, and distribution of natural
gas via international bids to some of the world’s top energy
firms.5 After completing two pipelines for liquefied and natural
gas, the project became operational, connecting the gas source
within the Amazon forest of Camisea to consumers in Lima, and
the southern port city of Pisco. But despite progress and eco-
nomic benefits, five ruptures in the liquid natural gas pipeline
occurred, putting sensitive habitat and isolated indigenous com-
munities in danger. These incidents resulted in heavy criticism of
the government, particularly for a lack of involvement and over-
sight in the project’s design and construction. 
Local and international nongovernmental organizations are
advocating for indigenous rights and environmental protection.
Both Amazon Alliance and Amazon Watch recently cited an inde-
pendent report by a California non-profit organization finding
numerous deficiencies in the project.6 The report lists troubles
including: a lack of supervision, little concern for indigenous
needs, rushed construction to avoid U.S. $90 million in contractual
late fees, and allegations that nearly 40 percent of the pipe material
came from defunct projects in South America. These accusations
strengthened opposition to the project along the entire pipeline
route.7 In response, Peruvian officials have countered these charges
with studies indicating that the Camisea project met technical spec-
ifications and are compliant with international agreements protect-
ing indigenous tribes and surrounding habitat. Officials assert the
ruptures were caused by poor soil. Ultimately, an independent audit
ordered by a special congressional commission will evaluate the
real effects of the pipeline on neighboring communities.
As a result of the Camisea development, Peruvian gas usage
continues to rise. However, project’s true economic potential lies
in exports. To complete the next phase, Peru requires U.S. $400
million from the Inter-American Development Bank,8 but the
bank has postponed any decision pending an independent study
to determine if the project meets
sustainable development guide-
lines. The Camisea case repre-
sents a difficult struggle between
economic potential in the
impoverished Amazon Basin
and the need for conserving pris-
tine areas and indigenous rights.
Sustainable development offers
the best hope that political, eco-
nomic, social, and environmen-
tal concerns can coexist to reduce the poverty and increase the
quality of life for all concerned. Any progress must consider
long term outlook rather than short-lived profits. Nevertheless,
Camisea may potentially benefit all Peruvians.
Endnotes:
1 Camisea Project, http://www.camisea.com.pe (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
2 See Diana Alberca Rivera, Recursos Energéticos del Perú: Proyecto Camisea,
available at http://www.monografias.com/trabajos34/recursos-energeticos-
peru/recursos-energeticos-peru.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
3 See Smithsonian National Zoological Park, MAB: Camisea Project,
http://nationalzoo.si.edu/ConservationAndScience/MAB/conservation/camisea.
cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
4 See IDB America, The Most Important Energy Project in the Country’s History,
http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?thisid=3665 (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
5 See Camisea Project, supra note 1.
6 Carlos Salazar Tirado, E-tech International: Evaluation Of Camisea Project
Piping Failures and Long-Term Solutions, AMAZON WATCH, Feb. 27, 2006,
available at http://www.amazonwatch.org/newsroom/view_news.php?id=1050
(last visited Feb. 28, 2007). 
7 See Kelly Hearn, Bungle in the Jungle, GRIST, Apr. 26, 2006, http://www.grist.
org/news/maindish/2006/04/26/hearn/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
8 See Inter-American Development Bank, Camisea Natural Gas Project,
http://www.iadb.org/pro_sites/camisea/index.cfm?language=EN&parid=1 (last
visited Feb. 28, 2007).
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Camisea represents the
most ambitious energy
project in Peru’s history.
INTRODUCTION
T
he Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) of the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (“Kyoto Protocol”) is
intended to provide financial incentives that support the adoption
of technology in developing countries to reduce carbon dioxide
(“CO2”) and other greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions through
the creation of certified emissions reductions certificates
(“CERs”). A major aim of the CDM is to promote 
sustainable development, including sustainable energy tech-
nologies.1 Project developers may either sell CERs to a third
party in order to raise additional project revenues or use 
the CERs themselves to meet their own carbon emissions obli-
gations under domestic laws
implemented pursuant to the
Kyoto Protocol.2
Although the issuance and
sale of CERS potentially pro-
vide an additional source of rev-
enue for qualifying projects, the
CDM aspects of a project
involve their own subset of
risks. This article evaluates
CDM project risks, focusing on three risks that remain outside
the control of project developers and are critical for evaluating
CDM opportunities: (1) the estimation and delivery of CERs; 
(2) CERs price and volatility; and (3) uncertainty concerning the
future of the Kyoto Protocol arrangements and the CDM. It con-
cludes by assessing the potential for the CDM to address climate
change and the development of clean energy technologies to
mitigate climate change.
OVERVIEW OF THE CDM PROJECT CYCLE
The CDM project cycle is a multi-step process. First, proj-
ect parties prepare a proposal, which sets out the design of the
venture in a document called the Project Design Document
(“PDD”). The PDD is then evaluated by a Designated Opera-
tional Entity (“DOE”), a private third party certified by the CDM
Executive Board, which validates the project’s design and esti-
mates the expected contribution to emissions reductions.3 Dur-
ing this phase, the project parties procure an environmental
impact assessment, obtain the approval of the host government,
and circulate the PDD for public comment. The PDD is then
submitted to the CDM Executive Board who reviews it for com-
pliance with CDM requirements. Projects involving new
methodologies will also be required to obtain approval of the
specific methodology. If approved, the project is registered with
the CDM. Registered projects then implement a monitoring plan
approved by the CDM Executive Board.4
Pursuant to the monitoring plan, a DOE periodically verifies
the actual emissions reductions that have occurred during each
verification period. Based on the DOE’s written certification of
the emissions reductions, the CDM Executive Board instructs
the CDM Registry Administrator to issue the appropriate num-
ber of CERs to the project for each verification period.5
CDM PROJECT RISKS
In addition to the risks associated with project financings
generally, the CDM aspect of a project entails substantial risk for
project sponsors, investors, and project customers that rely on
the issuance of CERs either as a
source of project revenues or 
to meet regulatory obligations.
Issuance of CERs requires
approvals of the host govern-
ment and the CDM Executive
Board. Additionally, the actual
number of CERs that a CDM
project produces depends upon
the verified performance of the
project. Purchasers of CERs
should be concerned about the financial stability and perform-
ance of the project and their ability to take legal title to the
CERs.6 As a result, CER purchasers tend to favor project spon-
sors with established records, countries with legal systems that
will enforce project contracts, national regulatory authorities
that will provide the necessary project approvals promptly, and
reliable technologies. 
As with any risk in project financing, CDM risks should be
separately identified, allocated, and mitigated. This may be
accomplished through the use of insurance or other similar prod-
ucts or through the project documents.7
Below we analyze several critical CDM risks commonly
identified by CDM sponsors, advisors, and investors in inter-
views: validation/verification error, limited price visibility, and
regulatory uncertainty. These are not the only critical risks iden-
tified by CDM participants. For example, high transaction costs
and scalability of projects were also frequently cited risks. The
risks analyzed here should be considered in evaluating the future 
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TABLE 1: CDM PROJECT RISKS8
Risks Examples
Market and Supply Risks Immature market; affected by 
Assigned Amount Units prices, 
energy prices, and weather 
conditions.
Technology Risk Clean technologies still developing;
uncertain costs and benefits.
Certification/Verification Variation in validation and
Risk verification procedures.
Proving additionality requirement.
Difficulty in monitoring emissions 
reductions.
Failure to deliver promised CERs 
due to validation/verification 
estimate error.
Regulatory Risk CDM methodologies still 
developing and untested.
Kyoto Protocol only extends to 2012.
Potential for commodities or 
securities regulation.
Political Risk Host government must approve the 
project under domestic laws for 
sustainability.
Accounting/Disclosure No standard or oversight for
Risk reporting national emissions or 
CDM results. 
Conflicts of interest among project 
parties.
Credit Risk Counterparty credit risk (no 
exchange clears CERs).
Default Risk Failure to deliver CERs due to 
financial or technical failure.
Legal Risk No legal standards for CDM.
No case law in any country.
Complex national and international 
law issues.
Capital Markets/Finance Significant volume needed for 
Risk economies of scale.
of the CDM as they are inherent to the structure of the 
CDM arrangement and largely beyond the control of project
developers. 
Validation/Verification Estimation Error
In order for CERs to be issued, the emissions reductions are
first “validated.” Validation is an estimate made at the design
stage for purposes of approving the project methodology and
monitoring plan.9 Expectations are created from the emissions
reduction estimate, including the expectations of investors and
those who are considering purchasing the CDM CERs produced
by the project. After the project has begun operation, a DOE
periodically verifies the project’s actual emissions. The verifica-
tion determines the actual number of CERs to be issued for each
particular verification period.10
In order to assess risk associated with validation/verification
error, this author compared the validation estimates and verified
results of the 175 CDM projects that had issued CERs as of 
May 1, 2007. The comparison suggests that validation proce-
dures tend to overestimate the number of CERS that will ulti-
mately be issued by a project. Significantly, these results reflect a
broad range of CDM projects. 
For the first 175 CDM projects that issued CERs, the valida-
tion procedure overestimated the number of CERs produced by
approximately 27 percent on average. The standard deviation for
the population of 175 projects is 42.5 percent.11
The large error rate for estimating the issuance of CERs
increases the risks associated with sourcing CERs and investing
in CDM projects. For example, one major Canadian electric gen-
erator that has committed itself to meeting its requirements for
allowances through CDM and Joint Implementation (“JI”) proj-
ects expressed concern that the availability of CDM CERs will
be inadequate to meet its company’s needs. This company has
adopted a 25-year plan to achieve zero net emissions by 2024
and has gained considerable experience assessing approximately
a dozen CDM projects. However, due to financial and other risks
associated with CDM, the company has undertaken only one
CDM project. Given Canada’s role as an energy-exporter in such
carbon intensive areas as tar sands, the company expects that
CDM may not provide a realistic method for meeting its supply
requirements for emissions allowances.12
The estimation error in the CDM validation/verification
process has significant implications for CDM. As of May 1,
2007, there were over 1800 CDM projects that had estimated
their emissions reductions through the validation process and
will eventually verify their CERs. Because the validations 
have already occurred in over 1800 projects, they may show 
error rates of similar magnitude to the 175 projects that are ana-
lyzed here.
Potential Explanations for CDM
Validation/Verification Error
Interviews were conducted with CDM DOEs, sponsors, and
advisors in order to ascertain the reasons for the high error rate
in the CDM validation/verification process. Interviews were
conducted with three firms that are approved by the CDM Exec-
utive Board as DOEs. Collectively, these firms are involved in
the validation or verification of 83 percent of the approximately
740 CDM projects that were registered as of May 1, 2006, when
the interviews were conducted.13 In addition, interviews were
conducted with four firms that invest in and/or act as project
consultants to approximately 30 percent of all CDM projects
then listed with the CDM Executive Board. 
Surveys of these CDM participants revealed that a variety of
factors potentially contribute to CDM validation/verification
error. These firms identified the following as contributing 
factors: 
(1) Inadequate Technology or Measurement Methodology;
(2) Environmental Fluctuations;
(3) Supply and Demand Fluctuations;
(4) Delays in Project Completion or Operation; 
(5) Use of Conservative Assumptions in Verification 
Procedures; and
(6) Inadequate Guidance or Changes in Validation/
Verification Procedures.
The leading explanation of validation/verification error was
inadequate technology or methodology to measure emissions
reductions. For example, with respect to methane landfill proj-
ects, several respondents identified the primary cause of error to
be the lack of adequate technology to measure low concentra-
tions of gases over large areas. Survey respondents noted that
measurements are typically not conducted under ideal condi-
tions (as assumed in the standard methodologies), and very little
is known about the quality of waste in landfill sites, which
affects decomposition rates and the selection of appropriate
methods for analyzing data. Further, models and assumptions
used for estimation are often not reliable or appropriate for local
conditions.14
With respect to environmental conditions, the performance
of projects that depend upon wind, precipitation, river flow, or
heat (as in the case of decomposition of waste) will be affected
by fluctuations in weather conditions. These factors will signifi-
cantly influence the outcome of verification results.15
Supply and demand conditions also influence the verifica-
tion results of projects whose performance is linked to market
conditions. For example, electricity generation projects are veri-
fied based on the actual amount of electricity supplied to the
grid.16 Furthermore, delay of project completion or operation
can significantly affect the economic feasibility of a project and
its verification results.17 In particular, hydroelectric plants are
highly sensitive to construction delays.18
Several firms identified the use of inappropriate assump-
tions in the validation stage and conservative assumptions in the
verification stage as potential factors influencing validation/veri-
fication error. Several respondents noted that CDM methodolo-
gies often use generalized Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”) estimates that do not take local conditions into
account. For example, the use of IPCC estimates for methane
projects fails to take into account local agricultural conditions.19
Several individuals noted that because the validation stage
involves estimation, it is inherently subject to error, and one
respondent noted that project sponsors are often optimistic in the
validation stage.20 Others suggested that firms conducting the
verification may use conservative assumptions in accordance
with best practices recommended by the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization and other organizations, thereby further
increasing the difference between validation estimates and veri-
fication results.21
With respect to the adequacy of guidance or change in pro-
cedures, several respondents noted that the CDM Executive
Board has not provided adequate guidance for validation and
verification procedures. CDM methodologies have been fre-
quently revised, which has greatly contributed to uncertainty.
One respondent noted that some of these methodologies have
been revised several times already since their inception and that
CDM guidelines do not specify exactly what steps need to be
taken to validate or verify emissions.22 Another person indicated
that CDM rules which prohibit direct contact between project
sponsors and reviewing personnel have slowed approvals and
prevented project sponsors from receiving timely or detailed
guidance.23
Prospects for Improvement
Several respondents suggested specific aspects of the CDM
that can be improved to reduce validation/verification error. One
respondent suggested more detailed methodology regarding
monitoring requirements should improve data collection and the
consistency in assumptions used at the validation and verification
stages.24 Several individuals emphasized that proven technolo-
gies should exhibit less variability between validation estimates
and verification results.25 Finally, one respondent indicated that
training and assistance in locating qualified people to carry out
estimates for each methodology would help reduce error.26
Finally, CDM participants were asked their opinion as to
whether they expected estimates would improve in the future.
Respondents generally believed that results should improve,
while at the same time acknowledged that estimation error is
likely to continue due to the inherent nature of prediction. One
respondent stated that observers should continue to see estima-
tion error, especially for projects that are influenced heavily by
outside factors. In general, respondents believed that the vari-
ability is inherent in the design of the CDM validation and veri-
fication arrangement; validation estimates are made based on
theoretical engineering estimates, whereas the verification is
based on actual plant operations. 
EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES PRICE VOLATILITY AND
EXCESS SUPPLY
Interviews with industry participants revealed that CDM
CERs are priced based on multiple factors: spot and futures
prices of European Union Emission Allowances (“EUAs”), the
rules governing carbon offsets, risks of the particular project
producing the CERs, expectations regarding supply and demand
for CERs, and expected supply and demand for other carbon off-
sets, especially AAUs.
The starting point for pricing CERs is the spot and futures
prices of EUAs as this market is the most highly liquid and pro-
vides near-term price visibility. CDM CERs are priced based on
expected supply and demand for carbon offsets. CERs must
compete against supply from various other sources, including JI
Emission Reduction Units (“ERUs”), RMUs, and excess
Assigned Amount Units (“AAUs”). 
Over-allocation of emissions allowances presents one of the
greatest risks to the viability of the CDM. The availability of a
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FIGURE 1: EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS ALLOWANCE PRICES,
APRIL - MAY 200628
large number of low-cost allowances will lower the price of car-
bon and potentially increase price volatility of CO2 emissions
allowances. In turn, this will make more costly CDM projects
unattractive financially and will increase the risks of CDM proj-
ects in general. 
Over-allocation of emissions allowances has occurred in
both the European Union and Eastern Europe. The announce-
ment of the first verification of EU national emissions in May
2006 caused the EU Emissions Trading System (“EU ETS”)
market price of EUAs to drop by over 67 percent because veri-
fied emissions were 41 million metric tonnes of CO2, or approx-
imately 2.5 percent, lower than expected.27
The drop in EUA prices in May 2006 placed downward
pressure on CER prices and slowed CDM activity considerably.
As a result, many CDM projects are no longer financially com-
petitive.29
To place the EU over-allocation in perspective, CDM proj-
ects that had filed with the CDM Executive Board as of May 1,
2007 represented 305,801,000 metric tonnes of validated CO2
emissions reductions per year.30 The EU carbon over-allocation
displaces over one eighth of the total amount of these estimated
CDM emissions reductions. However, if the verification process
results in a lower issuance of CERs, as has been observed in
projects verified to date, the displacement could be considerably
higher. If the validation/verification error of the first 175 CDM
projects is representative of the other 1660 validated and unveri-
fied CDM projects filed as of May 1, 2007, the expected number
of CDM CERs to be issued would be approximately 223 million
metric tonnes of CO2 per year. The May 2006 over-allocation
would displace 18 percent of the expected CERs from the CDM
projects validated as of May 1, 2007.
Eastern European excess emissions allowances could have
an even greater effect on carbon prices. Most excess emissions
allowances are held by Russia and Ukraine. Russian and Ukrain-
ian excess emissions are expected to exceed 791.5 million met-
ric tonnes of CO2 per year by 2010 from fossil fuel emissions
alone. Table 2 sets forth the Energy Information Administra-
tion’s estimate of projected Russian and Ukrainian CO2 emis-
sions from fossil fuel consumption, and the resulting estimated
excess CO2 allowances.
If Russian and Ukrainian excess allowances enter the mar-
ket in 2008, they would exert significant downward pressure on
CERs and prices. To place this in perspective, if 791.5 million
tonnes of Russian and Ukrainian annual excess allowances pro-
duced from fossil fuel CO2 emissions enter the market, this addi-
tional supply would be approximately twenty times larger in
volume than the 41 million tonne over-allocation of CO2 in May
2006 that caused the price of EUAs to drop by over 67 percent.
The same 791.5 million metric tonnes CO2 per year would be
almost three times greater than the validated annual emissions
reductions of the 1835 CDM projects filed as of May 1, 2007,
and almost four times greater than the expected annual volume
TABLE 2: RUSSIA AND UKRAINE PROJECTED CO2 ALLOWANCES (METRIC TONNES)31
Year Russia Emissions Ukraine Emissions Total Emissions Projected Excess Allowances
1990 2,347,000,000 674,400,002 3,021,400,002
2002 1,522,000,000 426,024,926 1,948,024,926 1,073,375,075
2010 1,732,000,000 497,898,263 2,229,898,263 791,501,738
2015 1,857,000,000 539,804,109 2,396,804,109 624,595,893
2020 1,971,000,000 568,392,418 2,539,392,418 482,007,583
2025 2,063,000,000 599,999,369 2,662,999,369 358,400,632
Note: Ukraine is 17.76% of former Soviet Union projections. These projections only take account of excess allowances from carbon dioxide emissions from
fossil fuel consumption. Other greenhouse gas sources may increase the allowances.
of CERs to be issued by these CDM projects assuming that vali-
dations continue to overestimate actual issuances of CERs by a
27 percent error margin.
In addition, other GHGs are expected to produce additional
allowances for Eastern European countries in excess of 100 mil-
lion metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year, a majority of
which will belong to Russia and Ukraine.32 These excess emis-
sions allowances are approximately 33 percent of validated
CDM emissions reductions as of May 1, 2007, and almost one
half the number of CERs expected to be issued, assuming valida-
tion estimates continue to exhibit an error rate of 27 percent. To
the extent these other gases are permitted to enter the market, the
resulting excess AAUs from Eastern Europe will place addi-
tional downward pressure on the price of CDM CERs.
Rules Governing Emissions Allowances
The rules governing the CDM and other emissions
allowance instruments also affect the prices of CERs. Under the
Kyoto Protocol, CDM CERs and JI ERUs may be used in future
compliance periods up to a
maximum of 2.5 percent of a
party’s AAUs of emissions.33
However, Article 12(10) of the
Kyoto Protocol ensures that
CERs and ERUs obtained prior
to 2008 can be fully banked 
for use in the 2008-2012 com-
pliance period.34 In contrast,
AAUs are fully bankable with-
out limitation starting during 
the 2008-2012 compliance
period.35 Still, the EU has
allowed its member states to
decide whether unused EUAs acquired during the 2005-2007
trial phase can be carried over and used to meet emissions limits
in the first commitment period in 2008-2012.36 Potential tempo-
rary restrictions on the ability to bank EUAs for the 2008-2012
period enhance the value of CERs relative to EUAs during the
trial phase.
To the extent excess emissions allowances held by Eastern
European countries enter the market, these excess allowances
will affect prices and the operation of the EUA market, and in
turn, the CDM and JI programs. The Kyoto Protocol does not
place explicit limits on the entry of excess allowances; however,
parties are required to limit their use of tradable allowances to
levels that are “supplemental” to “significant” domestic meas-
ures to reduce GHG emissions.37 The EU has been particularly
active in seeking to promote domestic reductions through the
supplementarity provision. However, there are differences of
opinion among European officials whether a quantitative limit
on trading allowances is desirable.38 While it is not clear how the
supplementarity restriction will be implemented by Kyoto Par-
ties, it will influence how Eastern European excess allowances
compete with EUAs and other forms of AAUs, CERs, ERUs and
Removal Units.
The imposition of penalties by the EU provides some level
of price support for EUAs and CERs. The EU imposes penalties
for failure to deliver adequate EUAs of 40 euros per tonne of
CO2 in the trial phase which runs until December 21, 2007, and
100 euros per tonne in the first commitment period from January
1, 2008 through December 31, 2012.39
CDM CER prices are also influenced by the perceived qual-
ity of the project and project sponsors. As previously discussed,
there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the delivery of ver-
ified CERS, which increases supply risk for the purchaser of
CERs. One way to address this risk is to price CERs differently
based on the stage of the project; sales early in the process prior
to final approval receive a much lower price than those sold post-
verification. The creditworthiness of the seller also significantly
affects the price of CERs.40
Academic Study Projections of Future Prices
A number of studies have estimated future carbon prices,
with the results varying widely based on differing assumptions
and models. These assumptions
include different estimates of
future economic growth, oil
prices, cost of emissions abate-
ment, the rules concerning the
availability of Eastern European
excess emissions allowances, the
rules concerning trading across
emissions sectors and countries,
and banking of emissions. One
1999 study that compared the
results of eleven leading models
predicted prices would range
below twenty euros to 100 euros
per tonne of CO2 in order to achieve five percent emissions
reductions from 1990 levels. Seven of the eleven models sur-
veyed predicted the price would range from twenty euros to 35
euros per tonne of CO2 for a five percent reduction of 1990 lev-
els in a market in which the United States participated.41 More
recent studies have predicted median prices to range from under
one euro to under six euros per tonne of CO2 if trading across
sectors and countries is permitted under the EU ETS.42 The
study which predicted that CO2 prices should be under one euro
per tonne was based on analysis of the current EU ETS regime
and assumed that emitters will find relatively inexpensive meth-
ods to meet target reductions.43
These estimates are well below observed trading prices in
the 15-40 euros range. Again, the imposition of a 40 euros/tonne
penalty for failure to meet targets during the 2005-2007 period
may have supported the price at the observed levels. Alterna-
tively, these studies may underestimate the cost of reducing
emissions.44
LIMITED PRICE VISIBILITY
Interviews conducted by this author and industry reports
confirm that CDM projects have generally sold CERs for deliv-
ery though 2012, reflecting the duration of the regulatory regime
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rather than the potential duration of CERs contracts.45 Although
there is little activity beyond 2012, some survey respondents and
other commentators have confirmed that purchasers of CERs
have entered into options agreements for CERs to be produced
in the post-2012 period.46
The survey shows that because CDM projects require a min-
imum of approximately eighteen to 24 months to register and
verify CERs, most activity in the CDM market is for future deliv-
ery of CERs starting approximately two years ahead of time.
The EUA market provides limited, near-term price visibility
for emissions credits. Trading EUAs is primarily conducted
through brokered transactions over the Over the Counter
(“OTC”) market. In 2005, OTC trades accounted for an esti-
mated 80 percent of combined OTC and exchange trades.47 Lit-
tle data is publicly available for OTC trades.
Several organized exchanges also trade EUAs. The Euro-
pean Climate Exchange is the largest exchange, representing 63
percent of exchange-traded emissions contracts. This exchange
trades standardized futures contracts for delivery of EUA.48 As
of April 2006, 100 metric tonnes of carbon contracts were avail-
able for quarterly delivery through March 2008, and then annual
delivery from 2008 through 2012.49
An analysis of the European Climate Exchange’s Carbon
Financial Instruments (“ECX CFI”) futures contracts reveals
that liquidity in this market is mostly short-term. Open interest
in ECX CFI futures contracts is most liquid in the first year. At
the time of analysis, 79 percent of open interest in exchange-
traded EUAs was for delivery by December 2007, the time
period during which regulatory certainty is greatest. Survey
responses confirm the OTC EUA market follows the same short-
term pattern as the exchange-traded futures markets.
TABLE 3: OPEN INTEREST IN EUROPEAN CLIMATE EXCHANGE
CFI CONTRACTS, APRIL 200650
Open 
Period Interest
June, September, December 2006 46%
March, June, September, December 2007 32%
March, June, September, December 2008 17%
December 2009 3%
December 2010 1%
December 2011 1%
December 2012 1%
The statistics in Table 3 reflect the short-term nature com-
mon to most trading markets as well as the fact that supply and
demand in EUA markets is strongly influenced by regulatory
considerations. The significant volume of trades for the 2008 to
2012 period may be influenced by EU rules that impose a
penalty of 100 euros per tonne of CO2 equivalent for failure to
deliver adequate allowances in the first commitment period from
January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2012.51
The short-term nature of the EUA market provides limited
price visibility for longer-term CDM projects. This introduces
an added price risk for investors in CDM projects and purchasers
of CERs.
REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY
Regulatory uncertainty has adversely affected the CDM at
several levels. Because the Kyoto Protocol is only in force until
2012, there is uncertainty regarding the future of the CDM. The
short time horizon for the CDM through 2012 reduces incentives
to develop CDM projects.52 One project sponsor noted that if
there was greater commitment to the Kyoto Protocol by his own
government, he believes his firm would be much more aggres-
sive in developing CDM and JI projects.53
Uncertainty regarding CDM standards and methodologies
is another source of regulatory uncertainty. All firms surveyed
identified that uncertainty in standards and methodology were
causing significant delays and additional cost. For example, the
cost of a new methodology is typically recovered by its applica-
tion in multiple projects. Interviewees stated that the cost of
developing a methodology is approximately U.S. $150,000.54
Further, the time required to develop new methodologies is sub-
stantial. Methodologies have required an average of 280 days for
approval.55 Yet, a number of methodologies are under revision
and review, some of which have been revised multiple times.56
Several firms expressed concern that these problems could
undermine the viability of the CDM. 
Significantly, because CDM projects require a minimum of
approximately eighteen to 24 months to register and verify the
CERs, CDM regulatory requirements need to be clarified well in
advance of the upcoming compliance period to ensure a large
volume of CDM activity.57
Finally, the CDM will also be affected by the rules concern-
ing trading emissions between countries. In addition to the EU, a
number of countries are developing emissions trading regimes in
anticipation of the 2008-2012 compliance period.58 The regula-
tory arrangements for linking these national trading systems, the
rules concerning the supply of gases, and the excess AAUs that
will enter the market will affect the viability of CDM.59
PROSPECTS FOR CDM TO ADDRESS
CLIMATE CHANGE
The CDM is in the development stage and must overcome
several significant hurdles before it is a viable mechanism for
addressing climate change, promoting sustainable development,
and fostering clean energy technologies in developing countries
on a meaningful scale. Specifically, difficulty in reliably estimat-
ing and delivering CERs, oversupply of emissions allowances,
lack of clear CDM standards and methodologies, and regulatory
uncertainty concerning the future of the Kyoto Protocol are crit-
ical issues that must be addressed successfully in order for the
CDM to be a commercial and policy success. 
Endnotes: The Clean Development Mechanism on page 75
A
n alarming, and at the same time, reassuring realization
is making its way to the forefront of the minds of energy
onlookers. The United States has one of the world’s
largest oil reserves:1 trapped deep within the rocks of Colorado,
Wyoming, and Utah, as well as Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana, is
an oil shale with deposits estimated at more than five times the
size of Saudi Arabia.2 However,
this oil is not readily available. If
nature were to take its course,
the oil could not be extracted for
millions of years.
Royal Shell Oil Company
(“Shell”) has created a way to
speed up the process, allowing
for extraction in three to four
years.3 The method is called In-
Situ Conversion Process
(“ICP”). The process begins
with drilling holes into the
earth’s crust and then dropping
huge heating coils into the
ground.4 By heating up the
earth’s surface, kerogen, a solid
organic substance, transforms into oil and gas.5 Shell’s pilot
project has produced over 1,200 barrels of oil on government-
owned land containing oil shale deposits.6 Currently, Shell is
perfecting the ICP and moving toward a large-scale commercial
project that could produce up to one trillion barrels of oil on U.S.
soil.7 While Shell is spending millions of dollars to perfect its
system, it is also lobbying the United States Congress for the
right to lease more land where the oil shale is located. The U.S.
government took ownership of the land in 1910 with the passage
of the Pickett Act and set aside the land as the nation’s first
strategic reserve.8
The oil shale could potentially solve many of the energy
problems that the United States has faced since the oil embargo
in the 1970s. With access to this reserve, the United States will
greatly diminish its oil imports. However, what does this mean
for the environment? Shell maintains that the environmental
impact of oil shale exploration is actually less than the impact in
regular oil exploration.9 More
worrisome is the effect on the
atmosphere if that much more
fossil fuel is burned. Can the
earth sustain itself if a trillion
more barrels of oil are burned in
the next generations than would
have been naturally available? 
In the United States,
national security concerns seem
to outweigh many other consid-
erations these days, and so the
exploration and exploitation of
this reserve may be viewed by
some as the best option to lessen
the dependency of the United
States on foreign energy
sources. Governmental and commercial players posit that they
have the utmost consideration for the environment and sustain-
able development. However, at this critical moment it is exceed-
ingly important for nongovernmental organizations and
environmental groups to weigh in with their expertise. Further-
more, the benefits of renewable energy sources and other new
technology must be considered. 
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Endnotes:
1 HARRY R. JOHNSON ET AL., STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF AMERICA’S OIL SHALE
RESOURCE (2004), available at http://www.oildrop.org/Info/Lib/Shale/npr_
strategic_sigv2.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
2 Dan Denning, Oil Shale Reserves: Stinky Water, Sweet Oil, DAILY RECKONING,
available at http://www.dailyreckoning.com/rpt/OilShale.html (last visited Feb.
23, 2007).
3 Oil Shale and Oil Sands Resources: Hearing Before the Senate Energy & Nat-
ural Resources Committee (2005) (testimony of Stephen Mut, CEO, Shell),
available at http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.
Testimony&Hearing_ID=1445&Witness_ID=4139 (last visited Mar. 9, 2007)
[hereinafter Mut]. 
4 Mut, id.
5 Mut, id.
6 Mut, id.
7 Mut, supra note 3. 
8 Denning, supra note 2. 
9 Mut, supra note 3.
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INTRODUCTION
R
ecently published scientific studies, such as the Stern-
Report1 and the Fourth Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (“IPCC”) Assessment Report,2 illustrate
the dire need to curb carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions in order
to combat global climate change. As a result, climate change mit-
igation has become a cornerstone of European energy policy and
is becoming increasingly important in the United States.3 Euro-
pean leaders have agreed on ambitious targets, including a twenty
percent CO2 emission reduction from 1990 levels by 2020. In
view of these European commitments and the nascent carbon
emissions trading regimes underway in the United States, it is
worthwhile to inspect the efficiency of European Union Emis-
sions Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”), the central instrument of
European climate policy. This paper presents an empirical analy-
sis of the corporate transaction costs from three German compa-
nies obligated to take part in the EU ETS. The data presented in
this article are among the first systematically surveyed results in
Europe. Under inspection, these costs vary widely by companies
participating in such regimes and can differ by a factor of five. 
The information presented in this article helps identify opti-
mization potential within the German implementation of this
Emissions Trading Scheme and assist in the design of sound
emission trading systems in the United States or elsewhere. As a
result, the countries’ energy policies will be better suited to ful-
fill energy needs with a reduction in greenhouse gases. 
TRANSACTION COSTS
In this article, the term transaction cost is not restricted to
search, negotiation, and decision-making costs. It is used here in
a wider sense to include information and opportunity costs
beyond those directly associated with a good’s transaction. Sim-
plified, all costs that arise in the course of administration and
management of the emissions trade are considered transaction
costs, excluding purchasing or abatement costs (See Table 1).
Generally all transaction costs are “deadweight losses,” as
expenditures for the obligations of the emissions trade cannot be
used to realize emission abatement measures. 
Macroeconomic theory states that transaction costs hinder the
cost-effective allocation of tradable permits as the volume traded
decreases, which results in an increase of macroeconomic abatement
costs.4 However, this aspect is of less importance since a significant
proportion of the transaction costs associated with the EU ETS arises
with non-trade related activities; therefore, the effect on trade volume
is not as significant as new institutional economics would expect.5
Transaction costs are influenced by the frequency, asset
specifics, and uncertainty of the transaction.6 All these factors
are to some degree interrelated with the implementation of the
EU ETS but depend mainly on the size and the type of company
participating in the system.7 For instance, it can be expected that
a pulp and paper company will have higher costs to develop a
trading strategy than a large utility actively engaged in electricity
trade due to the necessary expertise already being developed in
the utility sector. 
EU EMISSIONS TRADING IN GERMANY
The European Emissions Trading Directive 2003/87/EG8
defines the structural elements of the ETS. As an EU Directive, it
must be implemented into national law in all EU member coun-
tries. In Germany, the Directive was implemented through two
laws and two ordinances.9 The first, the Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions Trading Act (“TEHG”) is composed of six sections defin-
ing the ETS framework and how the system functions. The first
section of the Act defines the aim, the criteria for participation in
the system (defined as installations, or sources, with a generation
capacity greater than 20 MWh), and the central terms of the
scheme. The second section requires affected companies to
properly monitor their emissions and to have a permit to run the
installation. The third section of the TEHG sets forth the terms
implementing the national allocation plan and sets allocation
rules. The terms of the actual emission trade are defined in the
fourth part. The fifth and sixth parts contain sanction mecha-
nisms, assign jurisdiction to the German Emissions Trading
Agency (“DEHSt”), and define additional formal requirements.
The Allocation Law of 2005-2007 and the Allocation Ordi-
nance of 2005-2007 govern the allocation for the first commit-
ment period from 2005 to 2007.10 The former outlines the
allocation rules, whereas the latter contains all the technical def-
initions and details necessary for calculating the exact number of
EU Allowances (“EUA”) an installation receives. 
Germany allocates emission credits to sources through a
range of methods. Primarily, emission allocation is based on
benchmarks or historical emissions; however, the political
process has resulted in special rules for certain facilities. For
instance, exceptions are made for certain efficient technologies,
such as combined heat and power plants, or firms experiencing
undue hardships. As a result, there is a fairly complicated set of
58 different possible combinations of allocations rules that the
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DEHSt, as the executive agency, must navigate. Thus, regulatory
complexity is a main driver of transaction costs in the first com-
mitment period. Moreover, a cost ordinance determines which
fees a company has to pay to participate in the EU ETS. The
TEHG specifies that participating companies must bear the cost
of the DEHSt through these fees, making the administration of
the EU ETS cost neutral for the German government.
Table 1 presents eight categories summarizing transaction
costs facing companies participating in the EU ETS. Specifi-
cally, these costs consist of application, implementation of an
emissions trading management, monitoring, reporting, abate-
ment measures, trade related activities,11 and development or
adaptation of strategic considerations. The cost for appeals and
other legal claims belong to the application category but are not
analyzed in the following case studies.12
TABLE 1: TRANSACTION COST CATEGORIES
Category Transaction Costs
Application • Quantification of historic emissions
• Development of emission outlooks 
• Decision for an application rule 
• Compilation of an application
• Where necessary, compilation of a 
benchmark
• Verification of the application
• Fees for annual allocation
• Fees for emissions register
Implementation  • Information, training
of an • Assessment of obligation to 
emissions participate in the EU ETS
management • Set up of organizational structures 
and assignment of responsibilities
• Adaptation or purchase of software
• Material costs
Monitoring • Design of a monitoring concept
• Implementation of an internal 
monitoring system
• Ongoing monitoring
Reporting • Quantification of annual emissions 
• Compilation of an emissions report
• Verification of an emissions report
• Delivery of data for ex-post-control 
Abatement measures • Identification of abatement measures
• Decision about abatement measures
Trade • Transactions fees (exchange fees, 
broker fees, clearing)
• Trade
• Market observation
Strategy • Definition of a risk strategy
• Definition of a trade strategy
• Definition of a abatement strategy
CASE STUDIES
Case studies are well suited to analyze transaction costs,
because it is possible to effectively consider unique characteris-
tics facing the corporation that cannot be gleaned from surveys
or simplistic questionnaires. For instance, observed transaction
costs arise in different parts of the companies and their underly-
ing time and cost expenditures are typically not separately
recorded from other ongoing business routines. For this case
study, three companies were chosen and several corporate
employees interviewed in-depth after the first emissions reports
were sent to the DEHSt in April 2006. The data surveyed can be
considered to be precise because all information was verified by
interviewees. It should be emphasized that the small sample size
indicates that this data is not representative. For that reason, no
aggregate figures or extrapolations are presented in this paper. 
The first case study is one of the four major utilities in Ger-
many whose twenty installations emitted about eleven million
tons (“Mt”) CO2 in 2005. Due to the magnitude of the emissions
and their direct relation to the firm’s core business processes,
corporate exposure to the EU ETS can be regarded as high. The
company analyzed in the second case study is a typical medium-
sized utility, which is active in municipal public services like
water and gas supply. Its three installations are only used for dis-
trict heating and reserve or peak load production. Therefore, less
CO2 is emitted which—in combination with the diversity of its
operations—leads only to a medium exposure to the EU ETS.
The third case study analyzes a major lime works company. The
emissions of twelve installations add up to about two Mt CO2 per
year. As the added value per ton of CO2 is low in mineral pro-
cessing industries, emission levels result in a high exposure to
the EU ETS. 
TABLE 2: CASE STUDIES
Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3
Major Pubic Major
Utility Services Lime Works 
(MU) Utility (PS) Co. (LW)
Employees 18,000 1,100 900
(2005) (2005) (2004)
Installations 18 2 12
Total annual EUA 
[t CO2] 1,000,000 62,000 2,000,000
Average EUA 
per installation 
p.a. [t CO2] 600,000 31,000 150,000
Reported emissions 
in 2005 [t CO2] 11,000,000 64,000 1,800,000
Surplus/shortage 
2005 -1,000,000 -2,000 200,000
Exposure to EU 
ETS High Medium High
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Results
In 2006, transaction costs for the major utility (“MU”)
totaled 2.8 million euro, 52,000 euro for the medium-sized pub-
lic services utility (“PS”), and 270,000 for the major lime works
company (“LW”). One-time costs, such as setting up the neces-
sary corporate structures, quantifying historic emissions for the
application process, and verifying the applications were aggre-
gated, and then divided by the number of years in the first com-
mitment period and then allocated to the year 2005. The
transaction costs for the compilation and verification of the first
emissions report were also attributed to 2005, although they
arose in 2006, to ensure accordance with a cost-accrual concept.
The figures in Table 3 relate to the EUAs assigned, and not to the
EUAs returned in 2005, because this would have caused incon-
sistencies when accruing the cost partition of one-off13 costs to
the years 2006 and 2007. In regard to the different emissions lev-
els of the installations, the results are presented as specific trans-
action costs per EUA and per installation.
The specific costs per EUA differ by a factor of five, from
0.14 euro to 0.79 euro. Surprisingly, the lime works company
has the lowest transactions costs, which can only be explained by
relatively low expenditures for abatement, strategy, and trade.
The company’s emission management set-up costs have been
relatively moderate, which might be a result of the company’s
existing environmental management system that follows similar
management routines. Unlike utility companies, the lime works
company participates in a competitive market place and cannot,
or can only to a limited extent, pass on the additional costs from
the EU ETS to their customers. This fact might also have led to
greater cost-consciousness. 
The major utility’s transaction costs are about twice as high
than the lime work company’s due to high allocation fees and
frequent trade activities. The public services utility bears the
lowest absolute transaction costs in all categories but the highest
transaction cost per allocation at 0.79 euro. A comparison of the
cost figures per installation in Figure 1(b) shows that the major
utility bears highest costs as a result of high average emissions of
600,000 tons CO2 (See Table 2). This reflects the curbing effect
of frequency on the specific transaction cost per allocation.
FIGURE 1: COMPARISON OF TRANSACTION COSTS
An analysis of transaction cost distribution clearly shows
that the one-time costs for the set-up of the emission trade are a
relatively low component (between four and twelve percent of
the total costs). The latter could increase by the end of the first
commitment period in 2008, when companies decide to acquire
software for the automation of processes. This was not an attrac-
tive option in the beginning, as compatibility definitions for the
software interface with the DEHSt were not available. Therefore,
companies integrated the processes of the EU ETS in their exist-
ing software environment instead of purchasing additional ones. 
The application’s high cost share (37 percent) for the public
services utility is astonishing. The category includes cost related
to initial training in the emissions trading scheme and this 
adds up to a rather high amount. It is likely that the cost for the
orientation in the new complex policy regime is of a similar
magnitude in other small companies with few installations.
Obviously, these learning costs will be much lower for the next
TABLE 3: TRANSACTION COSTS IN 2005
Emissions
management Application Fees Monitoring Reporting Abatement Strategy Trade Total
MU 0.03 c= 0.01 c= 0.08 c= 0.02 c= 0.02 c= 0.005 c= 0.02 c= 0.08 c= 0.27 c=
PS 0.05 c= 0.31 c= 0.07 c= 0.17 c= 0.07 c= 0.094 c= 0.00 c= 0.03 c= 0.79 c=
LW 0.01 c= 0.02 c= 0.04 c= 0,03 c= 0.04 c= 0.00 c= 0.00 c= 0.00 c= 0.14 c=
MU 18,519 c= 3,648 c= 44,612 c= 13,889 c= 13,889 c= 2,778 c= 13,889 c= 44,444 c= 155,667 c=
PS 1,633 c= 9,583 c= 2,158 c= 5,288 c= 3,800 c= 2,917 c= 0 c= 869 c= 26,248 c=
LW 857 c= 2,530 c= 7,375 c= 5,116 c= 6,073 c= 233 c= 78 c= 233 c= 22,496 c=I
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commitment period as companies will be familiar with the func-
tion of the EU ETS and will have experiences in trading. Simi-
larly, fees make up around one third of total transaction in the
major utility and lime works company, both enterprises with
high emissions levels. This is especially negative from a corpo-
rate point of view as there are limited possibilities to internally
decrease this share through efficiencies or other mechanisms.  A
simplified allocation scheme with fewer combinations of appli-
cation rules would have decreased the costs at the DEHSt
administrational level resulting in lower fees for the participants. 
The share of transaction costs due to monitoring and report-
ing is highest at the lime works company (23 percent and 27 per-
cent, respectively), which can be explained by more complex
monitoring procedures covering a wider product range, various
fuels and different productions methods. The public utility also
has a high transaction cost share for those two categories (twenty
percent and fourteen percent), but they can likely be accounted
to the low number of installations that prevent the company from
profiting from learning effects in the compilations of monitoring
schemes and emission reporting. 
Approximately one third (29 percent) of the transaction
costs observed at the major utility originate from trading per-
mits, which significantly differ from the other firms examined
(three percent for PS, one percent for LW). This is most likely
due to similarities in the core business of larger utilities that con-
stantly optimize their power generation capacities. The high
amount of allocated permits certainly enhances corporate possi-
bilities to take advantage of the emissions trade. The permit
trade is part of the day-to-day business just as much as electric-
ity trading at the major utility, and this compliments a higher
transaction cost share. Another surprising finding is the low level
of transaction costs at the lime works company that cannot be
explained with transaction cost theory. The higher costs at the
public services utility on the other hand are in line with theoreti-
cal assumptions regarding economies of scale, as there are only
two installations and relatively few EUAs allocated. The level of
transaction costs at the major utility can be well explained by the
more pro-active emission management and the voluminous trad-
ing activities. Apart from that it can be stated that the amount of
transaction costs corresponds well with other preliminary esti-
mates, but no extraordinarily high transaction costs of greater
than one euro per EUA was found. 
CONCLUSION
The varying results in transaction costs should encourage
companies to examine the structure of their emissions manage-
ment and to look for optimization potentials. Generally, sinking
transactions cost levels can be expected with increasingly ampli-
fying learning effects, but this will not be self-evident. Usually, a
simpler allocation scheme could contribute to decreasing trans-
action costs for the application and fees. Among the possibilities
to achieve this are permit auctions or a de-minimis rule for
reduced requirements for installations with low emissions level-
both are currently discussed in the policy formulation phase for
the second commitment period in Germany. Although the level
of transaction costs overall is moderate, a decrease would be
highly desirable—especially when they are compared to the cur-
rent spot price of permits of about 1.50 euro.
1 See NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
(2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_
review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm (last visited Apr.
16, 2007). 
2 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (2007), available
at http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb07.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
3 See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), http://rggi.org/about.htm
(last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
4 See Robert N. Stavins, Transaction Costs and Tradable Permits, 29 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 113, 113-48 (1995).
5 See Douglas W. Allen, Transaction Costs, in THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS VOLUME I 893
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000), available at http://users.
ugent.be/~gdegeest/tablebib.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
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INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION VOLUME I 136 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert
Willig eds., 1989). 
7 See INGO PUHL ET AL., LEITFADEN ZERTIFIKATEHANDEL (2005), available at
http://www.co2ncept.net/downld/Leitfaden_Zertifikatehandel_OV.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2007). 
8 Council Directive 2003/97/EC, Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community and Amending Council
Directive 96/61/EX, 2003 O.J. (275/32). 
9 See DEHST, EMISSIONS TRADING IN GERMANY: ALLOCATIONS OF ALLOWANCES
FOR THE FIRST COMMITMENT PERIOD 2005-2007 (2d ed. 2005), available at
http://www.dehst.de/cln_007/nn_941174/SharedDocs/Presse/Hintergrundinfor-
mationen/Allocation__of__Allowances,templateId=raw,property=publication-
File.pdf/Allocation_of_Allowances.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2007). 
10 See NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
2005-2007 (2004), available at http://www.bmu.de/english/emissions_trading/
national_allocation_plan/doc/5894.php (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
11 Note, that this category comprises only the transaction costs of trading.
Potential profits or losses are not taken into account in this analysis. 
12 The transaction cost categories relate partly to the framework legislation
(TEHG), the allocation act (ZuG 2007) and systematics of the EU ETS. 
13 One-off costs are costs that arise only once during the first commitment
period, e.g., the fee for an account in the registry at the DEHSt.
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I
n addition to over 1,150 civilian deaths, 3,700 civilian injuries,
and the creation of nearly one million refugees and internally
displaced peoples,1 the recent Lebanon-Israel war in the sum-
mer of 2006 left the Lebanese infrastructure and environment
severely damaged.2 According to “Lebanon Rapid Environmental
Assessment for Greening Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform
2006,” a report issued by the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, the war resulted in the “destruction of approximately
445,000 [meters squared] of road network, 92 bridges and over-
passes, as well as the destruction or
damage of an estimated total of
130,000 dwelling units in addition to
water supply and wastewater infra-
structure.”3 Lebanon’s Council for
Development and Reconstruction, a
quasi-governmental organization,
estimated that the destruction resulted
in approximately U.S. $2.5 billion in damages, not including
losses of revenue.4 In addition to the massive devastation caused
to the civilian infrastructure, the region’s environment paid a
heavy toll as a result of the war, the effects of which are still being
dealt with today. 
The most widely publicized environmental consequence of
the war was Israel’s attack on the Jiyyeh power plant, located
south of Beirut. A report by the United Nations Environmental
Programme (“UNEP”) stated that up to “75,000 cubic met[ers]
of heavy fuel oil could have been burned, spilled or leaked into
the ground after the Israeli air raids of 13 and 15 July 2006,
though the exact amount is still unknown.”5 The attack resulted
in the spill of 15,000 cubic meters of oil, which spread across the
Mediterranean coast, reaching the Syrian coastal city of Tartus
to the north and Tyre in the south.6 Approximately 150 kilome-
ters of Lebanon’s coastline, out of a total 220 kilometers, was
directly affected by this spill.7 That Israel targeted the plant on
three separate occasions and had even threatened to bomb the
power plant again8 clearly indicates that Israel’s attack against
the plant was willful and deliberate, and therefore could consti-
tute a war crime based on principles of international humanitar-
ian law (“IHL”), due to the civilian-use nature of the plant.9
Once the ceasefire went into effect on August 14, 2006, a
coalition of organizations including UNEP, various NGO’s and
Lebanese Ministry of Environment (“MoE”) took part in Phase I
of the cleanup process along the coast.10 Phase I involved “the
removal of free floating oil and the bulk of the oil that can be
remobilized from all heavily affected sites along the coast,” and
according to MoE, was successfully completed in January 2007,
a full six months after the Summer War.11
Phase II, on the other hand, which is only just beginning, may
prove to be a much more challenging task. The sea continues to
deposit oil onto the shores of the country, and shifting sands contin-
ually expose large deposits of oil from the bombed power plant.12
The remaining cleanup will be a much more costly and lengthy
effort, and one which the government may not be able to handle.
UNEP reports that the “disposal of toxic waste and other debris
from Israel’s bombing last July and
August still poses a major environ-
mental challenge to Lebanon. Unex-
ploded cluster bombs, sacks oozing
oil on beaches, mountains of rubble
and bombed-out factories with stock-
piles of chemicals all may have a far-
reaching impact on people and their
environment unless treated urgently.”13 The MoE reports that the first
phase of the cleanup cost between U.S. $137 and $205 million dol-
lars, and the “assistance that Lebanon has received to date is less than
[five percent] of the needed financial resources” for these projects.14
Despite several proclamations by the Lebanese government
that it intended to pursue legal action on an international level
against Israel for the alleged war crimes committed, action on
the part of the government has been minimal.15 This is likely due
both to internal political turmoil and the likelihood that Israel
could pursue similar action against the Lebanese government
because of Hezbollah’s position in the government and its con-
duct during the war. The International Court of Justice has
opened up its own investigation into whether war crimes were
committed by either side, under the title Expert Legal Inquiry
into Possible Violations of International Humanitarian Law in
the Armed Conflict in Lebanon.16 Whether either side can collect
against the other for violations of IHL is yet to be seen.
Because of this, it is likely that Lebanon’s only remedy to its
environmental situation is to seek financial assistance from
donor countries to continue the cleanup and reconstruction
process, which, if the first six months are any indication, will
likely take another six months to one year and several hundred
million dollars to complete. The country has a long way to go
before full environmental recovery is achieved. 
UPDATE ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE RECENT
LEBANON-ISRAEL WAR
by Salah Husseini*
* Salah Husseini is a JD candidate, May 2008, at American University Washing-
ton College of Law.
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result of the war.
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INTRODUCTION
T
he world is becoming an increasingly urban place, creat-
ing problems that affect the environment, the poor, and
the global economy. The urban population for developing
countries by 2020 is forecasted to expand by 2.4 billion people.1
In the People’s Republic of China (“PRC” or “China”) nearly all
of the population growth over the last twenty years has occurred
in urban settings.2 The country’s urban population was 72 mil-
lion in 1952 and increased to 540 million in 2004.3 It is predicted
that an estimated 900 million will live in Chinese cities by 2020
if urbanization continues at the rate of one percent annually.4
China is not the only country experiencing rapid growth in
urban settings. Over the next two decades, developing countries
are projected to be home to 80 percent of urban dwellers.5 Fur-
ther, approximately 80 percent of East Asia’s economic growth
will occur in urban areas.6 Thus, one of the challenges for this
millennium is to develop an urban strategy for sustainable envi-
ronmental and energy growth in current and emerging cities,
with the goal of improving economic vitality and environmental
livability for all.7
This article examines the relationship between urban popu-
lation growth, municipal solid waste8 (“MSW”), and energy sus-
tainability challenges in the PRC. It also suggests that the United
States could derive substantial benefits by assisting the PRC, and
ultimately the world, in tackling these challenges.
The first section illustrates the challenges and relationships
between urban growth, MSW, and sustainable development. It
also provides a background of the current state of MSW in the
PRC. The second section looks at the current methods of treat-
ment for MSW, including promising waste-to-energy (“WTE”)
technologies as a means to achieving environmental and energy
sustainability. The third section addresses the opportunities and
benefits for the United States, and the U.S. environmental tech-
nology industry in the PRC. In conclusion, we find that the
opportunities available in the PRC will simultaneously allow
U.S. companies to reap economic benefits while providing solu-
tions to critical environmental and energy problems that pose
severe global consequences if not confronted today. 
THE CHALLENGE: URBAN POPULATION
GROWTH, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE, AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE PRC
The increased level of urban domestic wastes, occasioned
by spectacular population explosion, has become a serious prob-
lem in the PRC. Due to China’s rapid urban population and eco-
nomic growth, MSW levels have increased approximately ten
percent per year.9 At present, the MSW treatment rate in the
PRC is less than twenty percent, in comparison to over 90 per-
cent in developed countries. Accumulated wastes in the PRC
occupy 500 million square meters of space, weighing approxi-
mately six billion tons.10 Currently, garbage surrounds two-
thirds of the PRC’s cities. For instance, Shanghai is surrounded
by about 1,000 garbage dumping grounds11 and Beijing has
about 700 solid waste dumps surrounding the city in order to
handle the 10,000 tons of urban solid waste generated every day.12
No country has ever experienced such a phenomenal
increase in solid waste quantities that China is now facing. In
2004, China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest
waste generator and it is estimated that annual solid waste quan-
tities will increase by 150 percent by 2030.13 As a result, China’s
annual solid waste quantities will increase from 190,000,000
tons in 2004 to over 480,000,000 tons in 2030.14
The China Council for International Cooperation on Envi-
ronment and Development, a nongovernmental advisory board
working to strengthen environmental dialogue between China
and the international community, recently released a report that
summarized some of the land-use problems associated with
MSW in China.15 While currently a Chinese urban resident pro-
duces 740 pounds less waste per year than his/her American
counterpart, Chinese waste production rates are rapidly rising.
The report found that landfills of solid waste have clogged
50,000 hectares of land surrounding cities in China, rendering
this land as useless.16 Moreover, all urban landfills will reach
capacity in another thirteen years.17 Additionally, it is estimated
the PRC’s garbage pile-up will reach 400 million tons in 2020,
which is equivalent to the volume generated by the entire world
in 1997.18 This report provides a dire glimpse into the future
problems China will face while attempting to handle the
increase in MSW that results from a soaring population.
According to the above statistics, China will be overflowing
with MSW unless action occurs. China will need to develop sys-
tems to effectively handle two-and-a-half times more waste than
current levels no later than 2030-and the sooner this technology
* Longmire Harrison is the Managing Director at Nichibei Legal Consultants,
LLC. Mr. Harrison obtained his L.L.M. in International Environmental Law from
George Washington University School of Law; B.A. in International Studies and
Economics from American University; and certificate in Japanese Language and
Culture from Reitaku University (Japan).
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is developed, the better.19 China cannot ignore this problem due
to the social, financial, and environmental impacts of its increas-
ing waste production on domestic and international matters.20
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN THE PRC
China’s State Environmental Protection Administration
(“SEPA”) began to promulgate regulations and legislation
related to solid waste management in the 1990s.21 In 1991,
SEPA started a waste declaration and registration pilot project in
seventeen cities.22 Part of the goal of this program was to iden-
tify the type, characteristics, quantity, and danger of solid waste,
including the hazardous types. Under this program, SEPA also
conducted tests on waste exchange
to evaluate how a comprehen-
sive regional program could be
adopted.23 As a result of this
experimental work, a solid foun-
dation for waste exchange has
been established in China. 
In October of 1995, China
passed the “Law of the People’s
Republic of China on the Pre-
vention and Control of Environ-
mental Pollution by Solid
Waste.”24 As China’s first com-
prehensive law on solid waste, it
authorizes the government to
inflict solid waste discharge fees
on entities that do not comply
with certain environmental
laws.25 The Cleaner Production Law was passed in 2002 and put
in force in 2003; the goal of this law is to provide incentives to
industries to reduce, recycle, and reuse wastes.26 Some local
governments also have enacted regulations and standards for the
prevention and control of pollution by solid waste.27
THE PRC’S NEW MSW APPROACH
In China, the municipal environmental sanitation adminis-
trative bureaus are responsible for daily garbage collection,
transportation, and centralized garbage treatment, including
landfills and incineration plants.28 Based on the volume, it has
become clear that the Chinese waste industry alone cannot meet
the demand for waste management technology.29
China’s waste management system is undergoing wholesale
changes as the government tries to respond to the increase in
production of waste.30 Partly inspired by Japanese and German
recycling economy laws, the Chinese Government is increas-
ingly viewing the concept of a circular economy (“CE”), also
known as a life cycle economy, as a means of balancing rapid
economic development in China.31 A basic definition of CE is
the joining of manufacturing and service businesses seeking to
improve economic and environmental performance by collabo-
rating in the management of environmental and resource issues.
One of the Chinese CE objectives is to diminish the growing
waste problem by increasing the efficiency of resource utiliza-
tion by a factor of ten by the year 2020.32
Factors, such as hosting the 2008 Olympic Games and the
2010 International Expo, mounting health hazards such as
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”), and trying to
manage growing stockpiles of solid waste are increasing exter-
nal pressures on the Chinese Government to safely manage its
solid waste. As a result, the government has begun encouraging
the development of a solid waste management industry. Unfortu-
nately, the local industry lacks the experience and technology to
satisfy the rapidly growing demand.33 As a result, China desig-
nated environmental protection as a key investment area, making
it a new, market-oriented point of economic growth in the coun-
try and directing more foreign
capital into this sector. This has
resulted in China’s environmen-
tal industry quickly becoming
one of the most dynamic seg-
ments of its economy. Increas-
ingly, international partnership
projects, cleaner production,
energy efficiency, and carbon
dioxide emissions reduction are
opening the market in China to
highly diversified environmental
technologies and services.
THE SUSTAINABILITY
SOLUTION:
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE
AND WASTE TO
ENERGY CONVERSION
TECHNOLOGY
China needs an integrated sustainable waste management
approach with the long-term objective of waste segregation. This
approach requires involving key stakeholders, such as the
82,000 rural migrants making their living as garbage pickers in
Beijing,34 in the planning and decision-making process. China
must also take a holistic view of the complete waste manage-
ment system, including waste minimization, collection, transfer,
treatment, recycling, resource recovery, and disposal.35 Some
MSW management techniques include source reduction, recy-
cling, composting, landfills, and incineration. Source reduction
involves altering the design, manufacture, or use of products and
materials to reduce the amount of toxic materials that become
waste. Recycling diverts items, such as paper, glass, plastic, and
metals from the waste stream. 
China currently uses the following three principal treatment
methods for managing MSW: (1) landfills (70 percent); (2) high-heat
composting (twenty percent); and (3) incineration (ten percent).36
LANDFILL: TURNING MUNICIPAL WASTE METHANE
INTO ENERGY
Most cities use centralized stacking and simple landfill treat-
ing methods to dispose of waste. The majority of these treatment
facilities are not able to meet international standards and pose
significant environmental hazards, particularly associated with
leachate from the site.37 Water percolating through landfills produces
The conversion of
municipal solid waste 
to energy can conserve
valuable fuels and improve
the environment by
lessening the amount 
of waste in landfills.
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leachate, which often contains toxic chemicals. Very few landfill
sites in China are equipped with leachate collection and treat-
ment systems, which are required in the developed world.
The biodegradation of organic matter creates landfill gas,
which is about fifty percent methane.38 The abundance of land-
fills has given China the distinction of producing more methane
than any other developing country. This dubious distinction,
since methane is a greenhouse gas, can be turned into a positive
in that methane can be used as fuel for industry and vehicles.39
Along this line of thought, China implemented several landfill
gas capture projects. For exam-
ple, one project included three
technology demonstrations on
how to use landfill gas for elec-
tric power generation, incinera-
tion of medical wastes, and
vehicle fuels.40 In addition,
besides helping energy-starved
cities in China, according to a
World Bank report, “carbon cred-
its from turning methane into
energy could generate as much as
[U.S.] $1 billion per year for Chi-
nese cities.”41
HIGH-HEAT COMPOST
Composting decomposes
organic waste, such as food
scraps and yard trimmings, with
microorganisms (mainly bacteria and fungi).42 Composting may
increase in importance due to the possible sale of carbon emission
reductions under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto
Protocol; however, this would entail establishing a marketing pro-
gram and a review and testing of compost quality.43 Currently,
high-heat compost is not the focus of the Chinese Government.
WTE TECHNOLOGY
In many Chinese cities, WTE has been selected as a primary
treatment method for MSW volume reduction and as a source of
energy.44 The conversion of MSW to energy can conserve valu-
able fuels and improve the environment by lessening the amount
of waste in landfills.45 The importance of utilizing WTE was rec-
ognized in the 1991 U.S. National Energy Strategy, which sought
to support the conversion of MSW to energy.46
One way to utilize the energy value of MSW is to burn it in a
steam power plant to generate electricity. In addition, the co-com-
bustion of coal and MSW is an option. Coal has long been the
predominant source of energy for electricity production in China
and around the world. The same combustion principles apply to
both energy sources, and the technologies for controlling emis-
sions are similar in both the combustion of coal and WTE.47
More than half of the electricity generated in China is produced
in coal-fueled power plants. Thus, the co-combustion of coal and
MSW as an energy resource can help mitigate the MSW disposal
problem, conserve valuable fuels, and reduce emissions of CO2.48
This type of combustion reduces waste volume by 90 percent,
resulting in sizable landfill capacity savings, even when the
resulting ash is landfilled. Land filled ash weighs about one-
fourth to one-third as much as processed trash and can be used as
aggregate material for road building and other construction.49
In China, MSW incineration technology was initially used
at the end of the 1980’s, and was rapidly developed in the 1990’s.
Incinerators are growing in popularity but their “growth is often
driven by artificial and non-sustainable subsidies and non-trans-
parent financing structures, as well as lack of understanding and
experience about incineration facilities.”50 It is encouraged that
all new incinerators should meet
Japanese-EU emission standards
for dioxin and mercury, and that
all operators should receive a sig-
nificant level of training.51
China currently operates
nineteen municipal waste incinera-
tors with a total daily capacity of
approximately 7,000 tons (Decem-
ber 2002 status).52 This is about
two percent of all the municipal
solid waste produced in China.53
More than 30 enterprises, research
institutes, and universities are now
concentrating on the research and
development of incineration tech-
nology and its integrated equip-
ments, and more than 30 large-
and middle-scale cities have constructed or are constructing MSW
incineration plants. Many new constructions are in conjunction
with Japanese, German, French, and Canadian companies.54
THE OPPORTUNITY: BENEFITS FOR THE
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
AND U.S. COMPANIES
China, with a current population of over 1.3 billion people,
is one of the fastest growing economies of the world. This rapid
growth will propel a dramatic increase in the demand for energy
and other resources, with increasing demand over the next 40
years. In order to meet the increasing needs for proper MSW
management, the Chinese Government is working with foreign
partners to import technology. This creates great business oppor-
tunities for countries like the United States. The United States is
a major exporter of MSW management technology, permitting it
to provide guidance and gain financially from exchanging devel-
opment technology with countries like China. 
For example, effective alternatives to the MSW disposal and
conversion technologies currently available in the PRC have
been developed by the global environmental technology indus-
try. Some of these technologies have still not been commercially
exploited. However, each of these technologies will be able to
convert MSW into usable raw material for other industries, and,
at best, will completely eliminate contaminants in the air waste
stream. The use of such technologies will create true sustainabil-
ity in places like the PRC. Thus, the market for environmental
goods and technology is rapidly increasing.  
After the United States,
China is the world’s
greatest energy consumer
and largest emitter of
greenhouse gases that
contribute to global
climate change.
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Despite the obvious opportunities for U.S. companies to
continue to develop and deploy new technology in markets like
the PRC, many companies allege that more stringent emission
reductions standards cannot be achieved or that doing so would
be devastating to the national economy. While these claims are
met with sympathy in some circles, it is instructive to note that
similar arguments were made by the U.S. automobile industry in
the 1970s when they insisted that greater gas mileage or fuel
economy could not be achieved. While the U.S. automobile
industry, their lobbyists, and politicians were playing bipartisan
politics and a game of “chicken,” the Japanese simply developed
and tested the technology, and built fuel efficient automobiles.
The U.S. automobile industry has never recovered and has never
been the same. Thus, this lesson should caution those who claim
new MSW technology could not conform to stringent environ-
mental standards. 
CONCLUSION
Sustainable economic growth and development is critical in
every part of the world. As urban populations increase and
mega-cities become the norm, political leaders will increasingly
be called upon to develop policies and procedures that promote
economic viability while enhancing the environment. Such
growth also provides opportunities for foreign companies to reap
economic benefits while providing solutions to critical environ-
mental and energy problems, such as the possible role of U.S.
MSW management technology in the PRC.
Current MSW treatment and disposal methods in the PRC
lag far behind international standards. This lag, if unchecked,
will lead to dire consequences for the global community. After
the United States, China is the world’s greatest energy consumer
and largest emitter of greenhouse gases that contribute to global
climate change. New and existing MSW and WTE technologies
have the ability to revolutionize the WTE industry in the PRC.
The merger of new technology and existing experience-based
practices could create a powerful partnership between respective
organizations in the PRC and global environmental technology
companies as the two work together to deliver the benefits of
strong sustainable environmental and economic development to
the citizens of the PRC and the world. 
1 Michael A. Cohen, The Hypothesis of Urban Convergence: Are the Cities in
the North and South Becoming More Alike in an Age of Globalization, in
PREPARING FOR THE URBAN FUTURE: GLOBAL PRESSURE AND LOCAL FORCES 25,
27 (Michael A. Cohen, Blair Ruble, Joseph Tulchin & Allison Garland eds.,
1996).
2 Zijun Li, Rapid Growth of China’s Cities Challenges Urban Planners,
Migrant Families, WORLD WATCH INST., June 27, 2006, available at
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/4148 (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
3 Zijun Li, id.
4 Zijun Li, id.
5 Zijun Li, id.
6 Janet Ellen Stearns, Urban Growth: A Global Challenge, 8 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 140, 140 (1999).
7 See Megacities Biggest Future Threat to Health, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Apr.
4, 1996.
8 Municipal Solid Waste is defined as all waste originating in urban areas from
residential, industrial (non-hazardous), commercial, and institutional sectors.
This definition is consistent with international practices and enables better com-
parisons across Chinese cities and other global cities. See Dan Hoornweg et al.,
Waste Management in China: Issues and Recommendations 18 (East Asia 
Infrastructure Dep’t, World Bank, Working Paper No. 9, 2005), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPURBDEV/Resources/
China-Waste-Management1.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
9 See China Waste Management 4 (Streams Technology Programme, Working
Paper, 2004) available at http://akseli.tekes.fi/opencms/opencms/OhjelmaPor-
taali/ohjelmat/Streams/fi/Dokumenttiarkisto/Viestinta_ja_aktivointi/Julkaisut/K
ansainvaliset_selvitykset/S24045_Waste_Management_Review.pdf (last visited
Apr. 4, 2007) [hereinafter China Waste Management]. 
10 Gary Liu et al., 1999 Industry Sector Analysis, “China - Solid Waste Man-
agement Technologies Market,” FT ASIA INTELLIGENCE WIRE, July 30, 1999.
11 MICHAEL R. SANIO ET AL., THE CHALLENGE IN WASTING WASTE, REUSE OF
URBAN WASTE FOR AGRICULTURE: AN INVESTMENT PROGRAM FOR PROGRESSIVE
ACTION, PHASE 1 REPORT (1998).
12 China Waste Management, supra note 9, at 4.
13 Hoornweg et al., supra note 8, at 11
14 Hoornweg et al., supra note 8, at 11.
15 Samantha L. Jones, A China Environmental Health Project Research Brief:
Environmental and Health Challenges of Municipal Solid Waste in China
(Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Research Brief 2007),
available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/INDEX.CFM?TOPIC_ID=1421&
FUSEACTION=TOPICS.ITEM&NEWS_ID=218565 (last visited Mar. 27,
2007); see also, Sun Xiaohua, Country Faces ‘Great Wall’ of Waste, CHINA
DAILY, Jan. 9, 2007.
16 Jones, supra note 15.  
17 Jones, supra note 15.  
18 Jones, supra note 15.  
19 Hoornweg et al., supra note 8, at 15.
20 Hoornweg et al., supra note 8, at 15.
21 Liu et al., supra note 10. 
22 Liu et al., supra note 10. 
23 Liu et al., supra note 10. 
24 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of
Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste, available at http://www.enviroinfo.
org.cn/LEGIS/Laws/la558_en.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
25 Jones, supra note 15.
26 Jones, supra note 15, at 2.
27 Jones, supra note 15, at 2.
28 He Pinjing & Shao Liming, A Perspective Analysis on Municipal Solid Waste
(MSW) Energy Recovery in China, 9 J. ENVTL. SCI. 221, 221-25 (1997).
29 Pinjing & Liming, id.
30 Hoornweg et al., supra note 8, at 11.
31 Jones, supra note 15, at 3.
32 Jones, supra note 15, at 1.
33 Liu et al., supra note 10. 
34 See Erik Eckholm, Amid Garbage and Disdain, China Migrants Find a Liv-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at A1. 
35 Hoornweg et al., supra note 8, at 12.
Endnotes: Merging Environmental and Energy Sustainability
Endnotes: Merging Environmental and Energy Sustainability
continued on page 76
O
n December 7, 2005 the European Union published its
Biomass Action Plan.1 The EU’s goal of promoting the
use of biomass energy, generally defined as energy that
comes from processing any form of harvested biological life
such as forest products and plant life, is part of an increasing
trend.2 Biomass emerged on the international market as a major
renewable energy source during the last fifteen years. 
While biomass has the potential to be a sustainable, renew-
able, and economic source of energy, it has drawbacks that must
be managed. For example, biomass production could compete
with food production.3 Cultivation of cash crops to produce bio-
mass energy could also lead to deforestation or the take-over of
traditionally indigenous lands by multinational corporations.4
Furthermore, the trade in biomass fuels crosses state boundaries
and is largely the purview of multinational corporations. Hence,
states are unable to effectively regulate this trade. Civil society
actors, such as international regulatory organizations, have
attempted to fill this governance gap by providing incentives for
multinational corporations to adopt policies that reduce the
potential negative impacts of biomass cultivation. Forest certifi-
cation was one of the first incentive structures devised. Forest
certification is the process by which an independent third-party
assesses the management of biomass cultivation by a firm in
relation to standards set by a regulatory organization.5 If the
management of the resource complies with these organizational
standards, the firm may display a label signifying they have con-
formed to the standards.6
While certification procedures are likely to marginally raise
the cost of grossly violating the norms of a regulatory organiza-
tion, these policies fall far short of the goal of ensuring biomass
fuels do not negatively impact sustainable development. Certifi-
cation procedures are not efficacious because they fail in two
critical regards. First, they do not enforce accountability because
of the limited resources of many regulatory organizations. Sec-
ond, the broad language of the standards used to assess firms
incentivizes compliance that often violates the spirit of the
norms themselves.
Forest certification is not effective in realizing the goal of
sustainable energy development because the organizations
enforcing these norms lack the reach and resources to compel
multinational corporations to comply.7 The funds necessary for
continued monitoring of biomass firms are heavily reliant on the
revenue generated by the certifications procedure itself.8 These
limited resources make it difficult to ensure some compliance on
the part of firms that have not sought certification. This leads to
a basic selection problem. The only firms that will comply with
certification procedures are those who have an interest in doing
so.9 As a result, the firms that are most likely to opt out of these
procedures are the firms whose behavior civil society would
most like to influence.10
The certification process itself has the potential to under-
mine the stated goals of the regulations. Since certification is the
primary way organizations receive revenue, the certification
process can be influenced by pecuniary interests.11 Firms pay
independent certifiers for their services. Certifiers who have a
track record of certifying firms are more likely to be hired. If
track records play a role in the selection of certifiers, this deci-
sion risks the creation of a negative feedback loop where firms
select certifiers who interpret regulations more loosely and other
certifiers lower their standards to compete for employment. In
addition, few institutional safeguards exist to ensure that certi-
fiers will remain truly independent.12 Regulatory organizations
that promote certification procedures without ensuring that certi-
fiers have a safeguarded fiduciary responsibility run the short-
term risk of entrenching this negative feed-back loop.
Despite the short-term limitations of biomass certification
programs, it is important to see the forest through the trees. 
Virtually all stakeholders viewing the issue of biomass through
the prism of sustainable development agree that some regulation
is needed. Not all agree that certification programs alone will 
be the most effective method of achieving the stated goals of
regulation. While all certification regimes face drawbacks, 
many other certification regimes benefit from state-level regula-
tions that have established a baseline of acceptable corporate
behavior. The nascent nature of international biomass trade
means that there are few supplementary regulatory frameworks
to create a baseline of permissible practice. While certification
procedures may be effective in the long-term despite these prob-
lems, they cannot be effective alone in the short-term. In fact,
the use of these procedures without other safeguards and supple-
mentary forms of regulation risks the creation and entrenchment
of policies that run counter to the ultimate goal of ensuring 
that biomass energy production is sustainable, renewable, and
economic.
THE FOREST AND THE TREES: 
BIOMASS AND CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES
by Stephen Medlock*
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INTRODUCTION
A
gricultural and energy policies that are seemingly unre-
lated to water use, such as institutionalized support of
biofuel production, can have major water-related
impacts. For instance, expanding agriculture to meet countries’
growing demand for biofuels could place extreme stress on
global water resources. Clean and reliable water resources are
necessary for nearly all social-industrial processes. Currently,
agricultural production is the
world’s largest user of water.1
However, agriculture is not the
only sector straining global
water supplies. Water demand
continued to rise in nearly every
component of global society
over the last twenty years despite
limited supplies, particularly in
the world’s expanding arid and
semi-arid regions.2
Utilizing biofuels has
numerous positive results, such
as reducing greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions, improving
countries’ energy security, and providing economic opportuni-
ties in the world’s impoverished rural areas. However, this
renewable energy source also comes with a price. Biofuels com-
pete with food crops for scarce arable land. For example,
Europe’s pledge to replace 5.75 percent of their fuels with biofu-
els by 2010 and the United States’ proposal to substitute fifteen
percent of U.S. gasoline use with biofuels by 2017 will place
enormous demands on existing cropping systems. The U.S. plan
alone would require 35 billion gallons of alternative fuel: the
equivalent of 13.5 billion bushels of corn (using current tech-
nologies). The water-related consequences of large-scale biofuel
production and the potential need for policy guidance in this
area have yet to be fully explored. 
This article has two major goals. The first is to establish
that, in the context of the “global water crisis,” water accounting
is a useful tool with which to evaluate the international impacts
of producing and trading biofuel stocks. The second idea to be
conveyed is that the international community must move
towards a more integrated understanding of the development of
biofuels within the context of the global water crisis. 
THE RISE OF BIOFUELS
Countries around the world are currently employing (or
exploring) biofuels as cleaner, more secure alternatives to gaso-
line in meeting their transportation energy needs.  Current biofu-
els technologies rely on converting crops that farmers have tradi-
tionally grown for feed purposes (i.e. corn, soybeans, sugar, and
palm oil) into ethanol or biodiesel that could displace fossil fuels
in motor vehicles, a significant source of carbon dioxide emis-
sions.3 Ethanol is produced from crops with high sugar content,
such as wheat, beets, and sugar cane. These sugars are fermented
into ethanol either by biologic or chemical means.4 Biodiesel is
made from oil crops such as
rapeseed, soybeans, and jat-
ropha; fuel derived from veg-
etable oils can be blended with
oil-based diesel or used directly.5
Biofuels present a way to
meet Kyoto Protocol commit-
ments for GHG emission reduc-
tions, decrease air pollution for
domestic reasons, and/or gener-
ate greater domestic energy
security in non-oil producing
countries.6 Another reason for
encouraging growth in the biofu-
els sector is to revitalize a deteri-
orating agricultural sector, both in developing and developed
countries.7 Some farmers see biofuels as the answer to often inac-
cessible and unpredictable global agricultural markets. For exam-
ple, some individuals in South Africa believe that “the whole
bioethanol revolution will save maize farmers” in this country.8
Beyond land and water constraints, concerns exist regarding
increases in the production of biofuels. Developing countries
will likely become the primary producers of biofuel feedstocks
with developed countries as the primary consumers. A large
group of international nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”)
have expressed concern that increasing biofuel production may
create a scenario reminiscent of earlier colonialism based on
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BIOFUELS WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS
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resource extraction and exploitation.9 These groups recognize
that there are likely short-term benefits to the agricultural sector
in producing countries. Nonetheless, these NGOs worry that
poorer countries will continue to be dependent on primary
resource exports and may forgo opportunities to invest in
increases in food production for their citizens. In contrast, bio-
fuel expansion in developing countries is also viewed as a way to
help reduce commodity dependency in these countries and sup-
port infrastructure development that will help with the distribu-
tion of crops.10 In addition, there is concern about the
implications of increasing monoculture farming practices for
biodiversity in the surrounding ecosystems. 
Obviously, there is much debate over these issues because
specific threats and benefits for local communities are extremely
difficult to predict with accuracy. As a result of these issues,
some NGOs, Indigenous Peoples Organizations, farmer’s move-
ments, and individuals went as far as to publicly and formally
oppose the use of biofuels to the Conference of the Parties of the
Framework Convention on Climate Change.11 Stating that
“[b]iofuels are a disaster in the making,” those opposing biofuels
called for immediate suspension all subsidies and other support
for trade.12 However, whether or not such a North-South disac-
cord will exist within the biofuel trade regime may only be dis-
covered through experience.
GLOBAL WATER CRISIS
Mounting evidence has prompted a nearly universal decla-
ration of the existence of global water scarcity- coined the
“global water crisis.”13 Such evidence includes the fact that more
than two billion people are affected by water shortages in over
forty countries.14 The global water crisis is particularly evident
when trends are examined with an eye toward the future, as
water shortages experienced throughout the world often impose
serious risks to long-term sustainability of linked socio-ecologi-
cal water systems.15 More specifically, several studies have con-
cluded that the world’s freshwater ecosystems have already been
significantly degraded in form and function due to water overuse
and contamination.16 Further, a report initiated by the United
Nations Environment Programme predicts that freshwater short-
age will increase in severity in over two-thirds of the freshwater
systems by 2020.17
At the root of the water crisis are inappropriate economic
incentives for water use18 and insufficient social institutions and
legal frameworks for water management.19 Whether scholars
agree with the trend or not,20 the global community is playing a
significant role in the outcomes of local water scarcity issues.
For example, international aid and development strategies have
increasingly focused on addressing the critical nexus between
global water scarcity and poverty, allocating funds for this prob-
lem at local levels, and further integrating global economic and
political networks with water scarcity issues.21 Additionally, the
UN Millennium Development Goals challenge the world to
decrease by one-half the proportion of people without access to
potable water and sanitation by 2015.22 However, “[w]ater is not
only becoming scarce because of increased demand, but also
because of higher pollution levels and habitat degradation.”23
Worldwide, only five percent of waste water is treated before
entering the receiving fresh water bodies.24 This has resulted in
significant pollution levels in aquatic systems, especially sur-
rounding mega-cities. For example, 200 million liters of raw
sewage and twenty million liters of waste from Delhi are
dumped into the Yamuna River every day.25
Water scarcity problems are also fundamentally due to geo-
graphic and temporal distribution, resulting in excess water in
certain locations at a given time and too little water in other
areas at a given time (see Figure 1). For example, many countries
in sub-Saharan Africa or the Middle East must continually place
water scarcity issues at the top of their policy agendas regardless
of the existence of a current political crisis. In contrast, other
regions struggle to cope with seasonal flooding and storage
issues as well as groundwater intrusion.26
FIGURE 1: GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF PER CAPITA FRESHWATER
RESOURCES
VIRTUAL WATER: RETHINKING A RESOURCE
VIRTUAL WATER ACCOUNTING
Global trade in agricultural and other commodities influ-
ences how water is consumed among countries; however, inter-
national commodity trade has an under-recognized role in
redistributing global water resources. This is especially true for
trade in crops, which often require large quantities of water to
grow. The volume of water that farmers use to grow a crop,
which is not physically embodied in the final product, is dubbed
the crop’s “virtual water” content.27
Table 1 demonstrates how virtual water accounting has been
developed as a useful empirical tool for quantifying the flows of
water between countries as well as explaining the social, economic,
and environmental consequences of the trends. This virtual tool can
even be used to identify valuable policy levers; for instance, spe-
cific crop trading practices that would put undue burden (or pro-
vide relief) in instances of water scarcity. Virtual water accounting
emphasizes the important role of social and political institutions—
in addition to the relative availability of water resources—in deter-
mining how water is used and distributed around the world.28
Source: World Resources 2000-2001, People and Ecosystems: The Fraying Web
of Life, World Resources Institute (WRI), Washington D.C., 2000.
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TABLE 1: GLOBAL VIRTUAL WATER FLOWS BETWEEN NATIONS
BY PRODUCT (ADAPTED FROM HOEKSTRA AND HUNG 2005)
Product % Global Virtual Water Flow
Wheat 30.2
Soybean 17.1
Rice 15.4
Maize 8.9
Raw Sugar 7.2
VIRTUAL WATER CONTENT AND TRADE
Relying on irrigated crops to produce biofuels would signif-
icantly strain global water resources. The global average virtual
water content of wheat, sugar cane, and rapeseed is 1300, 175
and 1600 m3/ton, respectively.29 These crops are generally
grown under rain-fed conditions, but expanding production may
push crops into more marginal areas that require irrigation.
Depending on system configuration, the processing is less water-
intensive but can cause major pollution loads on aquatic sys-
tems, and hence an environmental burden shift to producing
countries.30
International trade in biofuels or in their ingredients will
cause additional virtual water flows, above and beyond existing
crop trade and its impact on global water resources as trade vol-
umes increase. For example, if South Africa increases biofuel
exports it will increase its net virtual water trade deficit. How-
ever, just as water is differentially distributed around the globe,
so is the capacity for countries to increase their production of
biofuels. For instance, the United States and Brazil are currently
the world’s leading ethanol producers. Brazil represents 50 per-
cent of global ethanol exports, exporting primarily to the United
States and India.31 The United States and Brazil are also major
consumers, but their level of trade in ethanol is small relative to
ethanol production levels.32 Interestingly, trade in cane sugar and
maize has not risen along with the ethanol boom. Most likely
this results from subsidies in developed countries favoring
domestic ethanol production. On the other hand, biodiesel repre-
sents an emerging new force in oilseeds trade. For example, a
spike in palm oil exports from Malaysia and Indonesia to the
European Union is most likely attributed to biodiesel demand.
It is forecasted that the commitment of the EU to a 30 per-
cent increase in biofuel use by 2025 will require imports of bio-
fuel feedstock from other countries. Even without considering
the needs of other countries, virtual water flows lead one to
believe that there possibly might be a shortage of available,
arable land to meet the demand created by this target unless sig-
nificant changes in crop selection and cultivation are instituted.
Implementing such changes would require political and techni-
cal exchanges, such as subsidization policy changes and technol-
ogy transfers. Such exchanges have thus far been avoided in the
international arena. Innovations have lead to potential decreases
in water competition. For example, the use of jatropha, a plant
able to grow quite easily in arid regions, has the potential to sig-
nificantly reduce the volume of water resources needed to sus-
tain biofuel production.33 Regardless, water availability will
likely still be a problem.
As shown in Table 1, four of the five crops most responsible
for the global flow of virtual water are also used in the produc-
tion of ethanol and biodiesel. Also, global trade in wheat alone is
responsible for 30 percent of global virtual water flows.34 If the
trade in these commodities is to greatly increase in the future to
meet the growing demand for biofuels it seems more than rea-
sonable to propose an assessment of how this will impact the
water resources in producing and consuming countries. Addi-
tionally, there is the need to address these concerns in the policy
frameworks which will undoubtedly arise around the trade
regimes. New biofuel crops may add themselves to the list of
“top five” virtual water crops, and those crops that are currently
responsible for most of the world’s virtual water trade will con-
tinue to grow in importance. If the global community agrees
that: (1) there is a global water crisis; (2) it is possible to calcu-
late the virtual water flows of agricultural crops; and (3) there is
the desire to maximize our ability as a global community to pro-
duce low-carbon emissions fuels, then such measuring of virtual
water flows is imperative.
FIGURE 2: NET VIRTUAL WATER IMPORTS AROUND THE WORLD
(SOURCE: UNESCO 2006)
THE ROLE VIRTUAL WATER CAN PLAY IN
INTERNATIONAL BIOFUELS POLICY
As trade in biofuels increases, virtual water metrics should be
used to improve global water governance. Achieving integration
in governance systems at the global level is a daunting task, but
one that is necessary to ensure sustainable and equitable futures as
the global community move toward the use and development of
alternative energy sources. Innovative perspectives to this prob-
lem are needed and it would positively serve the global commu-
nity think creatively about the types of governing institutions and
policies that would be capable of addressing linked water scarcity
problems to causes and solutions. Thus far, policy proposals have
addressed virtual water balances and biofuels trade in isolation.
Considering these issues simultaneously could lead to three types
of policy proposals: (1) domestic regulation; (2) international reg-
ulation; and (3) self-regulation within the industry.
Regional virtual water balances and net interregional water flows related to
trade in agricultural projects. Period 1997-2001.
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DOMESTIC REGULATION
A straightforward solution to tackling water-related con-
cerns in biofuel production is regulation at the domestic level.
For example, countries may be able to limit irrigation licenses
depending on water availability or to set regulative priorities for
food over biofuel production when necessary. This strategy will
depend in part on a government’s ability to collaborate with
often powerful agricultural lobbies. Moreover, in many cases the
capacity of a single nation-state to handle water issues is limited
when water crosses national frontiers. For example, more than
thirty percent of all states meet thirty percent or more of their
domestic water needs from sources in neighboring countries.35
Therefore, international agreements are likely needed in many
cases in order to achieve sustainable solutions.
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
International regulation means either modification of cur-
rent international regimes, especially global trade rules, or
developing a specific international water regime able to address
biofuel trade. In the former case, an obvious option is to inte-
grate biofuel trading into existing international trade regimes in
an attempt to harmonize its regulation with other agricultural
and energy-related commodities. Biofuels must first be formally
classified within General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”) framework; however, the lack of commodity classifi-
cation of biofuels may be significant barrier in incorporating of
biofuels into the GATT.36
Additionally, current trade regimes such as the GATT only
consider standards which refer to the traded products them-
selves, without standards regulating the production process. For
example, imports of bottled water can be rejected if the quality
of the bottled water implies health threats. There is no way to
ban imported bottle water from ground water aquifers that are
threatened in terms of water over-use. Modifying current trade
rules to internationalize such environmental and social costs
related to water use for biofuel production could improve the
sustainability of some water systems being used for biofuel pro-
duction. However, suggesting such modifications are easier than
implementing them. Parties to trade agreements must become
aware of the importance of integrating environmental concerns
into trade agreements.   
The development of standards and numerical criteria will
also play a key role in determining not only where within the
GATT biofuels are placed, but how water-related criteria are able
to be applied and how subsidy schedules will need to be adjusted
within and between countries. This is an area where basic and
applied research can significantly improve the global commu-
nity’s ability to address the global trade of biofuels from a virtual
water perspective because the potential trade flows will be more
predictable once standards allow classification.37
Ensuring that trade in biofuels proceeds in a way that maxi-
mizes benefits for those who need them most is critical. The
World Food Programme, a UN organization dedicated to ensur-
ing food security worldwide, has recognized the potential that
trade in agricultural commodities can have for these communi-
ties. Their support of trade as a tool for development is not with-
out reservations, as the achievement of key goals is critical if
trade regimes are to benefit a greater number of countries than
currently. As expressed in a 2002 WFP report:
While there are potential gains from freer trade in farm
products, the actual progress made in the ongoing
negotiations has been limited so far, and the benefits
remain modest. If further liberalization focuses too nar-
rowly on a removal of OECD subsidies, the lion’s share
of gains will accrue to developed country consumers
and taxpayers. More important for developing coun-
tries are: a removal of trade barriers for products in
which they have a comparative advantage and a reduc-
tion or reversal of tariff escalation for processed com-
modities; more and deeper preferential access for the
poorest of the least developed countries; open borders
for long-term foreign investments (FDI); and improved
quality assurance and food safety programmes that
enable developing countries to compete more effi-
ciently in markets abroad. The resources gained by
trade liberalization and reductions in domestic protec-
tion could be channeled into additional development
funding.38
An alternative at the international level to the modification
of existing international rules is to address water distribution
problems through a separate multilateral agreement, such as the
proposal of an “International Virtual Water Trading Council.”39
Such proposals suggest that virtual water council could play a
role in ensuring that the basic nutrition requirements of people
are met through securing food imports and the water saved by
these imports could subsequently be used to meet their basic
water requirements. This entity could act as an independent arm
of the World Trade Organization and coordinate international aid
efforts with its goals.40 This would be a very valuable contribu-
tion to efforts to incorporate virtual water accounting in emerg-
ing biofuel trade regimes, as the assurance of basic food and
water requirements could serve as a foundation for assessing the
capacity for biofuel feedstock cultivation in a given country. In
addition, international compacts or conventions among countries
to agree to reduce “water footprints,” (the extent of water use
internally and externally in relation to consumption) could pro-
vide incentives for countries to create water-efficient trade
regimes for biofuel stocks.41 Such a compact could be loosely
modeled on previous agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol,
which governs countries’ emissions of carbon dioxide.
SELF-REGULATION WITHIN THE INDUSTRY
A final proposal is voluntary self-regulation by the biofuel
industry through greater attention to corporate social responsi-
bility (“CSR”). CSR appears in many forms, including internal
codes of corporate conduct, which serve as important barome-
ters for raising awareness and changing behavior. One CSR
approach is for biofuel companies to establish voluntary water
saving and cost saving standards, and commit to the application
of water-saving irrigation technologies. A second approach is sec-
tor-wide agreements on best management practices among com-
panies, like those existing in the coffee sector. Another approach
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is the creation of general corporate and government adopted
codes that are not specific to particular organizations or indus-
tries, but rather apply to a suite of issues (e.g., the Global Com-
pact or the Coalition of Environmentally Responsible
Economies). These three CSR approaches could establish crite-
ria on water use and re-use including water efficient technology
and pollution prevention made visible to consumers through
product labelling. Additionally, such measures may provoke a
diffusion of sustainable water management measures.
NEED FOR MORE INFORMATION ON GLOBAL WATER
REQUIREMENTS
The above types of policy proposals are complementary and
far from mutually exclusive. Efforts can be made at all levels to
begin to incorporate water-related concerns in trade and devel-
opment policies using virtual water accounting. Common to all
solutions addressing sustainable development of biofuels is the
need for more information on global water requirements. Cur-
rently, significant information exists on global land use competi-
tion between biofuels and food crops and in varying future
scenarios, as does the quantification of global virtual water flows
within and between regions due to trade in food crops and live-
stock.42 The necessity of changing the global distribution of
freshwater resources to meet the needs of the poorest people and
endangered aquatic ecosystems is also well established.43 How-
ever, much of these data are currently reported at a highly aggre-
gated global level and are not directly applicable to particular
countries. Additionally, there are not sufficient data on the trade
(real or potential) in biofuel crops.44 Evaluating these areas is an
important first step for all of the sectors and interests involved,
including those hoping to mainstream biofuel trade, virtually re-
distribute water, and secure resources for impoverished people
and ecosystems. Such an effort should come from the global
community in order to fulfill its own commitments and interests.
However, academics and NGOs may also have a significant role
to play in securing the data and interpreting the information to
promote sustainable global water use. 
CONCLUSION
Virtual water accounting is a useful way to think about, and
empirically assess, the global chain of events that contribute to
particular patterns of water use, scarcity, and the implications of
the production of biofuels. As mentioned above, establishing
causal links in a global chain is difficult to do through thought
experiments, let alone as an empirical exercise. However, virtual
water accounting has been developed as a quantitative tool that
can and should be used as a criterion for trade and development
regimes.
Such quantification is not the end of the story. Virtual water
can give us the “what,” of global water distribution, but it is still
up to us to discover the “why.”45 Underlying political and eco-
nomic conditions may or may not be persuaded by virtual water
methods. Incorporating these values into decision making is a
worthy goal and should be viewed as an opportunity for future
problem solving. It would also be valuable to evaluate not only
the virtual water content of agricultural products, but the whole
production chain for biofuels and how virtual water flows and
distribution may coincide with other resource use such as “vir-
tual land” or “virtual timber.” Ultimately, it should be recognized
that there are externalities to most of the actions we take as indi-
viduals or collectively within market economies and as we con-
tinue to develop new energy sources such as biofuels,
internalizing these externalities at the global level is a difficult
but important task.
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INTRODUCTION
I
n December 2000, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (“FERC”) responded to the rising Western Energy Cri-
sis by issuing an order encouraging local utilities to enter
into long-term contracts, while promising to monitor the market-
based rates (“MBR”) on which
the contracts were based to
ensure that the rates met the
statutory “just and reasonable”
standard.1 The order resulted 
in a pressurized environment
requiring local utilities to hastily
negotiate expensive five-to-ten
year supply contracts or risk hav-
ing to shut down.2 Following sta-
bilization of the western energy
markets, the local utilities peti-
tioned FERC to permit alteration
of their long-term contracts to
obtain lower rates, arguing that
the rates obtained during the cri-
sis were unjust and unreason-
able.3 FERC denied their
petitions and the utilities subse-
quently filed complaints in federal court pursuant to Section
206(a) of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).4 At the end of last year,
the Ninth Circuit issued two opinions that overturned FERC’s
decision and have the potential to significantly influence the way
FERC addresses the aftermath of the Western Energy Crisis.5
In rejecting the utilities’ petition, FERC based its decision
largely on the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.6 Taken together, the
Mobile-Sierra cases establish a presumption that energy con-
tracts are just and reasonable under the FPA, which may be
rebutted by a showing that the contract is against the public
interest.7 Because this presumption is “practically insurmount-
able,”8 FERC’s application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to 
the utilities’ long-term energy contracts made it virtually impos-
sible for the local utilities to overcome the public interest 
presumption. 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT CASES
The Ninth Circuit’s December 2006 companion cases limit
FERC’s application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to the con-
tracts arising from the long-term MBR contracts. In Public Util-
ity District No. 1 of Snohomish County v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“PUD”)
and Public Utilities Commission
v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“PUC”), the court
held that the Mobile-Sierra pre-
sumption comes into play only
when three “prerequisites” exist:
(1) the contract cannot have a
clause that permits unilateral
changes; (2) “the regulatory
scheme in which the contracts
are formed must provide FERC
with an opportunity for effec-
tive, timely review of the con-
tracted rates;” and (3) the just
and reasonable analysis must
include a consideration of the
market conditions at the time of
the MBR contract formation.9
Applying the prerequisites to the MBR contracts, the court
quickly dispatched the first prerequisite and then turned to
examine FERC’s regulatory review.10 By failing to fulfill its
promise to the local utilities to oversee the MBR contracts and
then peremptorily applying the tough Mobile-Sierra presump-
tion, “without any direct inquiry into whether the resulting rates
were in fact ‘just and reasonable,’” FERC committed a “funda-
mental procedural error.”11 The lack of “meaningful opportunity
to institute a challenge” to the rates that the sellers charged the
local utilities before they entered into the disputed contracts con-
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stituted “the fatal flaw in FERC’s approach to ‘oversight’ . . . pre-
clude[ing] timely consideration of sudden market changes and
offer[ing] no protection to purchasers victimized by the abuses
of sellers or dysfunctional market conditions that FERC itself
only notices in hindsight.”12 Next, the court examined market
conditions at the time the con-
tracts were formed and found
fault with FERC’s lack of con-
sideration of the relationship
between the high “spot” market
prices and the pressure brought
to bear on the utilities to enter
into long-term MBR contracts to
obtain lower rates.13
The court also questioned
whether Mobile-Sierra applied
at all. However, if Mobile-Sierra
applies, the Ninth Circuit found
that FERC incorrectly applied
“low-rate” challenge factors to
“high-rate” cases because the public interest in each type is pro-
foundly different.14 In “low-rate” challenges, such as Mobile and
Sierra, the public interest “is in keeping utilities in operation so
that the public is not deprived of services;” whereas in “high-
rate” challenges, the public interest lies in making sure the “pub-
lic pays fair rates for the very energy covered by the challenged
contracts.”15 Therefore, where a contract at issue “imposes any
significant cost on ultimate customers because of a wholesale
rate too high to be within a zone of reasonableness, that contract
affects the public interest.”16 With these new instructions, the
court remanded back to FERC for a determination as to whether
the Mobile-Sierra prerequisites exist, and if so, to consider the
correct “high-rate” public inter-
est factors.17
CONCLUSION
The decisions are likely to
have wide-ranging implications.
For example, close to two hun-
dred MBR contract appeals are
still pending in the Ninth Circuit
and the decisions will likely
induce some cases to settle.18
Taken to the extreme, the deci-
sions might even require FERC
to return to a case-by-case
review of electricity supply con-
tracts.19 The decisions could
also have implications beyond MBR cases: to date, at least one
FERC Administrative Law Judge has applied the PUD/PUC pre-
requisites in a settlement context, finding that the parties’
energy-related agreement violated the third prerequisite because
it did not properly account for potential changes in market con-
ditions.20 However, the full implications of the court’s decisions
have not yet fully materialized.
Taken to the extreme, 
the decisions might 
even require FERC to
return to a case-by-case
review of electricity
supply contracts.
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A
s issues such as the depletion of fossil fuels and climate
change rise to the forefront of modern international
problems, energy law has become increasingly impor-
tant in the modern world. In Energy Law and the Environment,
authors Rosemary Lyster and Adrian Bradbrook paint a detailed
picture of where Australia has been, and where it is headed in its
efforts to adapt its energy policies to suit the needs of its popula-
tion, as well as stave off the
environmental problems that
will result from climate change
and current non-sustainable
energy practices. 
The authors describe an
Australia that is, and will likely
remain, a country heavily
dependent on fossil fuels. Aus-
tralia, rich in coal, will likely
continue to utilize coal as a
majority fuel source for electric-
ity, along with oil. Although
Australia’s federal government has refused to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol, arguing that without the participation of the United
States or developing nations the Protocol will fail and uselessly
jeopardize the Australian economy, the country has a number of
vulnerabilities that will provide strong incentives for change.
Examples of such vulnerabilities include: water resources
already stressed by overuse and increasing salinization; a food
production sector highly sensitive to changes in rainfall;
increased population centers in areas vulnerable to the increased
cyclones and storm surges of a warmed Earth; and sensitive
ecosystems that could be irrevocably harmed or destroyed by cli-
mate change, including the Great Barrier Reef, on which thou-
sands of tourism-related jobs depend. All of these
susceptibilities provide incentives for Australia to make policy
changes. 
Lyster and Bradbrook also describe how Australian energy
law is governed. In addition to describing the reform efforts of
individual states, the authors detail how the federal government’s
role in energy management has evolved over time. The Aus-
tralian Constitution, established in 1900, grants individual states
the right to manage their own natural resources. In the 1970s, as
international law began to pay more attention to environmental
and energy issues, the Australian federal government began leg-
islating definitions for its own environmental powers. For
instance, the Environmental Protection Act of 1974 required all
Commonwealth officers to consider the environmental impact of
their actions. Similarly, the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act
of 1975 gave the federal govern-
ment the authority to federally
regulate the management of the
reef. Slowly, a federal right 
to legislate on environmental 
matters emerged over time, as
confirmed in the case Common-
wealth of Australia v. State of
Tasmania, also known as the
Tasmanian Dams case. In 1993,
after years of constitutional liti-
gation between the states and the
federal government, the federal
and state Australian governments enacted the 1993 Intergovern-
mental Agreement on the Environment, which established areas
of regulatory responsibility, and assigned responsibility for pol-
lution, national energy concerns, and heritage protection through
the Council of Australian Governments (“COAG”), and the Min-
isterial Council on Energy.
As explained in the book, energy supply in Australia tradi-
tionally functioned by means of a state monopoly. As the energy
industry privatized over time, the accompanying legal restructur-
ing focused primarily on issues of competition and fair pricing
rather than environmental sustainability. Even major reforms
enacted as recently as 2005 by COAG to adjust the National
Energy Market (“NEM”) have failed to address climate change
or greenhouse gas emissions. The authors compare Australia’s
efforts to those of other countries, and suggest that a deliberate
pursuit of sustainable and environmentally-friendly policies
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must be taken, because natural competition and market forces
will not push Australia’s energy system in those directions by
themselves. In addition, the authors discuss the concern that
policies adopted by COAG are
technically unconstitutional,
because they are actions taken
outside of normal governmental
processes. Lyster and Bradbook
note that the formation of the
NEM in 1998 was accompanied
by a spike in greenhouse gas
emissions, a clear sign that eco-
nomic efficiency would not
address environmental energy
issues. Although a number of
positive reforms have been
made on a national level to
improve the environmental sus-
tainability of the NEM, such as
a nationally-applicable emis-
sions-trading system, no amend-
ments were added to the
National Electricity Law to ensure achievement of both a
restructured electronic industry and the reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions.
In addition to analyzing the various efforts of the federal
government and state governments to regulate both the electric-
ity and the gas markets, the authors discuss the effectiveness of
such efforts as compared to those of other countries, as well as
the industry response in Australia. Moreover, alternative elec-
tricity options are weighed as well. For example, although Aus-
tralia sits on forty percent of the
world’s uranium reserves,
nuclear power is not an attractive
alternative because the cost of
building nuclear plants: (1)
would not be cost-effective; (2)
creates other waste-related prob-
lems; and (3) might distract
attention away from the coun-
try’s development of solar,
hydro, and wind energy technol-
ogy, for which Australia is a
world leader in some respects.
Ultimately, Lyster and
Bradbook contend that Australia
must pursue a variety of new
energy-creation strategies, as
there will not be one particular
“magic bullet” technology that
will suddenly make Australia’s energy structure environmentally
sustainable. However, a general theme throughout the book is
that sustainability must be made the highest priority for energy
regulation on every governmental level, because without a leg-
islative push, market forces will not take heed of looming envi-
ronmental problems, like climate change, until it is too late.
Although Australia’s
federal government 
has refused to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol, the
country has a number 
of vulnerabilities that 
will provide strong
incentives for change.
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AFRICA
BUDDING BIOFUELS INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa recently joined a partnership with India, the
United States, China, Brazil, and the European Union to explore
the production and development of biofuel options.1 In addition
to its involvement in this alternative energy partnership, the
South African government has approved a “Draft Biofuels
Industry Strategy.”2 The goal of this strategy is for biofuels to
eventually make up 75 percent of South Africa’s renewable
energy supply.3 Maize, sugar, soya beans, sunflowers, and other
similar crops will be harvested to create the biofuels.4 However,
some critics have decried the use of such traditional foods that
are needed for “food security” in South Africa.5 Still, some com-
mentators laud the push for biofuels, suggesting that the biofuel
market will actually increase food security in South Africa.6
Additionally, South Africa hopes that a burgeoning biofuels
industry will create more opportunities for employment.7
The use of biofuels for renewable energy is already occur-
ring in some regions of South Africa. For example, the govern-
ment in South Africa’s Eastern Cape is undertaking a project to
create a biofuel industry in the region.8 The biofuel would be
produced mainly from canola crops, as well as sugarbeet, com-
bined with diesel or ethanol fuels.9 Several billion rands will be
invested in the project to grow the crops and to synthesize the
biofuel.10
AMERICAS
U.S. SUPREME COURT RULES EPA MAY
REGULATE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
In a landmark case on global warming, Massachusetts v.
EPA,11 the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) violated the Clean
Air Act (“CAA”) by failing to regulate greenhouse gases from
motor vehicles.12 In 1999, several groups petitioned the EPA to
“regulate ‘greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles
under § 202 of the [CAA].’”13 After the EPA declined to pursue
the rulemaking, Massachusetts and several other state and local
governments brought suit against the EPA.14
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, began the opinion
by asserting “[a] well-documented rise in global temperatures
has coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.”15 The Court held that the
states did have standing to sue.16 It further reasoned that the EPA
did have the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for
vehicle emissions,17 and by only providing a “laundry list of rea-
sons not to regulate,”18 the EPA violated the CAA’s statutory
mandate.19 The Court additionally ruled that the greenhouse
gases, such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and
hydrofluorocarbons, are air pollutants under the CAA, despite
the EPA’s argument to the contrary.20 The majority held that the
EPA may not decline to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under
the CAA, unless it provides a “reasoned explanation.”21 Chief
Justice Roberts, in a dissenting opinion, lamented that the Court
should have never found standing for Massachusetts and the
other states.22
Environmental groups hope that the opinion will push the
U.S. government into action to support climate change mitiga-
tion measures.23 Even since the Supreme Court decided to hear
the case in mid-2006, there has been an emergence of state and
Congressional plans to curb greenhouse gas emissions.24 Many
industry groups have also sought to create laws to limit green-
house gas emissions.25
ASIA
SINGAPORE TO INVEST IN CLEAN ENERGY
The Singapore government recently announced plans to
invest U.S. $250 million over the next five years in clean
energy.26 The government aims to become a leader in clean
energy—a “global green energy hub”27—with its investment in
clean energy technologies, through research and development
projects.28 It further hopes that its focus on clean energy will
attract groups to Singapore wishing to develop clean energy
projects.29 The clean energy projects, driven in part by the rising
price of fuel,30 will include, for example, solar panels, biofuels,
fuel cells, and wind power.31 Solar power is especially important
for some segments of the Singapore population, and other
Southeast Asians, that live off-the-grid, i.e. in areas that are not
served by traditional power lines.32 Singapore plans to launch
the project by utilizing clean energy in several government
buildings.33 Furthermore, a fuel cell car prototype is already
being tested in Singapore.34
The government plans to carry out its clean energy plans by
attracting businesses to Singapore, investing in domestic clean
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energy research, and by exporting its new technologies glob-
ally.35 Singapore’s push for clean energy technology will also
create over 7,000 new jobs, and in less than ten years account for
approximately 0.6 percent of Singapore’s GDP.36 Singapore’s
decision to heavily invest in green energy technology compares
with worldwide investment of U.S. $63 billion dollars in clean
energy in 2006.37
EUROPE
PORTUGAL LAUNCHES SOLAR
POWER PLANT OPERATIONS
In line with Portugal’s bid to invest in renewable energy
projects,38 the country began operating a major solar power plant
in the southern town of Serpa that will be able to serve 8,000
homes.39 Portugal also plans to build an additional solar power
plant in Moura, a town neighboring Serpa.40 Recognizing the
need to cut down on greenhouse gas emissions, over 77 percent
of the Portuguese population supports the move towards
increased solar power.41
The utilization and acceptance of solar technology signals a
step towards Portugal’s push for renewable energy to make up 45
percent of all of its power usage by 2010;42 an important move as
Portugal’s greenhouse gas emissions have increased almost 37
percent since 1990.43 Portugal also has a regional obligation
because it takes part in the European Union “burden sharing”
agreement, where the EU member States collectively seek to
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol
to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change.44 To fur-
ther reduce their emissions, Portugal is also pursuing other
renewable energy projects such as wind power and biomass
plants.45
MIDDLE EAST
OPEC SUPPORTS EXPLORATION
OF CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(“OPEC”), which includes many countries in the Middle East, as
well as Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia, has indicated
its support of exploration of climate change mitigation options.46
OPEC, which distributes more than one third of the global oil
supply, is interested in exploring new technologies for carbon
capture and storage to help address climate change.47 The organ-
ization wishes, in part, to promote carbon storage technologies
so that it can continue to utilize and export oil and gas resources,
yet help alleviate problems in a future “carbon-constrained envi-
ronment.”48 OPEC’s President, Mohammed al-Hamili, reported
that member countries currently carry out climate change stud-
ies and participate in international talks to find climate change
solutions.49 OPEC’s Secretary General Abdalla el-Badri, stressed
that the organization is committed to the environment and “a
cleaner, safer world.”50 Further, OPEC avowed that it aspires to
stabilize its oil supply without harming the environment.51
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